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Est-ce que, ce qui fait la valeur des pièces, c’est les images qui sont
dessus, ou quoi? ces demoiselles, ces femmes nues ou pas nues, les
couronnes, les écussons? Ou bien les inscriptions peut-être? Ou bien
leurs chiffres, disait-il, les chiffres qu’y met le gouvernement? Les in-
scriptions, on s’en fout, pas vrai? et les chiffres aussi, on s’en fout.
Ça ne serait pas la première fois que le gouvernement vous tromperait
sur la valeur et sur le poids, tout aussi bien qu’un particulier. Deman-
dez seulement à ceux qui s’y connaissent. Le gouvernement vous dit:
”Cette pièce valait tant; eh bien, maintenant elle vaudra tant...“ Ça
s’est vu, ça peut se revoir. C’est moins honnête que Farinet, les gou-
vernements, parce qu’à lui, ce qu’on lui paie, c’est en quoi ses pièces
sont faites et, à eux, c’est ce qui est dessus...
Charles Ferdinand Ramuz1
1Charles Ferdinand Ramuz, Farinet ou la Fausse Monnaie, in: Roman II, Gallimard, Coll.
”Bibliothèque de la Pléiade“, 2005, p. 703.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Money nonneutrality and imperfect common
knowledge
There is wide agreement today in the economics profession about the
role of monetary policy. While economists recognize classical results on the
long-run neutrality of money, they agree, at the same time, on the existence
of real effects of monetary policy in the short-run, as documented by Phillips
(1958). Friedman (1968) was one of the first to express this ambivalent role
of monetary policy:
Monetary policy cannot peg [. . .] real magnitudes at prede-
termined levels. But monetary policy can and does have im-
portant effects on [. . .] real magnitudes. The one is in no way
inconsistent with the other. (p. 11)
However, many economists at that time considered this dual role of
money as paradoxical. For instance, Gurley (1961) parodied the mone-
tary theory of Friedman in these words: “Money is a veil, but when the veil
flutters, real output sputters” (p. 308). Constructing models that simulta-
neously account for the short-run Phillips curve and the long-run money
neutrality, owing to agents’ rationality, has been an important challenge for
economists.
It is easy to understand why monetary policy affects nominal magni-
tudes in an economy. Indeed, classical economic models account for the
1
(long-run) money neutrality. As the Ricardian hypothetical experiment sug-
gests, an announced and fully expected monetary expansion will have a
proportional effect on nominal magnitudes, leaving the real economy unaf-
fected. But it is much harder to understand why variations in the nominal
quantity of money do not immediately yield proportional variations in all
nominal magnitudes such as prices and wages. Economists must think of
some frictions that prevent the private sector from instantaneously reacting
to variations in nominal magnitudes and that could explain the nonneu-
trality of monetary policy observed in reality. To address this issue, two
fundamentally distinct approaches have been considered.
The first approach, initiated by Phelps (1970), postulates that private
agents are not well enough informed about variations in nominal magni-
tudes to fully respond to them. Phelps develops a theory in which the short-
run nonneutrality of money is obtained when transactions are made under
incomplete information. Lucas (1972) formalizes this idea in an economy
where private agents produce output in separate markets and observe the
market-clearing price at which they can sell their own output, but ignore
market-clearing prices realized in other markets. The market-clearing price
in each market depends on both the nominal aggregate level of expenditure
(on all markets) and the relative demand for the particular good produced
in each market. Because of information incompleteness, private agents can-
not disentangle the rationale behind variations in the market-clearing price.
For instance, an increase in nominal aggregate level of expenditure can be
interpreted as an increase in the relative demand for the good produced in
that particular market. As a result, real magnitudes respond positively to
variations in nominal magnitudes in the short run, but not in the long run,
once agents have got enough information to distinguish nominal from real
variations. Lucas underlines that the short-run “Phillips curve emerges not as
an unexplained empirical fact” (p. 122) but is consistent with rational expecta-
tions in each market since economic agents are free of money illusion.
Appealing though the Lucas model may seem, it has been subjected to
some criticisms. In particular, the model does not capture the persistence of
business fluctuations observed in reality. Indeed, according to this model,
variations in nominal magnitudes have a real effect only in the period in
2
which they occur since they become common knowledge1 in the subsequent
period. Attempts to overcome this criticism led economists to consider
richer information structures. For example, Townsend (1983) shows, within
an investment model, how higher-order expectations2 can create an addi-
tional source of persistence in real fluctuations when the economic environ-
ment is characterized by strategic complementarities and heterogeneous in-
formation. This is reminiscent of the beauty contest metaphor by Keynes
(1936):
“[. . .] professional investment may be likened to those news-
paper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out
the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize be-
ing awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corre-
sponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole;
so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he him-
self finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch
the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the
problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing
those which, to the best of ones judgment, are really the pretti-
est, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the
prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote
our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects
the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who
practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” (p. 156)
But models in which decision makers forecast the forecasts of others
were difficult to formalize and to analyze. While Townsend provides a
framework that accounts for higher-order expectations, he shows that solv-
ing his model yields an infinite-dimensional fixed point problem that has
no simple characterized solution. The lack of economic realism of the Lucas
model and the complexity of models based on heterogeneous information
1There is common knowledge of x among a group of agents when all agents in the group
know x, they all know that they know x, they all know that they all know that they know
x, and so on ad infinitum.
2Higher-order expectations are expectations about others’ expectations of some vari-
ables. For instance, the agent i’s first-order expectation of the variable x is its expectation
of the variable itself. The agent i’s second-order expectation of variable x is its expectation
of the average expectation (over all agents) of the variable x, and so on.
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incited economists to devote their attention to another source of monetary
nonneutrality, the time-contingency of price adjustment.
The second approach postulates that real fluctuations in response to nom-
inal variations arise because adjustment and coordination frictions in price
setting prevent private agents to fully respond to variations in nominal mag-
nitudes. This class of models builds on the work of Taylor (1980), Rotemberg
(1982), Calvo (1983), and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). One comparative
advantage of this approach is its technical simplicity: since economic agents
have perfect information, all relevant variables of the economy are common
knowledge among them. In sharp contrast to the incomplete information
model of Phelps-Lucas, money nonneutrality arises here because of agents’
inability to adjust their price in every period (and not because of their in-
complete information about economic fundamentals). A second advantage
of the sticky-price model is that it captures money nonneutrality over many
periods, as long as not all agents have adjusted their price since a monetary
shock has occurred. This model, known as the new Keynesian framework,
has become the workhorse for monetary policy analysis.3 However, sticky-
price models make counterfactual predictions about the effects of monetary
policy. For instance, Ball (1994) shows that sticky-price models predict dis-
inflations to create booms rather than recessions. These models also fail to
capture the substantial delay observed in reality between monetary shocks
and their maximal impact on inflation.4
The lack of empirical plausibility of sticky-price models and new in-
sights into game theory under imperfect common knowledge and hetero-
geneous information have recently given rise to an increase of interest in
incomplete information models. As Woodford (2003a) emphasizes, the “re-
jection of the Phelpsian insight that information imperfections play a crucial role in
the monetary transmission mechanism may have been premature. For the unfortu-
nate predictions [of low persistence] relate to the specific model presented by Lucas
(1972), but not necessarily to alternative versions of the imperfect-information the-
ory.” This revival of interest in imperfect-information models includes the
3See Clarida et al. (1999) for a comprehensive overview of new Keynesian monetary
policy analysis.
4Counterfactual predictions of sticky-price models are more extensively discussed in
chapter 6.
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work of Adam (2006), Hellwig (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Wood-
ford (2003a). All these models depart from the Lucas model in two respects.
First, they allow higher-order expectations to play a crucial role in the de-
cision making of private agents by introducing a monopolistically-competitive
pricing framework. In such environment, optimal prices are strategic com-
plements since each agent sets its price according to its expectation of the
average price set by others. In the Lucas model, the only variable that mat-
ters for private agents – and about which they have imperfect information
– is the current value of exogeneous variables (first-order expectations). As
underlined by Townsend (1983), the introduction of higher-order expecta-
tions in optimal decision making accounts for an additional source of per-
sistence. While observations provide private agents with some insight into
variations of exogeneous variables, these observations provide them with
a more ambiguous picture of the way others may have changed their own
expectations about exogeneous variations, and with an even much more
ambiguous picture of the way others may have changed their own expecta-
tions about expectations of others. In an environment where individual de-
cisions are made according to expectations of both fundamentals and deci-
sions of others (as is the case in monopolistically-competitive price setting),
higher-order expectations are given an essential role in the determination of
aggregate outcomes.
Second, this new class of models departs from the model of Lucas by
questioning the assumption that shocks become common knowledge in the
period subsequent to their occurrence. Such questioning turns out to be a
necessary condition for higher-order expectations to play a crucial role in
optimal decision making. Accounting for higher-order expectations par-
ticularly matters under imperfect common knowledge (when agents have
heterogeneous information). Indeed, under perfect common knowledge, all
first and higher-order expectations are identical (i.e. the law of iterated ex-
pectations is satisfied), which makes the distinction between them totally
superfluous. By contrast, under imperfect common knowledge, higher-
order expectations are order specific and do not collapse to the first-order
expectation (i.e. the law of iterated expectations fails). This is important be-
cause higher-order expectations are slower to adjust in response to shocks as
uncertainty is exacerbated by iterations of one’s expectations about others’
5
beliefs.
Imperfect-information models of this kind offer an explanation not only
for temporary real effects of variations in nominal magnitudes (as the Lu-
cas model), but also for a substantial persistence of real effects over time.
Moreover, these models do not seem to suffer from the same counterfac-
tual predictions as sticky-price models. They typically capture the inertial
and gradual impact of monetary shocks on inflation. Adam (2006), Hellwig
(2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Woodford (2003a) show that their re-
spective model accounts for a considerable delay between the date of an
increase in the monetary base and the maximal impact on inflation. As
emphasized by Woodford (2003a), while these newly developed class of
imperfect-information models tend to rehabilitate the idea of Phelps and
Lucas – that imperfect common knowledge is the source of monetary non-
neutrality – they would not necessarily lead to the same conclusions for the
optimal conduct of monetary policy. For instance, the conclusion derived
from the model of Lucas according to which monetary policy can stabilize
the economy only to the extent that it takes the private sector by surprise
is not generally true in this class of models. Yet, the implications of strate-
gic complementarities under imperfect common knowledge for the optimal
conduct of monetary policy remain largely unexplored.
The main aim of this thesis is to address monetary policy issues in an
economy where money nonneutrality arises because of imperfect common
knowledge and strategic complementarities. In chapter 6, we compare and
discuss the optimal conduct of monetary policy in the sticky-price model
and the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002). We also ad-
dress central bank’s transparency questions in an environment where infor-
mation plays a key role in the determination of the real effects of money
and emphasize the relevance of central bank’s communication for the opti-
mal monetary policy in such a context. Transparency issues seem particu-
larly appealing when information is essential to transmission mechanisms
because it influences the inflation-output gap trade-off.
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1.2 Central bank’s transparency
Over the last decades, there has been a switch in central banks’ practice
from secrecy and opacity to openness and transparency. Generally speak-
ing, central bank’s transparency refers to the absence of asymmetric in-
formation between the central bank and the private sector. This trend to-
wards greater transparency is evident from casual observations and can be
illustrated, for example, by the growing number of publications and dec-
larations of central banks, or by the adoption of an explicit inflation tar-
get (that requires a high standard of transparency) by many central banks.5
The Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial
Policies published by the International Monetary Fund highlights two ra-
tionales for transparency (See IMF (1999)): democratic accountability and
economic benefits.
First, the increase in transparency can be rationalized by the accountabil-
ity required from an independent central bank. Indeed, a central bank that
becomes independent from its government still needs to be democratically
accountable. Some degree of transparency is then a necessary condition for
accountability. This rationale for transparency can be seen as a duty for an
independent central bank. However, the increase in central banks’ trans-
parency has gone beyond the requirement for accountability.
Second, as transparency influences the interaction between the private
sector and the central bank, it is likely to influence the economic outcome.
The central bank may derive economic benefits from being transparent.
Transparency may then be rationalized by central bank’s own interest. Yet,
while the Code of Good Practices issued by the IMF underlines the bene-
fits of transparency, the welfare effect of transparency is much more contro-
versial in the academic literature. For instance, the Lucas model is widely
argued to imply that monetary policy could successfully stabilize the econ-
omy only in the extent that the central bank implements its policy by sur-
prise. Hence, transparency would clearly be suboptimal as stabilization
would no longer be possible. But the effects of transparency are highly sen-
sitive to the specific context.
We propose here a short classification of the numerous arguments in
5See Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) and Poole (2005) for empirical evidence.
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Figure 1.1: Transparency arguments
favour and against transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. We also
briefly discuss the contributions of this thesis in this respect. Figure 1.1 pro-
poses an overview of the different arguments. The literature that deals with
the pros and cons of transparency from the point of view of its potential
economic benefits can be classified into two main groups.
First, most of the literature analyzes the welfare effect of transparency in
the time-inconsistency framework à la Barro and Gordon (1983). This has
been analyzed for example in the pioneer work of Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986). As the central bank is presumed to boost the economy above its nat-
ural level, this literature examines the extent to which transparency helps to
reduce the inflation bias and the time-inconsistency problem and to increase
the credibility and flexibility of the central bank.6
6See Geraats (2002) for an overview.
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Second, a much more recent strand of arguments considers different im-
plications of transparency that are not related to the credibility problem
linked to time-inconsistency. This literature posits that the central bank is
credible and that the private sector perfectly knows its preferences. This
thesis contributes to the debate on transparency when the central bank is
credible. The focus on credible central banks can be motivated by the two
following aspects. First, models where money nonneutrality arises because
of strategic complementarities under imperfect common knowledge pro-
vide an interesting framework to address transparency issue in the case
of credible central banks. Indeed, transparency related questions that one
can address in an environment where information is essential for transmis-
sion mechanisms are much broader than when information is perfect since
communication is crucial for the inflation-output gap trade-off. Addressing
transparency issues in sticky-price models where information is perfect nar-
rows the potential impacts of communication on the economic outcome. In
such a context, one is strongly inclined to examine the effect of transparency
about central bank’s preferences on the time-inconsistency problem. That is
what the literature has mainly focused on. Yet central banks’ communi-
cation in imperfect information models has been much less examined and
deserves more attention. Second, in the current context of central banks’
independence and historically – and durable – low levels of inflation, many
central banks have reached a high degree of credibility. On the one hand, the
benefit of independence from political interferences is nowadays commonly
accepted.7 On the other hand, central bankers are aware that boosting the
output above its natural level would be inflationary and consider that the
assumption of inflationary biased central banks does not capture the actual
rationale for the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, Blinder (1998),
King (1997), and Vickers (1998) argue that the Barro-Gordon argument is
not applicable to their respective central banks.8
We now present the main transparency effects discussed in the litera-
7For example, as politicians gave their opinion about the conduct of monetary policy by
the European Central Bank, its president at that time, Wim Duisenberg, stated that it was
a “normal phenomenon” to observe suggestions from politicians but that “it would be very
abnormal if those suggestions were to be listened to” (The Economist (1998)).
8For a discussion of this issue, see Cukierman (2002). Blinder (2000) also shows that
there is a strong consensus among central bankers about the importance and benefit of
credibility.
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ture and those newly developed in this thesis. We abstract from the trans-
parency debate related to credibility and focus on arguments that apply to
well-established central banks. We present transparency arguments that ac-
count for the distortion in the use of information, the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy, the exacerbation of firms’ response to shocks, and the efficiency
of policy board deliberations.
1.2.1 Distortion in the use of information
A first series of arguments emphasizes that transparency, considered as
the revelation by the central bank of its own estimation of the fundamentals
of the economy,9 may exacerbate market reaction and distort the economic
outcome away from fundamentals.
Overreaction, destabilization, and coordination
In their seminal beauty contest paper, Morris and Shin (2002) argue that,
in an environment characterized by imperfect common knowledge and strate-
gic complementarities, more accurate public information may be detrimen-
tal to welfare because public information is attributed too large a weight
relative to its face value.
This argument is based on two building blocks. First, it emphasizes the
relevance of positive externalities that often characterize financial markets
and macroeconomic environments (i.e. Keynesian beauty contest). Second,
it accounts for different types of information – private vs. public – that are
taken into consideration by each agent according to their predictive power
with respect to fundamentals and expectations of others. While private in-
formation and public information with identical accuracy have an identical
predictive power about fundamentals, public information is much more in-
formative about others’ expectations since it is common knowledge. As a
result, the combination of strategic complementarities and heterogeneous
information gives rise to an overreaction to public information in the sense
that private agents assign a larger weight to public information than what
would be justified by its face value. This overreaction increases with the
9Following Geraats (2002), we call transparency on economic information economic
transparency
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strength of strategic complementarities.
Morris and Shin argue that overreaction to public information may be
detrimental to welfare whenever it is noisy since overreaction to noisy infor-
mation destabilizes the economy. So, they conclude that it might be better,
under some circumstances, to entirely withhold public information.
Their argument has received a great deal of attention in the academic
literature, the financial press10, and central banks11. In a closely related
work, Amato et al. (2002) interpret the model by Morris and Shin (2002)
as a Lucas-Phelps islands economy in which firms try to second-guess the
pricing strategies of their competitors.
However, while Morris and Shin see their own argument as an argument
against transparency, Svensson (2006) underlines that when the central bank
has more accurate information than the private sector (which seems realis-
tic), then the model of Morris and Shin is in favour of rather than against
transparency. Indeed, for transparency in the model of Morris and Shin
to be welfare detrimental, central bank’s information must be less accurate
than private information (which is not realistic). Information of public insti-
tutions (like central banks) is typically more accurate than privately avail-
able information. For instance, in an empirical analysis on US data, Romer
and Romer (2000) show that the Fed better forecasts the output and inflation
than any single commercial bank.12
Nevertheless, Morris et al. (2006) provide a reply to this comment. By
integrating correlated signals in the analysis, they show that the result of
Morris and Shin (2002) still holds even if the public signal is more precise
than private ones. Indeed, with correlated public and private signals, the
public signal provides an additional hint on the errors of private agents; it
will therefore be more strongly taken into account by private agents in their
will to guess the behaviour of others, even for lower levels of relative pre-
cision of the public signal. The conceptual framework developed by Morris
and Shin (2002) thus appears quite robust.
While the debate between Morris and Shin, and Svensson only consid-
ers two extreme cases of disclosure (i.e. full transparency vs. full opacity),
10See The Economist (2004) for instance.
11See for example Kohn (2005) and Issing (2005).
12See also Peek et al. (1999).
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Cornand and Heinemann (2004) show that disclosing information with a
limited degree of publicity is welfare improving. Since overreaction occurs
because public information is common knowledge, reducing the degree of
common knowledge (by limiting the audience) reduces the overreaction
and, thereby, improves welfare. They show that public information should
always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions
not to all agents. Interestingly, reducing the degree of publicity turns out
to be optimal even when central bank’s information is more accurate than
private information for relatively strong strategic complementarities.
Hellwig (2005) analyzes the welfare effects of public information dis-
closures in a model of monopolistic competition among heterogeneously
informed firms. He shows that information heterogeneity leads to poten-
tially important delays in price adjustment and amplifies the real effects
of monetary shocks. Public announcements reduce adjustment delays, but
come at the cost of higher volatility due to informational noise. As we saw
earlier, on this basis, Morris and Shin (2002) have argued that public infor-
mation disclosures may be harmful. In contrast, Hellwig shows that such
announcements always improve welfare because they lead to lower price
dispersion.
The different and contrasting welfare results in Morris and Shin and in
Hellwig (as well as for example in Angeletos and Pavan (2004)) can be rec-
onciled as being the consequence of the extent to which coordination is valu-
able at the social level (compared to economic distortion).13 Public informa-
tion is a double-edged instrument. On the one hand, it helps coordination
between private agents. On the other hand, it may destabilize the economy
when it is rather noisy. As a result, when coordination is socially highly
valuable, as it is the case in Hellwig with microfounded welfare analysis,
transparency is always welfare improving. By contrast, when coordination
is less valuable, as in Morris and Shin, the detrimental destabilizing effect
of transparency may dominate.
Chapter 3 of this thesis – entitled Central Bank’s Action and Communi-
cation – contributes to this ongoing debate about the welfare effect of public
information. While the above mentioned literature considers communica-
13This issue is discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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tion as the sole task of the central bank and ignores that communication
usually goes with a policy action, we account for the action task of the cen-
tral bank. In particular, we analyze whether public disclosure is beneficial
in the conduct of monetary policy when the central bank primarily tries
to stabilize the economy with an instrument that is optimal with respect
to its perhaps mistaken view. In this context, our analysis suggests that
transparency is particularly welfare improving when the central bank ac-
tively shapes the course of the economy with its monetary instrument and
when its information is rather noisy. Transparency is beneficial when central
bank’s information is poorly accurate because the private sector’s reaction
helps reducing the distortion associated with badly suited policies.
Deterioration of the informative value of prices
One line of criticism that can be made to the literature in the vein of Mor-
ris and Shin (2002) and discussed in the previous section is the fact that all
the information considered is exogeneous. Yet a central bank typically influ-
ences the economy in disclosing information, which affects the fundamental
on which the central bank and agents precisely rely to make their decisions.
In a comment on Morris and Shin (2002), Atkeson (2001) firstly criticizes
the lack of a theory of prices linked with the absence of formalized mar-
kets in global games especially applied to currency crises. Atkeson stresses
the role of prices to coordinate actions in decentralized markets: prices ag-
gregate information across individuals and then allow the coordination of
their actions.14 The idea that prices serve as an aggregator of information
goes back to Hayek (1945). In his article “The use of knowledge in society”,
he emphasizes that the price is “an aggregator of the dispersed bits of incomplete
and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess”.
In practice, central banks cannot directly observe some exogeneous aggre-
gate processes driving the state of the economy. Instead, they devote huge
resources to collect data from the economy in order to estimate aggregate
14Relying on this criticism, Tarashev (2003), Hellwig et al. (2006) and Angeletos and
Werning (2006) show that the results of Morris and Shin can be questioned as soon as
prices endogeneously aggregate all the relevant information (i.e. when the market is in-
formatively efficient). Those studies mainly focus on the speculative attack game under
imperfect common knowledge in the line of Morris and Shin (1998) and more precisely on
the key point of multiplicity vs. uniqueness of equilibrium in global games, problem that
is not addressed in this thesis.
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economic outcomes and to understand how close the economy is to capac-
ity. Typically, central banks estimate and forecast the price level to estimate
economic imbalances and to decide which policy to implement. The Infla-
tion Reports of the Bank of England illustrate well the central role of observ-
ing the economic outlook in the conduct of monetary policy (see Bank of
England (2005)). This section discusses the main attempts to account for
the informative value of prices in a context of strategic complementarities
under imperfect common knowledge.
Amato and Shin (2006) emphasize that the central bank entails a dual
role in the economy. First, as noticed earlier, as a policy maker, the central
bank shapes market expectations. Second, the central bank observes the
economy to identify imbalances. While it scrutinizes the economic activity
to estimate the state of the economy it has to respond to, its policy mak-
ing strongly drives economic outcomes. Yet, the more effectively the central
bank shapes the economy, the less reliable becomes the economic outcome
as an indicator for the state of the economy. From this dilemma arises a
trade-off between observing and shaping the economy. Transparency in-
creases the effectiveness of the central bank in shaping market expectations.
But the more effective the central bank has been in manipulating the be-
liefs of the market, the more the central bank will observe its own economic
statement.
The deterioration in predictability of economic imbalances presents some
empirical evidence. It has especially been documented by Tulip (2005) for
the US and by Goodhart (2004) for the UK. For example, Tulip writes: “whereas
the Fed predicted a large share of the fluctuations in output in the 1970s and 1980s,
more recent fluctuations have been surprises”. Central banks face a high uncer-
tainty about the economic conditions. This decline in the precision of central
banks’ forecasts is related to the increase in central banks’ transparency.
Amato and Shin (2006) show in this context that the information value of
prices decreases with increasing strategic complementarities. The stronger
the coordination motive, the stronger the overreaction to central bank’s dis-
closure, and therefore the lower the informative value of prices. Morris and
Shin (2005) develop this intuition furthermore and show that prices do no
more play their role of informational variable.
Chapter 2 of this thesis – entitled Endogeneous Central Bank’s Infor-
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mation and the Optimal Degree of Transparency – analyzes in a different
framework the welfare effect of transparency when the central bank gleans
information about economic imbalances by observing the price level in the
economy. As transparency increases the overreaction of private agents to
central bank’s disclosure, it deteriorates the informative value of prices, the
information quality of the central bank, and, thereby, the precision of cen-
tral bank’s disclosure to which private agents overreact. Interestingly, max-
imal precision of central bank’s disclosure is reached for some limited level
of transparency. That is to say that increasing ambiguity in central bank’s
speech increases its quality since reducing the degree of common knowl-
edge improves the informative value of prices and the precision of informa-
tion the central bank relies on for its disclosure.
1.2.2 Monetary policy effectiveness
A second strand of arguments dealing with transparency relies on the
effectiveness of monetary policy. The link between transparency and mon-
etary policy effectiveness has recently been studied in various ways. Some
studies emphasize the relevance of inflation surprise in the Lucas model or
the role of transparent monetary policy on demand (especially via an arbi-
trage argument between short-term and long-term rates). By contrast, we
insist in this thesis on the role of transparency on price setting by firms.
Stabilization and inflation surprise
Gersbach (2003) and Cukierman (2001) analyze the effect of asymmetric
information about shocks hitting the economy. The particularity of their
approach is to assume that the central bank directly controls inflation and
that it influences the output gap only in the extent that inflation arises as a
surprise (Lucas surprise transmission mechanism). As a result, asymmetric
information about shocks is necessary for the central bank to stabilize them.
If the central bank reveals to the private sector its economic assessment,
the private sector anticipates the inflation response of the central bank and
stabilization is no longer possible.
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Monetary policy effectiveness on demand: overnight to long-term rates
Blinder (1998) and Woodford (2005) emphasize the fact that the cen-
tral bank only controls an overnight interest rate that is irrelevant to eco-
nomic decisions. In an environment where the central bank only controls
an overnight interest rate that is irrelevant for economic decisions, the cen-
tral bank can influence the long-term interest rate and asset prices only in
the extent that it can influence market expectations about future overnight
interest rate. Central bank’s transparency helps to predict future target rates
and therefore increases the effectiveness of monetary policy on the demand
side of the economy. As Woodford points out: “For monetary policy to be most
effective not only do expectations about policy matter, but very little else matters”.
So, managing market expectations plays a key role in the conduct of mone-
tary policy, as “markets can to a large extent ’do the central bank’s work for it’, in
that the actual changes in overnight rates required to achieve the desired changes in
incentives can be much more modest when expected future rates move as well”.
Empirical analysis shows that transparency increases the impact of mon-
etary policy on market expectations and increases its effectiveness. Demi-
ralp and Jorda (2002) emphasize the relevance of central bank’s communi-
cation to manipulate market expectations; they show in particular that the
publication of the instrument rate targeted by the policy board of the Fed
since 1994 has increased the effectiveness of monetary policy in shaping
market expectations.
Monetary policy effectiveness on price setting
While Blinder and Woodford emphasize that transparency increases the
effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing aggregate demand, we em-
phasize in chapter 4 – entitled Can Opacity of a Credible Central Bank Ex-
plain the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the 70s? – that transparency in-
creases the effectiveness of monetary policy on price stabilization.
We derive the optimal monetary policy in an economy where price set-
ting is characterized by strategic complementarities and imperfect common
knowledge. The central bank is fully credible in the sense that it has no in-
flationary bias à la Barro and Gordon (1983) and its preferences are perfectly
known to the private sector. We show that the optimal response of the cen-
tral bank to cost-push shocks is a function of its communication strategy. As
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cost-push shocks create a trade-off between inflation and output gap sta-
bilization, the central bank chooses whether to accommodate the nominal
aggregate demand in order to reduce the negative output gap (at the cost
of higher inflation) or to contract the nominal aggregate demand in order
to fight inflation (at the cost of larger output gap) according to the effective-
ness of its policy to influence inflation and the output gap. When the central
bank is opaque with respect to its instrument, fundamental and strategic
uncertainty of firms about the monetary instrument is high, which reduces
the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize inflation. As a result, when
uncertainty about its instrument is high because of opacity, the central bank
finds it optimal to expand nominal aggregate demand in response to posi-
tive cost-push shocks.
Our result suggests that the lack of central bank’s credibility is not a nec-
essary condition to explain the excess inflation of the 70s. While most of
the literature comments on excess inflation as the result of the permanent
inflation bias resulting from time-inconsistency, we propose an alternative
view according to which opacity (and not incredibility) could be made ac-
countable for excess inflation. We emphasize that our analysis is robust to
the criticisms against the Barro-Gordon argument made by Blinder (1998),
Friedman and Kuttner (1996), McCallum (1997), and Taylor (1983).
1.2.3 Exacerbation of response to shocks
In chapter 5 – entitled Monetary Policy and its Informative Value – we
present another argument against economic transparency about cost-push
shocks. As cost-push shocks create a trade-off between inflation and output
gap stabilization, they inevitably generate losses. We underline here that
the resulting loss depends on the strength of firms’ reaction. When price
setting is characterized by strategic complementarities, firms set their price
not only according to the own expectations of cost-push shocks but also
to their expectations about others’ expectations of shocks. The response of
each firm depends not only on how each firm is affected by cost-push shocks
but also on how each firm expects others to be affected. Transparency about
cost-push shocks reduces uncertainty and increases firms’ response to them,
which turns out to be welfare detrimental. In this context, transparency
does not reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize shocks but
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exacerbates firms’ response to them.15
1.2.4 Efficiency of policy board deliberations
Another argument that is perhaps less related to others underlines the
impact of transparency with respect to the minutes of deliberations of the
policy board on the quality of deliberations. One of the major recent trends
in central banking practice has been the formal adoption of decision-making
by Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) rather than by individual central
bank heads.16 Is such an evolution beneficial in a context where the delib-
erations of the committees are made public? This issue has recently been
under discussion.
In an experiment, Blinder and Morgan (2005) argue that diversification
pays off in the form of better decisions. Therefore an individualistic commit-
tee, which takes full advantage of the committee’s diversity, would seem to
have a clear edge over a collegial committee, which exploits diversity much
less.
However, Meade and Stasavage (2004) show that since the Fed has pub-
lished the minutes of deliberations, members of the policy board are much
less inclined to reveal their opinions contradicting the position of the chair-
man. Policy board members avoid expressing their opinions that deviate
from the majority since deliberations are made public. And as pointed by
Blinder and Wyplosz (2005) (p. 11), several voices potentially create con-
fusion: “The danger arises if an individualistic committee is undisciplined and
speaks with too many voices, especially if those disparate voices carry conflicting
messages. In that case, central bank’s transparency can degenerate into central bank
cacophony, leaving outside observers more befuddled than enlightened”. These ar-
guments are clearly against transparency.
15This mechanism is also present in Walsh (2005).
16However, committee structures remain highly various. Blinder et al. (2001) provide a
detailed typology of these committees. They especially distinguish collegial committees,
where decision is made by consensus from individualistic MPCs (e.g., the Bank of Eng-
land), where each member not only expresses his opinion verbally but also acts by voting;
in such a case, unanimity is not necessary. There is also a variety of collegial commit-
tees, with two polar cases being the “autocratically-collegial MPC” where the chairman
dictates the consensus and the “genuinely collegial MPC” where members argue for their
own points but finally compromise on a group decision. The Federal Reserve System is a
good example of the former, while the European System of Central Banks can represent the
latter.
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One observation that contradicts the former argument is that the talk
that emanates from the Bank of England’s MPC – and which is the expres-
sion of many voices17 – does seem to inform markets much more than it
confuses them.
1.3 Summary
This thesis addresses different issues of monetary policy when transmis-
sion mechanisms are characterized by strategic complementarities in firms’
price setting and imperfect common knowledge. This focus is motivated
by the appealing dynamic properties of this class of models18 and by the
crucial role that communication plays when money nonneutrality arises be-
cause of imperfect information. Appendix 1.A presents the microeconomic
derivation of the pricing rule in an economy characterized by monopolistic
competition. This pricing rule, linked to heterogeneous information, is the
fundamental equation our work relies on. In this section, we summarize the
chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Endogeneous Central Bank’s Information and the Optimal
Degree of Transparency This chapter accounts for the fact that the central
bank, in practice, cannot directly observe some exogeneous aggregate pro-
cesses driving the state of the economy. Instead, it devotes huge resources
to glean information about economic imbalances from the economy itself
in order to estimate how close the economy is to capacity. Typically, the
central bank estimates and forecasts the price level to identify economic im-
balances and to decide which policy to implement. Most of the literature,
however, assumes that the central bank has an exogeneous source of in-
formation about fundamental shocks, which implies that its information is
independent from its policy.
17Indeed, the Bank of England publishes the minutes (of MPC discussions) where differ-
ences in opinions are an essential part of the information that should be conveyed to the
markets.
18These properties have been emphasized by Adam (2006), Mankiw and Reis (2002),
and Woodford (2003a). See chapter 6 for a discussion on the counterfactual predictions of
sticky-price models and the dynamic properties of the sticky-information model of Mankiw
and Reis (2002).
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Considering the fact that the central bank observes the economy to col-
lect information entails a dual role for the central bank. As a policy maker,
a central bank is both an observer and a shaper of the economy. While it
scrutinizes the economic activity to estimate the state of the economy it has
to respond to, its policy making strongly shapes economic outcomes. Yet,
the more effectively the central bank shapes the economy, the less reliable
become economic outcomes as indicators for the state of the economy. Since
transparency deteriorates the accuracy of central bank’s information, the so-
cial value of central bank’s disclosure is questionable. This chapter presents
a simple model that captures the endogeneous nature of central bank’s in-
formation and addresses welfare issues. While Morris and Shin (2002) un-
derline that transparency generates overreaction to public disclosure, our
model with endogeneous information highlights that transparency also re-
duces the accuracy of central bank’s disclosure to which private agents over-
react. Transparency does not only raise the weight assigned to higher-order
expectation as in Morris and Shin, but also deteriorates the accuracy of first-
order (and higher-order) expectations. Interestingly, minimizing the am-
biguity of central bank’s disclosure does not maximize the precision of its
disclosure. It is shown that accounting for the endogeneity of information
reduces the optimal degree of central bank’s transparency.
Chapter 3: Central Bank’s Action and Communication This chapter
also contributes to the ongoing debate about the welfare effect of public in-
formation. In an environment characterized by imperfect common knowl-
edge and strategic complementarities, Morris and Shin (2002) argue that
noisy public information may be detrimental to welfare because public in-
formation is attributed too large a weight relative to its face value since it
serves as a focal point. This argument considers communication as the sole
task of the central bank and ignores that communication usually goes with
a policy action. This chapter accounts for the action task of the central bank
and analyzes whether public disclosure is beneficial in the conduct of mon-
etary policy when the central bank primarily tries to stabilize the economy
with an instrument that is optimal with respect to its perhaps mistaken view.
In this context, transparency is particularly beneficial when central bank’s
information is poorly accurate because it helps reducing the distortion as-
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sociated with badly suited policies.
Chapter 4: Can Opacity of a Credible Central Bank Explain the Con-
duct of Monetary Policy in the 70s? While the high inflation episode of
the 70s is usually rationalized by the Barro and Gordon (1983) argument,
this chapter provides an alternative explanation: the opacity of a credible
central bank with respect to its monetary instrument.19 In a monopolistic
competitive economy under imperfect common knowledge, where the cen-
tral bank has no inflationary bias, the effectiveness of monetary policy to in-
fluence the price level depends on the central bank’s disclosure regime. Un-
der opacity, as the fundamental and strategic uncertainty of firms about the
monetary instrument strongly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy
on the price level, the central bank may find it optimal to stabilize the output
gap by expanding the nominal aggregate demand in response to cost-push
shocks. This suggests that the central bank’s desire to push output above its
natural level is not a necessary condition for the expanding monetary policy
of the 70s.
Chapter 5: Monetary Policy and its Informative Value This chapter
analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the conduct of
monetary policy.20 We propose a model of monopolistic competition with
imperfect common knowledge on the shocks affecting the economy (de-
mand and cost-push shocks) where the central bank has no inflationary bias.
By contrast to chapter 4, the monetary instrument is common knowledge
among firms. But since the economy is affected by two types of shocks,
firms are uncertain about the rationale behind the instrument implemented
by the central bank. Transparency removes this uncertainty by revealing
to firms the central bank’s economic assessment. In this context, monetary
policy entails a dual role. The instrument of the central bank is both an ac-
tion that stabilizes the economy and a public signal that partially reveals to
firms the central bank’s assessment of the state of the economy. Yet, firms
are unable to perfectly disentangle the central bank’s signals responsible for
the instrument and the central bank optimally balances the action and infor-
mation purposes of its instrument. We derive the optimal monetary policy
19This chapter has been developed in collaboration with Camille Cornand.
20This chapter has been developed in collaboration with Camille Cornand.
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and the optimal central bank’s disclosure. We define transparency as an an-
nouncement by the central bank that allows firms to identify the rationale
behind the instrument. It turns out that transparency is welfare increasing
(i) when the degree of strategic complementarities is low, (ii) when the econ-
omy is not too affected by cost-push shocks, (iii) when the central bank is
more inclined towards price stabilization, (iv) when firms have relatively
precise private information, and (v) when the central bank’s information is
relatively precise on demand shocks and relatively imprecise on cost-push
shocks. These results rationalize the increase in transparency in the current
context of relative low sensitivity of the economy to cost-push shocks and
of strong central bank’s preference for price stability.
Chapter 6: Sticky Information and Monetary Policy This chapter com-
pares monetary policy with sticky-price (Calvo (1983)) and sticky-information
(Mankiw and Reis (2002)) Phillips curve for a central bank adopting an infla-
tion target. We discuss the dynamic properties of both models in response to
monetary shocks and address the extent to which cost-push shocks have a
gradual and delayed impact on inflation in the sticky-information economy.
While current inflation depends on current expectations about future in-
flation in the sticky-price economy, it is past expectations about current in-
flation that matter for current inflation in the sticky-information economy.
This feature has strong implication for the optimal targeting rule. Under
commitment, the targeting rule is history-dependent with sticky price but
forward-looking with sticky information. As a result, commitment in the
sticky-information economy does not imply price stationarity. We under-
line that, when information is sticky, the central bank must wait that in-
formation spreads through the population to benefit from the commitment
policy. This sharply contrasts with the sticky-price economy where the cen-
tral bank reaps benefit from commitment in the initial periods.
Interestingly, in response to cost-push shocks, the central bank of the
sticky-information economy first slightly expands the output gap as long
as information dissemination is low, and then fights inflation by strongly
contracting the output gap once information dissemination is high. This re-
sult recalls the conclusions of chapter 4 according to which less information
yields accommodating policy response.
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1.A Microfoundations
The model is derived from an economy populated by a representative
household, a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms21, and a central
bank. Two types of stochastic shocks can potentially hit the economy, de-
mand and mark-up (or cost-push) shocks. Nominal aggregate demand is
determined by both the demand shock and the monetary instrument set by
the central bank. The baseline framework is close to Adam (2006).
Representative household
The representative household chooses its aggregate composite good C
and labor supply H in order to maximize its utility subject to its budget
constraint,
gU(C) − V (H)
s.t. WH + Π = PC.
The parameter g is a stochastic demand shock with E(g) = 1, that induces
variations in the nominal aggregate demand. The utility function has the
following usual properties: U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, limC→∞ U
′(C) = 0, V ′ > 0,
V ′′ < 0, and V ′(0) < U ′(0). C is the composite good defined by the Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator
C =
[ ∫ 1
0
(Ci)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
where θ > 1 is the parameter of price elasticity of demand and where Ci
is the good produced by firm i. θ is stochastic with E(θ) = θ̄ and induces
variations in the desired mark-up of firms. W denotes the competitive wage
and Π the profits the household gets from firms. P is the appropriate price
index which solves PC =
∫ 1
0
PiCidi and satisfies
P =
[ ∫ 1
0
P 1−θi di
] 1
1−θ
.
Given the overall level of consumption, the household allocates its ex-
21See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
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penditure across goods according to
Ci =
(Pi
P
)−θ
C (1.1)
and optimizing the consumption-labor decision leads to the real wage
W
P
=
V ′(H)
gU ′(C)
. (1.2)
Firms
Each firm i produces a single differentiated good Ci with one unit of
labor Hi according to the simple production function
Hi = Ci. (1.3)
The profit maximization problem of firm i is given by
max
Pi
E[PiCi(Pi) − WHi(Pi)|Ii], (1.4)
where Ii is the information set of firm i. Using (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3), the
first-order condition of (1.4) becomes
E
[
(1 − θ)
(Pi
P
)−θ
+ θ
(Pi
P
)−θ−1 V ′(C)
gU ′(C)
|Ii
]
= 0. (1.5)
Linearizing (1.5) around the steady state delivers
pi = Ei[p + ξc + u], (1.6)
where small letters indicate percentage deviation from the steady state and
where
ξ = −
U ′′(C̄)C̄
U ′(C̄)
+
V ′′(C̄)C̄
V ′(C̄)
(1.7)
u =
1
1 − θ̄
θ − θ̄
θ̄
.
C̄ and θ̄ are the real output and the price elasticity of demand at their steady
state level, respectively.
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The pricing rule (1.6) states that firms set their price as a function of their
expectations of the overall price level p, the real output gap c, and the mark-
up shock u. This captures the strategic complementarity of price setting as
the price level is the average price set by all firms. Each firm sets its own
price according its expectation about the price of others.
The parameter ξ determines the extent to which the optimal price re-
sponds to the output gap. Prices strongly respond to the output gap when
the competitive real wage (and thereby the costs) is highly sensitive to the
output gap. This occurs when ξ is large. As expression (1.7) indicates, the
coefficient ξ is large when the household’s utility to consume is rather con-
cave and its disutility to work is rather convex. The real wage required for
additional production is high since the household derives a low utility from
additional consumption while it suffers a high disutility from additional
work. As a result, firms strongly adjust their price in response to expected
output gap variations since the latter strongly affect the real wage. We call
“weakly extensive” an economy with a high value of ξ and “highly exten-
sive” an economy with a low value of ξ.
In this context, ξ also determines whether prices are strategic comple-
ments or substitutes. Using the fact that the nominal aggregate demand
(deviation) y can be expressed as y = c + p, we rewrite the pricing rule (1.6)
as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξy + u].
In the whole thesis, we realistically assume that prices are strategic comple-
ments, i.e. 0 < ξ ≤ 1.
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Chapter 2
Endogeneous Central Bank’s
Information and the Optimal
Degree of Transparency
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, the conduct of monetary policy has been charac-
terized by the two following stylized facts: the increase in central bank’s
transparency and the deterioration of the accuracy of central bank’s infor-
mation. First, the increase in central bank’s transparency is evident from
casual observations. This can be illustrated by the increasing number of
publications of central banks with respect to their monetary policy or by the
adoption of an explicit inflation target by many central banks. Second, there
is some empirical evidence of a deterioration of central bank’s information.
This feature has been documented by Tulip (2005) for the US and by Good-
hart (2004) for the UK. For instance, Tulip concludes that “whereas the Fed
predicted a large share of the fluctuations in output in the 1970s and 1980s, more
recent fluctuations have been surprises.” The output growth forecast published
by the Bank of England also highlights the high uncertainty surrounding
economic conditions. The output growth forecast reported in May 2006 on
figure 2.1 reveals that assessments of the Bank of England even of the very
next future are highly imprecise.1
1See also Geithner (2006) for a general discussion on central bank’s uncertainty and
transparency.
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Figure 2.1: Output growth forecast of the Bank of England
This chapter argues that the increase in central bank’s transparency can
be made accountable for the deterioration of central bank’s information. In
particular, we emphasize that the accuracy of central bank’s information is
endogeneous in the sense that it is a function of its disclosure strategy. The
aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we develop a simple model with strate-
gic complementarities under imperfect common knowledge that captures
the endogeneous nature of central bank’s information. Second, we address
welfare issues of transparency in this context and derive the optimal disclo-
sure strategy of the central bank.
First, the endogeneity of information arises from the dual role of the cen-
tral bank in the economy: it is both an observer and a shaper of the economy.
On the one hand, for optimizing its policy making, the central bank gleans
information about economic conditions by scrutinizing market outcomes to
identify shocks. The central bank learns from market expectations. In prac-
tice, a central bank cannot directly observe some exogeneous aggregate pro-
cesses driving the state of the economy. Instead, it devotes huge resources to
collect data from economic agents’ behaviour in order to estimate aggregate
economic outcomes and to understand how close the economy is to capac-
ity. Typically, a central bank forecasts the price level to estimate economic
imbalances and to decide which policy to implement. The Inflation Reports of
the Bank of England well illustrate the role of observing the economic out-
look in the conduct of monetary policy. In a prominent article, Hayek (1945)
emphasizes the informational role of prices and argues that prices are not
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just an exchange rate between goods but also an information aggregator.
He points out that prices determined by decentralized markets provide an
essential source of information since they aggregate the “dispersed bits of in-
complete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
possess”. More recently, Hetzel (1992) argues that gleaning information form
private markets may help the central bank to conduct monetary policy. As
public’s inflation forecast may help a central bank, he calls for issuing both
nominal and inflation-indexed bonds that would provide “a useful ’outside’
assessment of the inflationary consequences thought likely to follow from its policy
actions” (p. 13).
On the other hand, by implementing its policy, the central bank influ-
ences the economic outcome and particularly the private sector’s expecta-
tions. Indeed, shaping market expectations plays a key role in the conduct
of monetary policy. As pointed out by Woodford (2005), “for [monetary pol-
icy to be most effective] not only do expectations about policy matter, but [. . .] very
little else matters.” While a central bank observes the aggregate economy to
conduct its policy, it also shapes the economic outcomes.
From this ambivalent central bank’s role – as an observer and as a shaper
– may arise a dilemma for the conduct of monetary policy that has been
documented by Amato and Shin (2006) and Morris and Shin (2005).2 In-
deed, the more successfully a central bank influences market expectations,
the less reliable become economic outcomes as indicators for the state of the
economy. While economic outcomes would reflect the true state of the econ-
omy in the absence of central bank’s interventions (while the central bank
is an observer only), they also partly reflect the central bank’s beliefs as the
central bank intervenes in the economic development. As soon as central
bank’s beliefs differ from the true state of the economy because of estima-
tion or forecast errors, economic outcomes may also reflect the mistaken
central bank’s view. Since the central bank ignores its own errors, it cannot
disentangle the state of the economy from its observation. The disclosure
2This ambivalent role of the central bank is already present in Bernanke and Woodford
(1997) who address the issue of existence and uniqueness of rational expectation equilib-
rium when the central bank observes and responds to private sector’s forecasts. In par-
ticular, they show that a central bank cannot at the same time infer the value of the state
variable from observing private-sector forecasts and fully stabilize the economy. This arises
because “if inflation equals the target in equilibrium, then the information of the private forecasters
is not revealed” (p. 669).
28
strategy of the central bank gives rise to a trade-off between the quality of
central bank’s information and the effectiveness of its policy. In an empir-
ical analysis on US data, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that with
increasing transparency “markets attach more importance to the statement and
the balance-of-risk assessments at FOMC meetings and less importance to news
about macroeconomic fundamentals.” They also conclude that they “believe that
the reaction of financial markets to the release of macroeconomic fundamentals can
be an important source of information for the central bank about the markets’ di-
verse and possible deviating views. Under its new disclosure policy, the Federal
Reserve has less such information available” (p. 9). This chapter provides a
simple framework accounting for this feature.
Second, this chapter contributes to the ongoing debate on the welfare
effect of central bank’s transparency and puts forward the deterioration of
central bank’s information and disclosure as a potential detrimental effect.
This argument is intertwined with that of Morris and Shin (2002) (hereafter
M-S). In their seminal beauty contest paper with exogeneous information,
the latter highlight the potentially detrimental effect of noisy public infor-
mation since private agents overreact to the public signal. In an environ-
ment of strategic complementarities, central bank’s disclosure is given too
large a weight relative to what would be justified by its face value because
it serves as a focal point. Indeed, as the strength of the coordination mo-
tive increases, agents attribute to their expectations about expectations of
others a larger weight. Since higher-order expectations are mainly driven
by the public disclosure, the increasing weight assigned to higher-order ex-
pectations exacerbates the response to disclosure and may destabilize the
economy. In this context, reducing the degree of transparency is welfare
improving as it reduces the degree of common knowledge of the disclosure
and thereby the weight assigned to it in higher-order expectations. This co-
ordination channel also arises in our model with endogeneous information.
Yet, in addition to it, our model with endogeneous information addresses
the detrimental effect of transparency on the accuracy of central bank’s dis-
closure and thereby of firms’ information. With endogeneity, transparency
also influences first-order expectations by reducing the accuracy of firms’
information. While the coordination channel of M-S focuses on the exces-
sive weight assigned to disclosure in higher-order expectations, our preci-
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sion channel shows that transparency reduces the accuracy of both first and
higher-order expectations. (Indeed, even the precision of the first-order ex-
pectation deteriorates as the degree of common knowledge of the central
bank’s disclosure becomes larger.) Both coordination and precision chan-
nels are intertwined since transparency reduces the precision of disclosure
in the extent that agents overreact to it because of the coordination motive.
Overall, accounting for the endogeneity of information reinforces the detri-
mental effect of transparency. Our analysis thus shows that the model with
endogeneous information always calls for a lower degree of transparency
than the model with exogeneous information.
Section 2.2 describes the economy. It is mainly characterized by imper-
fect common knowledge and the existence of strategic complementarities
in pricing decision of firms. Section 2.3 presents the model under exoge-
neous central bank’s information and replicates as a benchmark the anal-
ysis of M-S. Section 2.4 derives the model with endogeneous information
and discusses the effect of transparency on central bank’s information and
disclosure. It also compares the optimal degree of transparency under both
information regimes and shows that endogeneous information requires a
lower degree of transparency. While sections 2.3 and 2.4 address the wel-
fare effect of transparency for a broad class of welfare functions, section 2.5
focuses on microfounded welfare that highly weights coordination at the
social level. Finally section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The economy
The economy is populated by a representative household, a continuum of
monopolistic competitive firms, and a central bank. The economy is affected
by demand shocks. The microfounded market interactions are described in
the appendix 1.A of chapter 1.
2.2.1 Firms
The central equation of our model is given by the optimal pricing rule of
firms. This is derived from an economy where the representative household
consumes a composite good à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and where goods
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are imperfect substitutes. In such a context, the optimal price set by firm i is
pi = Ei[p + ξc], (2.1)
where Ei is the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its information,
p is the overall price level, and c is the real output gap. The pricing rule
(2.1) says that each firm sets its price according to both its own belief about
the real output gap and its belief about the overall price level. We assume
that the nominal aggregate demand defined as y = c + p is determined by a
stochastic demand shock g ∈ R. So, one can write the pricing rule as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξg]. (2.2)
The parameter ξ captures the impact of the real output gap on prices (through
wages). A large ξ means that the representative household is highly risk
averse and that output gaps imply large variations in wages and thereby in
prices. ξ also describes whether prices are strategic complements or sub-
stitutes. We shall assume in this thesis that 0 < ξ < 1, which implies that
prices are strategic complements, meaning that firms tend to raise their price
whenever they expect the others to do so. This assumption seems very nat-
ural and captures the concept of beauty contest introduced by Keynes: firms
base their decision not only on their own expectations of fundamentals but
also on the so-called higher-order expectations, i.e. expectations of the aver-
age expectations of fundamentals, up to an infinite number of iterations.
Substituting successively the average price level with higher-order ex-
pectations about the demand shock, the pricing rule becomes
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξg] (2.3)
= Ei
[
ξg + (1 − ξ)
[
Ē[ξg + (1 − ξ)[Ē[ξg + . . .]]]
]]
.
This chapter considers an economy under imperfect common knowledge
where firms have differential information. With heterogeneous information,
the law of iterated expectations fails and expectations of higher-order do not
collapse to the average expectation of degree one.3 This yields the pricing
3See Morris and Shin (2002).
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rule
pi = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)kEi
[
Ē
(k)(g)
]
,
and averaging over firms, we get
p = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ē
(k+1)(g)
]
, (2.4)
where k is the degree of higher-order iteration, Ē is the population average
expectation operator such that Ē(.) =
∫
i
Ei(.)di, and we use the following
notation of higher-order expectations: Ē(0)(x) = x is the expected variable
x itself, Ē(1)(x) = Ē(x) is the average expectation of x, Ē(2)(x) = ĒĒ(1)(x) =
ĒĒ(x) is the average expectation of the average expectation of x, and so on.
2.2.2 Welfare
One can show that in an economy characterized by imperfect competi-
tion, the welfare of the representative household is decreasing in both the
dispersion of prices across firms
∫
i
(pi−p)
2di and the variability of the output
gap c = y − p. So, we define the social loss as
L =
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di + λ(g − p)2, (2.5)
where λ is the weight assigned to the output gap variability. The welfare
function used in the transparency debate of M-S is a matter of controversy
since the detrimental effect of transparency is driven by the relative rele-
vance of coordination and stabilization at the social level. The application
of the M-S argument to different welfare functions may lead to different
conclusions. For example, Hellwig (2005) and Woodford (2005) show that
when coordination is socially highly valuable, transparency is welfare im-
proving as it helps coordinating firms’ price setting. In their model, the
potential destabilizing effect of transparency is neglected. The welfare func-
tion (2.5) is generic since the coefficient λ describes the relative importance
of coordination for the society as a whole.
We leave λ unrestricted (free from other parameters) in sections 2.3 and
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2.4 in order to discuss the argument of M-S in an environment where coor-
dination is socially not very valuable and to emphasize the effect of endoge-
neous information in this context. We show in section 2.3.3 that the welfare
in M-S given by −
∫
i
(pi − g)
2di can be expressed by (2.5) with the parameter
λ = 1. This means that the welfare in M-S equally weights coordination and
stabilization at the social level.
Then, in section 2.5, following Hellwig (2005) and Woodford (2005) we
consider the welfare function that is consistent with a microfounded econ-
omy. Adam (2006) derives the microfounded welfare of the representative
household and shows that the weight assigned to output gap stabilization
is given by λ = ξ
θ
, where θ > 1 is the degree of substitutability in the Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator. Since 0 < ξ < 1, the weight λ is typically much smaller
in the microfounded welfare function than in the analysis of M-S.
2.2.3 The central bank
The central bank discloses information to firms about the fundamental
demand shock g. We will discuss the welfare effect of the central bank’s
disclosure in two different informational contexts.
First, we consider the case where the central bank directly observes the
stochastic demand shock g with some noise. The precision of central bank’s
information is then exogeneously determined (section 2.3).
Second, we assume that the central bank cannot directly observe the de-
mand shock g but watches instead the economic activity to estimate the state
of the economy. In this case, we show that the precision of central bank’s in-
formation is endogeneous as it depends upon its disclosure policy (section
2.4).
2.3 Exogeneous central bank’s information
This section analyzes the welfare effect of central bank’s disclosure when
the central bank has a direct source of information about the demand shock.
The aim of this section is to illustrate the much debated result by M-S where
central bank’s information is exogeneous. The present section must be seen
as a benchmark case that replicates the results by M-S in a slightly less styl-
33
ized context and allows a better suited comparison.
We describe the information structure and derive the equilibrium. Then,
we discuss the optimal information disclosure first when the central bank
chooses between full transparency and full opacity (i.e. the central bank ei-
ther perfectly reveals its opinion or totally withholds it), and second when
the central bank can choose its optimal degree of transparency (i.e. the cen-
tral bank speaks with some ambiguity).
2.3.1 Information structure
Firms’ information
To make its pricing decision, each firm receives two signals. First, each
firm gets a private signal about the demand shock. The private signal is
centred on the true value of g and has a normally distributed error term:
gi = g + εi with εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε),
where εi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
Second, the central bank provides firms with its viewpoint about the de-
mand shock. The central bank communicates its information D with more
or less ambiguity. We capture this ambiguity with the transparency of its
disclosure. For the sake of generality, we write the signal disclosed by the
central bank and received by firm i as
Di = D + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
The dispersion of individual noises σ2φ determines the degree of transparency
of the central bank. Under transparency, every firm gets the same univocal
signal (σ2φ = 0). Then, the central bank’s information D is a public sig-
nal that is common knowledge among firms. Under opacity, the individual
signal got by each firm has an infinite idiosyncratic noise (σ2φ → ∞). The
central bank’s information thus does not contain any valuable information.
One can imagine any intermediate situation where the central bank pro-
vides firms with more or less equivocal information.
The introduction of idiosyncratic noise in central bank’s disclosure re-
duces its degree of common knowledge among firms. Heinemann and
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Illing (2002) address the issue of central bank disclosing information to ev-
ery agent in private but within a game of speculative attack. Cornand and
Heinemann (2004) propose another disclosure strategy that also reduces the
degree of common knowledge: the disclosure of a public signal D to a frac-
tion S of firms. The disclosure D thus becomes semi-public as the fraction
1 − S of firms does not receive it but only gets its private signal gi.
4 Ap-
pendix 2.B shows that both disclosure strategies – i.e. limited transparency
vs. limited publicity – are strictly equivalent in terms of welfare. More pre-
cisely, this appendix shows that the equivalence relationship between the
degree of transparency σ2φ and the degree of publicity S is given by
σ2φ =
1 − S
S
(σ2ε + σ
2
η) or S =
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
In the remainder of the chapter, we will however only address the question
of optimal degree of transparency.
Central bank’s information
The central bank imperfectly observes the demand shock: it receives a
signal on the demand shock that is centred on its true value and contains an
error term:
D = g + η with η ∼ N(0, σ2η).
Note that the precision of central bank’s information is exogeneously deter-
mined. Figure 2.2 illustrates the informational structure discussed in this
section.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
This section derives the perfect Bayesian equilibrium behaviour of firms.
To determine the optimal price rule (2.4), we build the first and higher-order
expectations of firm i about the demand shock g conditional on its informa-
4Some other way to disclose fragmented information is introduced in Morris and Shin
(2006).
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Figure 2.2: Exogeneous central bank’s information
tion. The expectation of degree one about the demand shock Ei(g) yields
E(g|gi, Di) =
σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi +
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Di = Ω11gi + Ω12Di. (2.6)
The best estimate of the demand shock by firm i is an average of its both
signals whose weighting depends upon their relative precision. To compute
the higher-order expectations of firm i, one needs also to know the expec-
tation of degree one of the central bank’s average disclosure Ei(D). This
delivers
E(D|gi, Di) =
σ2φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi +
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Di = Ω21gi + Ω22Di. (2.7)
Note that under transparency (when σ2φ = 0), the central bank’s disclosure
is univocal and Ω21 = 0 which means that the private signal gi does not help
guessing D (since Di = D). Under opacity, when the idiosyncratic noise is
infinite (σ2φ → ∞), the central bank’s disclosure is of no use to estimate the
demand shock g and the best estimate is the private signal gi itself (Ω11 = 1).
Using these results, we can express the higher-order expectation of de-
gree k as
Ē
(k)
(
g
D
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)k (
g
D
)
.
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Plugging this into the price rule (2.4), we get
p =
(
ξ 0
) ∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)k+1 (
g
D
)
. (2.8)
The price rule is a linear combination of the demand shock and the central
bank’s disclosure. Appendix 2.A shows that the price rule is given by
p = γ1g + γ2D with (2.9)
γ1 =
Ω11ξ + (1 − ξ)Ω21
1 − (1 − ξ)(Ω11 − Ω21)
=
ξσ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
ξΩ12 + (1 − ξ)Ω12Ω21
ξ − (1 − ξ)[Ω11ξ − (1 + ξ)Ω21 − (1 − ξ)(Ω21 − Ω11)Ω11]
=
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
γ1 and γ2 sum up to 1. The equilibrium firms’ action can be interpreted as a
weighted average of the fundamental g and the average disclosure D. Note
however that the weight assigned to the central bank’s disclosure is larger
in the equilibrium action (γ2) than in the best estimate of g given in (2.6):
γ2 > Ω12. This discrepancy arises because of the coordination motive in the
pricing rule. While εi and φi are idiosyncratic noises, the central bank’s er-
ror term η is commonly observed by all firms through the disclosure Di. The
weight assigned to the central bank’s error (and thereby to Di) increases as
the coordination motive strengthens: strategic complementarities raise the
incentive of firms to coordinate their action around the central bank’s dis-
closure. When the degree of strategic complementarities 1− ξ increases, the
weight assigned to the private signal gi declines (
∂γ1
∂ξ
> 0) while the weight
assigned to central bank’s disclosure increases (∂γ2
∂ξ
< 0). When the degree
of transparency increases (σ2φ falls), the weight put on the central bank’s
disclosure Di increases since its interpretation becomes less ambiguous and
better conducive to guess the action of others ( ∂γ1
∂σ2
φ
> 0 and ∂γ2
∂σ2
φ
< 0). Signals
are also given a higher weight when their precision increases: ∂γ1
∂σ2ε
< 0 and
∂γ2
∂σ2η
< 0.
2.3.3 Welfare
We now examine the welfare given by (2.5) in the current informational
context. On the one hand, the equilibrium firms’ behaviour (2.9) implies
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that the unconditional expected price dispersion across firms satisfies
E
(∫
i
(pi − p)
2di
)
= E
(∫
i
(γ1gi + γ2Di − γ1g − γ2D)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ.
On the other hand, the unconditional output gap expectation is
E(c2) = E(g − p)2 = E(g − γ1g − γ2D)
2 = γ22σ
2
η.
So, the unconditional expected social loss can be written as
E(L) = γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ + λγ
2
2σ
2
η (2.10)
=
σ2ε(λσ
2
η + σ
2
φ) + (ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
2
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
2
σ2ε .
Let us now discuss the welfare considered in M-S and given by −
∫
i
(pi −
g)2di. We write the corresponding loss as
E(LMS) = E
(∫
i
(pi − g)
2di
)
= E
(∫
i
(γ1(g + εi) + γ2(g + η + φi) − g)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ + γ
2
2σ
2
η.
This implies that the welfare in M-S is a particular case of our general for-
mulation (2.10) where λ = 1. This means that the model of M-S equally
weights coordination and stabilization at the social level.
The welfare effect of the central bank’s disclosure is analyzed in the next
sections. We first restrict the discussion to the binary case of transparency
vs. opacity. This is the perspective of M-S where the central bank either
discloses a public signal (that is common knowledge) or withholds its infor-
mation. Then, we allow for intermediate level of transparency and derive
the optimal degree of transparency.
2.3.4 Transparency versus opacity
Opacity The welfare is calculated when the central bank withholds its
information, i.e. σ2φ → ∞. Under opacity, firms set their price equal to their
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private signal gi, i.e. γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 0. The resulting expected loss is
E(LO) = E
(∫
i
(γ1(g + εi) − γ1g)
2di + λ(g − γ1g)
2
)
= σ2ε .
The overall price level p is equal to the fundamental g. The price dispersion
across firms is given by the variance of the idiosyncratic noise εi.
Transparency Under transparency, disclosure of the central bank is com-
mon knowledge (σ2φ = 0) and the pricing rule of firms becomes
p =
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
g +
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
D.
The resulting expected loss is
E(LT ) =
( ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2ε + λ
( σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2η.
Transparency is welfare improving when the loss under opacity LO is
larger than the loss under transparency LT . When the precision of cen-
tral bank’s information is exogeneous, it turns out that full transparency
is preferable to opacity when
λ − 2ξ <
σ2ε
σ2η
. (2.11)
This finding is in line with M-S: transparency is welfare detrimental
whenever public information is too noisy relative to private information (σ
2
ε
σ2η
small) and when the degree of strategic complementarities is rather high (ξ
small). When complementarities are sufficiently low such that λ − 2ξ < 0,
transparency is always beneficial since variances of error terms are positive
by definition (σ2. ≥ 0).
The general framework developed in this chapter shows the extent to
which the welfare effect of transparency is related to the social value of co-
ordination. In the case of M-S, as λ = 1, private information must be more
accurate than public information for transparency to be detrimental. The
left-hand side of inequation (2.11) is always smaller than one. For the right-
hand side to be smaller than the left-hand one, the central bank’s noise σ2η
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must be larger than the private noise σ2ε . Since information of public in-
stitutions (like central banks) is typically more accurate than information
privately available5, Svensson (2006) argues that the detrimental effect of
transparency emphasized in the beauty contest framework of M-S arises
under unrealistic conditions.
But if the social value of coordination is smaller than in M-S (λ > 1),
opacity may be superior even when public information is more accurate
than private information (this arises when λ − 2ξ > 1). This means that the
pertinence of the critique of Svensson strongly depends on the coordination
value at the social level.
2.3.5 Optimal degree of transparency
In the former section, the central bank could either disclose its noisy in-
formation with perfect precision or withhold it. In reality, however, cen-
tral bankers are known for mumbling with ambiguity. This makes central
bank’s disclosures open to interpretation. The more a central bank speaks
in an equivocal manner, the higher the uncertainty about the interpretation
of the disclosure (fundamental uncertainty) and the higher the uncertainty
about its interpretation by others (strategic uncertainty). When full trans-
parency is detrimental to welfare relative to opacity, reducing transparency
may improve welfare. But even when full transparency is preferable to
opacity, partial transparency may yield a superior outcome. What is the
optimal degree of transparency for a central bank to disclose its informa-
tion?
To determine the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ , we minimize the
loss (2.10) with respect to σ2φ and set it equal to zero:
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
= 2γ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2ε + γ
2
2 + 2γ2
∂γ2
∂σ2φ
σ2φ + 2λγ2
∂γ2
∂σ2φ
σ2η
=
(σ2ε + (3ξ − 2λ)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)σ
4
ε
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
3
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε . (2.12)
5For instance, in an empirical analysis on US data, Romer and Romer (2000) show that
the Fed better forecasts the output and inflation than any single private commercial bank.
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Since the variance of idiosyncratic noise is nonnegative, the optimal de-
gree of transparency is described by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (2.13)
We show in appendix 2.B that full transparency is always superior to full
opacity when σ2∗φ is not defined as the right-hand side of equation (2.12) is
negative. This analysis calls for partial transparency when coordination is
not very valuable at the social level (λ large), when the degree of strategic
complementarities is high (ξ small), and/or when the central bank’s infor-
mation is rather noisy (σ2η large).
Implementing the optimal degree of transparency (2.13) yields the fol-
lowing expected welfare:
E(L∗) = min
[(λσ2ε + ξ
2σ2η)σ
2
εσ
2
η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η)
2
,
4σ2η(ξ − λ) + σ
2
ε
4σ2η(ξ − λ)
σ2ε
]
.
The first panel of figure 2.3 illustrates the unconditional expected loss
under transparency (dotted line), under opacity (dashed line), and under
optimal degree of transparency (solid line). The parameter values are σ2η =
0.25, ξ = 0.1, and λ = 1. As (2.11) shows, full opacity is superior to full trans-
parency when σ2ε < (λ − 2ξ)σ
2
η = 0.2. The optimal degree of transparency is
represented in the second plot below. As (2.13) states it, reducing the degree
of transparency is optimal when σ2ε < (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η = 0.425. Interestingly, for
0.2 < σ2ε < 0.425, reducing the degree of transparency is optimal even if full
transparency is superior to full opacity.
2.4 Endogeneous central bank’s information
In this section, we relax the assumption that the central bank directly
observes the exogeneous aggregate shock g underlying the economy. Since
the central bank has no direct source of information about stochastic aggre-
gate economic conditions, it must observe the aggregate activity of firms
to infer the demand shock. In reality, the central bank learns about aggre-
gate shocks by collecting data from the aggregate economic outcome and
not by observing an exogeneous fundamental process.The model developed
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Figure 2.3: Unconditional expected loss and optimal degree of transparency
in the current section accounts for the feature that the central bank learns
about economic conditions from watching the economy itself. But the cen-
tral bank, as a policy maker, also strongly shapes market expectations and
thereby drives the path of economic activity. While the central bank only
shapes the economy with its disclosure in the case of exogeneous informa-
tion, it also observes the economy when information is endogeneous. The
dual role of the central bank entails a dilemma: the better the central bank
succeeds in influencing the economic activity, the more the economy reflects
the central bank’s assessment and the less accurate becomes the observation
of aggregate economic outcomes as indicators of imbalances.
The next sections describe the information structure and derive the equi-
librium. We then discuss the properties of the model and the effect of the
central bank’s disclosure on the accuracy of its information and of that of
firms. Finally, we examine the optimal disclosure strategy and compare it
to the benchmark case of exogeneous information.
2.4.1 Information structure
Firms
Each firm receives two signals, as in the case of exogeneous central bank’s
information. First, each firm faces a particular demand condition that re-
flects the particularity of its own industry or business. Each firm has its
own “window on the world”. Overall, the mean of these individual shocks
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is the aggregate demand shock g and individual shocks have some disper-
sion around their mean:
gi = g + εi, with εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε).
Second, each firm i observes the central bank’s disclosure given by
Di = D + φi, with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
εi and φi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
The central bank
The central bank has no direct access to information on the underlying
shock. In particular, it cannot observe the aggregate demand shock g be-
cause it is not a tangible quantity. Instead, the central bank bases its estima-
tion of the demand shock on its observations of the overall price level. As
pointed by Hayek (1945), prices play a crucial informational role by aggre-
gating individual information. By observing the average action of firms, the
central bank obtains information about the state of the economy.
We postulate that the central bank observes the price level p with some
noise η
D = p + η, with η ∼ N(0, σ2η).
The variance σ2η denotes, as in the case of exogeneous information, the im-
precision of central bank’s observation (estimation). As we discuss below,
since firms base their pricing decision partly on the central bank’s disclo-
sure, the precision of central bank’s information is a function of its disclo-
sure strategy.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the information structure of our model with en-
dogeneous central bank’s information.
2.4.2 Equilibrium
This section solves the perfect Bayesian equilibrium price setting of firms.
We determine the first and higher-order expectations of firm i about the de-
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Figure 2.4: Endogeneous central bank’s information
mand shock g and the central bank’s disclosure D conditional on its infor-
mation gi and Di. The equilibrium pricing rule of firm i is a linear combina-
tion of its signals
pi = γ1gi + γ2Di.
Using this and the fact that γ1 + γ2 = 1, we rewrite the disclosure Di as
Di = D + φi = p + η + φi = γ1g + γ2D + η + φi
= g +
1
1 − γ2
η + φi.
Note that the precision of the signal disclosed by the central bank is a func-
tion of γ2, the firms’ reaction to this signal. Its precision decreases with the
strength of the firms’ response. When their reaction to the central bank’s
disclosure is weak (γ2 small), the factor of the central bank’s noise η is small.
The precision is maximal when firms do not react to the disclosure (γ2 = 0).
The stronger their reaction, the more noisy is the disclosure. This relation
captures the main trade-off of our model. As the central bank’s influence
on the firms’ pricing decision increases, the accuracy of its information (and
disclosure) is reduced. In this sense, the central bank’s information is endo-
geneous: it is a function of its disclosure strategy.
Expectations of degree one yield
E
(
g
D
gi, Di
)
= Ω
(
gi
Di
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
) (
gi
Di
)
(2.14)
=


(1−γ2)−2σ2η+σ
2
φ
σ2ε+(1−γ2)
−2σ2η+σ
2
φ
σ2ε
σ2ε+(1−γ2)
−2σ2η+σ
2
φ
σ2
φ
σ2ε+(1−γ2)
−2σ2η+σ
2
φ
σ2ε+(1−γ2)
−2σ2η
σ2ε+(1−γ2)
−2σ2η+σ
2
φ


(
gi
Di
)
.
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The best estimate of the demand shock is a weighted average of signals gi
and Di. The weight assigned to each signal increases with its relative pre-
cision. As just discussed, the precision of the disclosure Di depends on the
equilibrium pricing rule (on γ2). In sharp contrast to the model with exoge-
neous information (see equations (2.6) and (2.7)), the precision of first-order
expectations depends on the strength of firms’ reaction to central bank’s
disclosure γ2.
Using this solution to solve firms’ inference problem, we write (2.4) as
p = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ē
(k+1)(g)
]
=
(
ξ 0
) ∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ω
k+1
(
g
D
)
]
.
The resulting price rule is described by
p = γ1g + γ2D (2.15)
γ1 =
(1 − ξ)Ω21γ2 + ξΩ11
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω11
=
ξ(1 − γ2)
−2σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + ξ(1 − γ2)
−2σ2η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)Ω12γ1 + ξΩ12
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω22
=
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξ(1 − γ2)
−2σ2η + σ
2
φ
.
Similarly to the case of exogeneous information presented in section 2.3 (see
equations (2.6) and (2.9)), the equilibrium price rule is distorted towards the
central bank’s disclosure compared to the first-order expectation of g given
in (2.14). This distortion increases with the degree of strategic complemen-
tarities 1 − ξ.
2.4.3 Bayesian update and equilibrium action
This section compares the Bayesian update and the equilibrium action
in both cases of exogeneous and endogeneous information. Figure 2.5 il-
lustrates the weight assigned to the central bank’s disclosure both in the
first-order expectation of the demand shock g and in the equilibrium pric-
ing rule as a function of the degree of transparency σ2φ. This is computed
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with ξ = 0.1 and σ2η = σ
2
ε = 0.25.
6
For the case of exogeneous information, the dash-dotted and dotted lines
represent the weight assigned to Di in the Bayesian update (Ω12 in equation
(2.6)) and in the equilibrium price rule (γ2 in equation (2.9)), respectively.
We see that both weights increase with the degree of transparency: higher
transparency increases the degree of common knowledge of central bank’s
disclosure and its focal role for price setting. The weight in the pricing rule
is also larger than that in the Bayesian update (γ2|σ2
φ
> Ω12|σ2
φ
,∀σ2φ).
For the case of endogeneous information, the solid line represents Ω12
in the first-order expectation (2.14) and the dashed line γ2 in the optimal
pricing equation (2.15). As in the case of exogeneous information, firms
overreact to the central bank’s disclosure in the sense that the weight as-
signed to it in the pricing rule (γ2) is larger than that in the Bayesian up-
date (Ω12). But with endogeneous information, the effect of central bank’s
transparency (σ2φ) on firms’ estimation is ambiguous: while a reduction in
the degree of transparency (that is to say an increase of the idiosyncratic
noise) reduces the accuracy of the disclosure, it increases the precision of
the average disclosure D as firms respond less strongly to it. Ω12 does not
monotonously increase in the degree of transparency. When σ2φ falls, the
degree of common knowledge of the central bank’s disclosure Di increases
and the weight assigned to it in the pricing rule (γ2) rises. The impact of a
fall in σ2φ on the precision of the disclosure Di (and consequently on Ω12) is
twofold. On the one hand, the precision of disclosure increases because the
idiosyncratic noise is reduced. On the other hand, as firms respond more
strongly to the disclosure, the precision of both central bank’s information
and disclosure decreases. The combination of both mechanisms gives rise to
the ambiguous effect of transparency on Ω12 that is particular to the model
with endogeneous information.
The next section addresses the effect of transparency on the accuracy of
prices and central bank’s information as indicators of the state of the econ-
omy.
6We use the methodology of Ulrich Doraszelski to solve this nonlinear model. We are
grateful to him for making his codes available. See Doraszelski and Markovich (2005) for
example.
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Figure 2.5: Bayesian update and equilibrium action
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Figure 2.6: Informative value of prices and central bank’s observation
2.4.4 Information value of prices and precision of central
bank’s information
Figure 2.6 illustrates the accuracy of prices and central bank’s informa-
tion as indicators of economic conditions. The computation is done with
σ2η = σ
2
ε = 0.25. The information value is evaluated as the variance of the
error of demand shock estimations conditional either on the price level p or
on central bank’s information D.
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The information value of the price level p is given by
Var[E(g|p) − g] = Var
[
E
(
g|g +
γ2
1 − γ2
η
)
− g
]
=
γ22
γ21
σ2η =
γ22
(1 − γ2)2
σ2η,
while the information value of the central bank’s observation D is given by
Var[E(g|D) − g] = Var
[
E
(
g|g +
1
1 − γ2
η
)
− g
]
=
1
γ21
σ2η =
1
(1 − γ2)2
σ2η.
The figure 2.6 shows that the information about the state of the economy
contained in the price level and in central bank’s observation decreases with
the degree of central bank’s transparency. In the limit of opacity, γ2 con-
verges to zero (firms don’t react to the disclosure) and the price level be-
comes a perfect indicator for the demand shock g. The accuracy of central
bank’s observation also increases with opacity. But as the central bank ob-
serves the price level with an error term η, it is always less accurate than the
price level itself.
The accuracy of the price level as an indicator for economic conditions
decreases with the weight assigned to central bank’s disclosure. This weight
is high either when the idiosyncratic noise of the disclosure is low (high
degree of transparency or common knowledge) or when strategic comple-
mentarities are strong (ξ small). The degree of strategic complementarities
affects the information value of prices because it drives the overreaction to
central bank’s disclosure. When complementarities are high (dotted lines),
the central bank’s disclosure is given a large weight in the pricing rule. This
increases the impact of the noise η on the price level.
This clearly highlights the endogeneous nature of central bank’s infor-
mation. The more effectively the central bank influences the pricing be-
haviour of firms (γ2 large), the less accurate is its estimation of demand
shocks.
2.4.5 Firms’ information
We now turn to the information accuracy of individual firms. While
opacity increases the precision of central bank’s observation and thereby of
average disclosure D, it increases the idiosyncratic noise at the same time
(σ2φ). The overall impact of opacity is therefore ambiguous on the accuracy
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of the disclosure received by an individual firm i. On the one hand, a rise
in opacity increases the precision of central bank’s observation and average
disclosure. This tends to increase the precision of individual disclosure Di
as well. On the other hand, a rise in opacity requires a larger idiosyncratic
noise φi that reduces the precision of the individual disclosure. By contrast
to the case of exogeneous information where increasing idiosyncratic noise
always reduces the precision of firms’ information, it may increase the pre-
cision of firms’ information with endogeneous information.
The precision of firms’ information is captured by the variance of the
error term of the demand shock first-order expectation conditional on the
private signal gi and disclosure Di. This is given by
Var[E(g|gi, Di) − g] = Var
[
E
(
g|g + εi, g +
1
1 − γ2
η + φi
)
− g
]
= Ω211σ
2
ε +
( Ω12
1 − γ2
)2
σ2η + Ω
2
12σ
2
φ =
σ2ε [(1 − γ2)
−2σ2η + σ
2
φ]
σ2ε + (1 − γ2)
−2σ2η + σ
2
φ
.
Figure 2.7 illustrates this variance for three degrees of strategic complemen-
tarities as a function of the degree of transparency. The solid line shows
that when complementarities are low reducing the degree of transparency
always deteriorates firms’ information. This arises because transparency
does not distort central bank’s information too much as the coordination
motive is weak (see Figure 2.6 in section 2.4.4). The increasing idiosyncratic
noise of opacity is not overcome by the rise in the precision of central bank’s
information.
When the degree of transparency is high and complementarities are strong,
the dotted and dashed lines show that reducing the degree of transparency
increases the precision of firms’ information. The gain in the precision of
central bank’s information overcomes the rise in idiosyncratic noise as long
as transparency is sufficiently high. Below a certain threshold of trans-
parency, lowering it further reduces the precision of firms’ information.
The effect of transparency on the first-order expectation of firms is partic-
ular to endogeneous information. The case of exogeneous information em-
phasizes the effect of transparency on expectations of higher orders: trans-
parency may be detrimental because expectations of higher orders are given
too large a weight into the pricing rule. Our case of endogeneous informa-
tion highlights a new effect of transparency since even the first-order expec-
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Figure 2.7: Precision of firms’ information
tation of firms is affected by the degree of transparency.
2.4.6 Welfare
We now examine the welfare given by (2.5) in the context of endoge-
neous information. As with exogeneous information, the equilibrium firms’
behaviour (2.15) implies that the expected price dispersion across firms sat-
isfies
E
(∫
i
(pi − p)
2di
)
= E
(∫
i
(γ1gi + γ2Di − γ1g − γ2D)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ.
But now the unconditional output gap expectation is expressed by
E(c2) = E(g − p)2 = E(g − γ1g − γ2D)
2 =
γ22
(1 − γ2)2
σ2η.
So, the unconditional expected social loss can be written as
E(L) = γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ + λ
γ22
(1 − γ2)2
σ2η. (2.16)
The welfare effect of the central bank’s disclosure is analyzed in the next
sections. We first restrict the discussion to the binary case of transparency
vs. opacity. This is the perspective of M-S where the central bank either
discloses a public signal (that is common knowledge) or withholds its infor-
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mation. Then, we allow for intermediate levels of transparency and derive
the optimal degree of transparency.
2.4.7 Transparency versus opacity
Opacity Under opacity, firms do not respond to the central bank’s dis-
closure and set their price equal to their private signal gi, i.e. γ1 = 1 and
γ2 = 0. The resulting expected loss is
E(LO) = σ
2
ε .
The overall price level p is equal to the fundamental g. The price dispersion
across firms is given by the variance of the idiosyncratic noise εi.
Transparency Under transparency, disclosure of the central bank is com-
mon knowledge (σ2φ = 0) and the resulting expected loss is
E(LT ) = γ
2
1σ
2
ε + λ
γ22
(1 − γ2)2
σ2η.
Transparency is welfare improving when the expected loss under opac-
ity E(LO) is larger than the expected loss under transparency E(LT ).
Qualitatively, transparency is welfare improving for the same configura-
tion as in the case of exogeneous information presented in equation (2.11).
Namely, transparency is welfare improving when strategic complementar-
ities are weak (ξ large), when private signals are noisy (σ2ε large), when the
central bank’s error term σ2η is small, and when the weight assigned to out-
put gap deviation λ is small. Figure 2.8 illustrates the unconditional ex-
pected loss under transparency relative to that under opacity E(LT )/E(LO)
as a function of the precision of private signals for three levels of comple-
mentarities. This is computed with σ2η = 0.25 and λ = 1. The solid line
shows that transparency is beneficial when complementarities are weak.
But transparency is welfare detrimental when complementarities are strong
(dashed and dotted lines) because it deteriorates the accuracy of central
bank’s information and enhances the destabilizing effect of transparency.
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Figure 2.8: Unconditional expected loss under transparency vs. under opac-
ity
2.4.8 Optimal degree of transparency
Endogeneous information This section derives the optimal degree of
transparency. The first panel of figure 2.9 represents the unconditional ex-
pected loss (2.16) as a function of the degree of transparency for three values
of strategic complementarities. The parameter values are σ2η = σ
2
ε = 0.25
and λ = 1.
The expected loss is minimal at some intermediate level of transparency,
the optimal degree of transparency. Under full opacity, the loss is given by
σ2ε = 0.25 whatever the degree of strategic complementarities. When com-
plementarities are strong (dotted and dashed lines), full transparency yields
a larger loss than that under full opacity. But increasing transparency from
full opacity reduces the expected loss up to the optimal degree of trans-
parency that minimizes the expected loss. When complementarities are
weak (solid line), the loss under full transparency is lower than that un-
der full opacity. But even in this case, reducing the degree of transparency
yields a superior outcome. Partial transparency is thus also optimal.
Exogeneous vs. endogeneous information The second panel of fig-
ure 2.9 compares the effect of transparency with exogeneous information
(presented in section 2.3) and endogeneous information. Parameter values
are σ2η = σ
2
ε = 0.25 and λ = 1. Note that under full opacity both mod-
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Figure 2.9: Unconditional expected loss
els are strictly identical: as central bank’s disclosure does not contain any
valuable information, firms set their price according to their private signal
exclusively, the price level is a perfect indicator for the demand shock, and
central bank’s information has a noise with variance σ2η . But as the degree
of transparency increases, the differential between both models is brought
out. The second panel of figure 2.9 points out two features. First, the welfare
improving effect of transparency is weaker with endogeneous than exoge-
neous information. And second, with endogeneous information, the min-
imal loss is reached at higher level of idiosyncratic noise σ2φ: the optimal
degree of transparency is lower with endogeneous than exogeneous infor-
mation.
The impact of transparency in the model with exogeneous information
is twofold. First, higher transparency has a clear-cut effect on fundamen-
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tal uncertainty of firms (first-order expectations): it raises the accuracy of
firms’ information. Second, higher transparency reduces strategic uncer-
tainty of firms (higher-order expectations) and leads to an overreaction to
central bank’s disclosure. While the effect of transparency on fundamen-
tal uncertainty is welfare improving, the effect on strategic uncertainty is
detrimental as it may destabilize the economy.
By contrast, the impact of transparency with endogeneous central bank’s
information is threefold. First, transparency has an ambiguous effect on
fundamental uncertainty of firms. While higher transparency increases the
accuracy of individual central bank’s disclosure as idiosyncratic noise falls,
the precision of central bank’s information (and thereby that of average dis-
closure) decreases. This is the detrimental effect of transparency particular
to the model with endogeneous information that has been discussed in sec-
tion 2.4.5. Second, transparency reduces strategic uncertainty of firms as in
the model with exogeneous information and involves overreaction to cen-
tral bank’s disclosure. Consequently, the welfare improving effect of trans-
parency is weaker with endogeneous information and the minimal loss is
reached at higher σ2φ: the optimal degree of transparency is lower.
Figure 2.10 compares the optimal degree of transparency with exoge-
neous (solid line) and endogeneous (dashed line) central bank’s informa-
tion. The optimal degree of transparency with exogeneous information
is given by (2.13). As expected, the optimal degree of transparency is al-
ways lower in the model with endogeneous information than in that of ex-
ogeneous information. This arises because the endogeneity of information
gives rise to an additional detrimental effect of transparency, namely the de-
terioration of the accuracy of central bank’s information and disclosure. The
parameter values set by default are σ2η = 0.25, σ
2
ε = 0.25, ξ = 0.25, and λ = 1.
The first graph illustrates the impact of σ2η , the variance of the error term
of central bank’s observation, on the optimal degree of transparency. As it
rises, the optimal degree of transparency decreases because the precision of
the disclosure falls and this increases the potential distortion.
The second graph shows the impact of σ2ε , the variance of the error term
of private signals. With exogeneous information, an increase in σ2ε leads to
a higher optimal degree of transparency because the coordination potential
of private signals decreases. The degree of transparency has no impact on
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Figure 2.10: Optimal degree of transparency with exogeneous and endoge-
neous information
the relative precision of the disclosure (σ2ε/σ
2
η). The level of coordination
among firms falls as private signals are more dispersed. More transparency
and thereby a higher degree of common knowledge of the disclosure par-
tially compensates the lack of coordination. By contrast, with endogeneous
information, the degree of transparency affects the relative precision of the
disclosure σ2ε/((1−γ2)
−2σ2η): a lower degree of transparency increases the rel-
ative precision of the average disclosure since γ2 falls with opacity. Optimal
transparency is driven by two opposite effects. First, an increase in σ2ε leads
to a much smaller increase in the relative precision of the disclosure because
γ2 rises as the precision of private information falls. This means that the pre-
cision of central bank’s information falls when firms’ private information
becomes less accurate. This effect calls for a lower level of transparency in
order to confine the deterioration of central bank’s average disclosure. Sec-
ond, as with exogeneous information, less accurate private information re-
duces the coordination success of firms what favours more transparency on
central bank’s disclosure. It turns out that the loss due to the deterioration
of disclosure accuracy dominates the loss due to the lack of coordination.
Consequently, the optimal degree of transparency declines as the precision
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of private information shrinks.
The third graph shows the impact of the degree of strategic complemen-
tarities 1 − ξ on the optimal degree of transparency. An increase in com-
plementarities reduces the optimal degree of transparency in both models.
As the coordination motive strengthens, the distorting effect of the noisy
disclosure becomes more relevant and the optimal degree of transparency
falls.
And finally, the fourth graph illustrates the impact of λ, the weight as-
signed to output gap deviation. When the weight assigned to price dis-
persion falls, the distorting effect of the disclosure is more costly and the
optimal degree of transparency becomes lower.
2.5 Microfounded welfare function
This section examines the welfare effect of transparency when the weight
assigned to output gap deviation λ is consistent with other parameters of
the model (λ = ξ
θ
).7 As discussed in section 2.2.2, the microfounded welfare
is given by
L =
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di +
ξ
θ
(g − p)2, (2.17)
where 0 < ξ < 1 and θ > 1. The relative weight assigned to coordina-
tion is high since price dispersion reduces utility of households. This in-
creases the welfare improving effect of central bank’s disclosure because it
helps coordinating firms’ price decisions. The potential destabilizing effect
of transparency is disregarded in a large extent. We may therefore expect
that the optimal degree of transparency is higher than when coordination
and stabilization are equally weighted as in M-S (λ = 1). One may however
question whether this microfounded analysis fits the benefits of coordina-
tion and costs of destabilization that occur in reality.
We first show that considering the microfounded welfare renders full
transparency always optimal under exogeneous information since coordi-
nation is given a larger weight at the social level. Second, we turn to en-
dogeneous information. Even if the optimal degree of transparency under
7See Adam (2006) for complete derivation.
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endogeneity is systematically lower than under exogeneous information,
coordination is socially so valuable in (2.17) that full transparency turns to
be the best disclosure strategy as well.
2.5.1 Exogeneous information
This section briefly discusses the optimal disclosure strategy of the cen-
tral bank when its information is exogeneous. We rewrite the optimal dis-
closure strategy derived in section 2.3 and substitute the unrestricted weight
λ with its microfounded value.
When we confine the disclosure strategy to either full transparency or
full opacity, the optimality condition (2.11) becomes
E(LT ) < E(LO) ⇔ 0 >
ξ
θ
− 2ξ <
σ2ε
σ2η
.
Since the condition is always satisfied, we conclude that disclosing informa-
tion is always optimal. This result coincides with that of Hellwig (2005).
Allowing transparency to be intermediate, we rewrite condition (2.13) as
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2
ξ
θ
− 3ξ)σ2η − σ
2
ε
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
] = 0.
Again, the new optimal degree of transparency implies that full transparency
is always optimal.
2.5.2 Endogeneous information
Figure 2.11 computes the unconditional expected loss with the following
parameter values: σ2η = σ
2
ε = 0.25 and θ = 1.2 for three values of strategic
complementarities. Reducing the degree of transparency never increases
the unconditional expected welfare. This arises because the microfounded
welfare function assigns an extremely large weight to coordination and ne-
glects stabilization. The consideration of endogeneous central bank’s infor-
mation does not change the conclusion of Hellwig (2005).
57
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
σφ
2
E
(L
)
ξ=0.1
ξ=0.25
ξ=0.5
Figure 2.11: Unconditional expected loss with endogeneous information
and microfounded welfare function
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a model with endogeneous central bank’s in-
formation that gives rise to a trade-off between shaping and learning from
market expectations. As transparency increases the effectiveness of central
bank’s disclosure on firms’ behaviour, it reduces the accuracy of prices as
an indicator for the underlying shocks and at the same time the accuracy of
central bank’s information. Considering endogeneous central bank’s infor-
mation enables us to address some new issues with respect to the welfare
effect of central bank’s transparency.
Morris and Shin (2002) underline the potential detrimental effect of trans-
parency when higher-order expectations are given a large weight because of
a coordination motive. As transparency reduces strategic uncertainty, it ex-
acerbates the overreaction to central bank’s disclosure. Our model with en-
dogeneous information captures an additional – but somehow intertwined
– detrimental effect of transparency: the deterioration of central bank’s in-
formation and disclosure. Transparency generates overreaction to noisy in-
formation and deteriorates thereby the accuracy of central bank’s disclosure
to which private agents overreact. This increases fundamental uncertainty of
firms.
While the overreaction in M-S occurs because higher-order expectations
overweight public information, the deterioration of accuracy affects both
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first and higher-order expectations as it enhances fundamental uncertainty
of firms about shocks. For instance, we show an ambiguous effect of the
degree of transparency on the precision of firms’ information. Surprisingly,
raising a low idiosyncratic noise increases the precision of central bank’s
disclosure because it strongly improves central bank’s information.
Since both overreaction and deterioration effects of transparency com-
bine, accounting for the endogeneity of central bank’s information calls for
a lower optimal degree of transparency than in the case where the accuracy
of central bank’s information is exogeneous. However, the welfare effect of
transparency strongly depends on how valuable coordination is to society.
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2.A Appendix I: Linear pricing rule for exogeneous
information
This appendix solves the rational expectations equilibrium for the pric-
ing rule of firms given by equation (2.3).
We first postulate that the optimal price of firm i is a linear combination
of its two signals
pi = γ1gi + γ2Di. (2.18)
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pric-
ing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average price
is therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(D). (2.19)
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (2.3) and replacing the expectations of
firm i about g and D yields
pi = (1 − ξ)[γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(D)] + ξEi(g)
= (1 − ξ)[γ1(Ω11gi + Ω12Di) + γ2(Ω21gi + Ω22Di)] + ξ(Ω11gi + Ω12Di).
Rearranging gives
pi = gi[(1 − ξ)(Ω11γ1 + Ω21γ2) + ξΩ11]
+Di[(1 − ξ)(Ω12γ1 + Ω22γ2) + ξΩ12].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
(1 − ξ)Ω21γ2 + ξΩ11
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω11
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)Ω12γ1 + ξΩ12
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω22)
.
And solving this system of equations yields
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + (1 − ξ)Ω21
1 − (1 − ξ)(Ω11 − Ω21)
=
ξσ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
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γ2 =
ξΩ12 + (1 − ξ)Ω12Ω21
ξ − (1 − ξ)[ξΩ11 − (1 + ξ)Ω21 − (1 − ξ)(Ω21 − Ω11)Ω11]
=
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
This solution is equivalent to equations (2.9) in the text.
2.B Appendix II: Limited publicity versus limited
transparency
As Morris and Shin (2002) show, firms overreact to the public signal be-
cause it is common knowledge among them. Consequently, limiting the de-
gree of common knowledge reduces the overreaction and may improve wel-
fare. Which disclosure strategies can reduce the degree of common knowl-
edge? This appendix compares two strategies and shows that they are strictly
equivalent for a large class of coordination games.
First, the central bank can reduce the degree of transparency by disclosing
its information with idiosyncratic noise to each firm. This strategy has been
proposed by Heinemann and Illing (2002) and is discussed in section 2.3.
The disclosure received by firm i is given by
Ii = I + φi = g + η + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
Each firm receives the central bank’s disclosure in private. This disclosure
strategy captures the so-called mystique of central banks’ speech, i.e. the
ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of central banks’ message. In-
deed, central banks are known for speaking with some ambiguity that gives
rise to fundamental and strategic uncertainty about the interpretation of
their speeches.
Second, the central bank can reduce the degree of publicity by disclosing
its information with perfect precision but not to all agents. This strategy has
been proposed by Cornand and Heinemann (2004). In this set-up, a fraction
S of agents receives the semi-public signal D = g+η in addition to its private
signal gi = g + εi while the other fraction 1 − S only gets its private signal.
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Information structure
We allow now the central bank to dispose of both disclosure strategies
simultaneously. So, we have
• a fraction S of firms who gets a private signal and a central bank’s
disclosure
– gi = g + εi with εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε)
– Di = g + η + φi with η ∼ N(0, σ
2
η) and φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
σ2φ captures the degree of transparency of the central bank’s disclosure
and drives the degree of common knowledge among the fraction S of
firms that gets the disclosure.
• a fraction 1 − S of firms who only get a private signal
– gi = g + εi.
Equilibrium action
The average equilibrium action of the fraction 1 − S receiving only a
private signal is given by
p1−S = g
since private signals gi are centred on the true value g.
The average equilibrium action of the fraction S receiving both a private
signal and a central bank’s disclosure is given by
pS = γ1g + γ2D
=
(1 − (1 − ξ)S)σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + (1 − (1 − ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
g +
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1 − (1 − ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
D.
The overall average equilibrium action (over both fractions of firms with
and without central bank’s disclosure) can be written as
p = Γ1g + Γ2D
= S · pS + (1 − S) · p1−S
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= S(γ1g + γ2D) + (1 − S)g
= (Sγ1 + 1 − S)g + Sγ2D
=
(1 − S)σ2ε + (1 − (1 − ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + (1 − (1 − ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
g +
Sσ2ε
σ2ε + (1 − (1 − ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
D.
Welfare
We consider the general form of social loss
L =
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di + λ(g − p)2, (2.20)
where λ describes the extent to which coordination is socially valuable.
Using equilibrium actions of our set-up, we express the unconditional ex-
pected loss as
E(L) = E
[
S
∫
S
(γ1gi + γ2Di − Γ1g − Γ2D)
2di + (1 − S)
∫
(1−S)
(gi − Γ1g − Γ2D)
2di
+λ(g − Γ1g − Γ2D)
2
]
= S[γ21σ
2
ε + (1 − S)
2γ22σ
2
η + γ
2
2σ
2
φ] + (1 − S)[σ
2
ε + Γ2σ
2
η] + λΓ
2
2σ
2
η
= S[γ21σ
2
ε + (1 − S + λS)γ
2
2σ
2
η + γ
2
2σ
2
φ] + (1 − S)σ
2
ε . (2.21)
As discussed in section 2.3.3, the welfare in M-S given by −
∫
i
(pi − g)
2di
is a particular case of (2.20) where λ = 1. The corresponding unconditional
expected loss with full publicity (i.e. S = 1) and full transparency (i.e. σ2φ =
0) is
E(LMS) = γ
2
1σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
η
=
σ2εσ
2
η(σ
2
ε + ξ
2σ2η)
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η)
2
.
Optimal transparency
Transparency versus opacity
We address the question whether full transparency (σ2φ = 0) is superior
to full opacity (σ2φ → ∞) in terms of welfare (2.21). It is straightforward to
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show that transparency is superior to opacity if
S2λ − 2 + 3S − S2 − 2Sξ
2 − S
<
σ2ε
σ2η
. (2.22)
In the particular case where the degree of publicity is maximal (S=1), we get
condition (2.11) in the text.
Optimal degree of transparency
General case We derive the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ . The
degree of publicity S is considered as given. The first derivative of the un-
conditional expected loss (2.21) with respect to σ2φ is
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
=
(σ2ε + (1 − S − 2λS + 3ξS)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)Sσ
4
ε
(σ2ε + (1 − S(1 − ξ)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
3
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (S − 1 + 2Sλ − 3Sξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε . (2.23)
We ensure that extrema yield minimum losses. The second derivative of the
expected loss with respect to σ2φ leads to
∂2E(L)
∂(σ2φ)
2
=
−2Sσ4ε(σ
2
ε + (1 − S − 3Sλ + 4Sξ)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
(σ2ε + (1 − (1 − ξ)Sσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
4
> 0 ⇔ σ2φ < (S − 1 + 3Sλ − 4Sξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε . (2.24)
To show that reducing the degree of transparency according to (2.23)
always leads to a minimum expected loss, we plug (2.23) into (2.24). The
second derivative of the expected loss is then positive only if ξ < λ, which
turns to be a necessary condition for the optimal variance σ2φ of (2.23) to
be positive (the expression (S − 1 + 2Sλ − 3Sξ) is larger than zero only if
ξ < λ). This means that when (2.23) calls for increasing σ2φ (i.e. reducing
transparency), the resulting expected loss is a minimum.
One can show that when the right hand side (RHS) of (2.23) is negative,
condition (2.22) is always satisfied. So, full transparency is always superior
to opacity when the (RHS) of equation (2.23) is negative.
For the sake of generality, the optimal degree of transparency is given by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (S − 1 + 2Sλ − 3Sξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (2.25)
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Reducing the degree of transparency is optimal improving when the pre-
cision of central bank’s information 1/σ2η is low, when the weight λ assigned
to economic stabilization is large, when complementarities are strong (ξ
small), and when the degree of publicity is large.
σ2∗φ > 0 ⇔ S(1 + 2λ − 3ξ) >
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2η
.
Full publicity For the particular case of full publicity (i.e. S = 1) dis-
cussed in section 2.3 we have:
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε (2.26)
∂2E(L)
∂(σ2φ)
2
> 0 ⇔ σ2φ < (3λ − 4ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε (2.27)
To show that reducing the degree of transparency according to (2.26)
always leads to a minimum expected loss, we plug (2.26) into (2.27). The
second derivative of the expected loss is then positive only if ξ < λ, which
turns to be a necessary condition for the optimal variance σ2φ of (2.26) to be
positive (the expression (2λ − 3ξ) is larger than zero only if ξ < λ). This
means that when (2.26) calls for increasing σ2φ (i.e. reducing transparency),
the resulting expected loss is a minimum.
We now check whether transparency is superior to opacity when the
RHS of equation (2.26) is negative. We distinguish two cases. First, when
ξ < λ, the condition (2λ− 3ξ) < σ
2
ε
σ2η
(for negative RHS of (2.26)) implies (λ−
2ξ) < σ
2
ε
σ2η
, which calls for full transparency according to (2.11). Second, when
ξ > λ, condition (2.11) is always satisfied and full transparency optimal. As
a result, full transparency is always superior to opacity when the RHS of
equation (2.26) is negative.
The optimal degree of transparency is given by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (2.28)
This is equation (2.13) in the text.
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Optimal publicity
Full versus zero publicity
Again, we address the question whether full publicity (S = 1) is superior
to zero publicity (S = 0). One can show that full publicity is superior to zero
publicity in terms of welfare (2.21) if
(λ − 2ξ) <
σ2ε + σ
2
φ
σ2η
. (2.29)
In the particular case where the central bank’s disclosure is fully transparent
(σ2φ = 0), the condition for full publicity is identical to the condition for
full transparency (under full publicity) (2.11) in the text. In other words,
the condition for full publicity under full transparency is identical to the
condition for full transparency under full publicity.
Optimal degree of publicity
General case We derive the optimal degree of publicity S∗. The central
bank seeks to determine the optimal degree of publicity for a given degree
of transparency σ2φ. The first and second derivatives of the unconditional
expected loss (2.21) are given by
∂E(L)
∂S
= 0 ⇔ S =
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
(1 + 2λ − 3ξ)σ2η
(2.30)
∂2E(L)
∂S2
> 0 ⇔ (λ − 1 + S + 2Sλ − 2(2 + λ)Sξ + 3Sξ2)σ2η
+(λ − 1)(σ2ε + σ
2
φ) > 0. (2.31)
Substituting (2.30) into (2.31), we see that the extrema yield a minimum
expected loss if and only if λ > ξ. This is however a necessary condition
for the RHS of (2.30) to be positive.
For the case where the RHS of (2.30) is negative, we see that (1 + 2λ −
3ξ) < 0 implies (λ − 2ξ) < 0, which calls for zero publicity according to
(2.29). For the case where the RHS of (2.30) is greater than 1, we rewrite it
as (2λ − 3ξ) <
σ2ε+σ
2
φ
σ2η
and see that it implies the condition for full publicity
(2.29) when λ > ξ, which turns to be a necessary condition for the RHS of
(2.30) to be greater than 1 (or even positive).
66
For the sake of generality, the optimal degree of publicity is given by
S∗ = min[1, max(0,
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
(1 + 2λ − 3ξ)σ2η
)]. (2.32)
Reducing the degree of publicity is optimal when the precision of central
bank’s information 1/σ2η is low, when the weight assigned to stabilization λ
is large, when complementarities are strong (ξ small), and when the degree
of transparency is large (σ2φ small).
S∗ < 1 ⇔ 2λ − 3ξ >
σ2ε + σ
2
φ
σ2η
.
Full transparency When the central bank’s disclosure is common knowl-
edge among receivers (σ2φ = 0), the condition for limiting publicity becomes
S∗ < 1 ⇔ 2λ − 3ξ >
σ2ε
σ2η
. (2.33)
Note that the RHS of (2.30) is negative when
S∗ < 0 ⇔ 1 + 2λ − 3ξ < 0,
what must be foreclosed because it has no economic sense. Since Cornand
and Heinemann (2004) consider the case where λ = 1 (as in M-S), the RHS
of (2.30) is never negative in their analysis.
Welfare under optimal degree of publicity vs. transparency
We analyze the welfare (2.21) when the central bank implements the op-
timal degree of transparency (2.25) or the optimal degree of publicity (2.32).
It turns out that the loss under both disclosure strategies is strictly iden-
tical and is given by
E(L∗) = σ2ε +
σ4ε
4σ2η(ξ − λ)
.
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Publicity-transparency equivalence
Since implementing a limited degree of publicity or a limited degree of
transparency yields the same welfare, the central bank can indifferently im-
plement one of both disclosure strategies to reduce the degree of common
knowledge about its disclosure. The relation between the degree of public-
ity S and the degree of transparency σ2φ is
σ2φ =
1 − S
S
(σ2ε + σ
2
η) or S =
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
Interestingly, while the weight λ assigned to economic stabilization in
the welfare drives the optimal degree of publicity or transparency (optimal
publicity or transparency are low when coordination is given a small weight
at the social level), it does not challenge the publicity-transparency equiva-
lence result.
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Chapter 3
Central Bank’s Action and
Communication
3.1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy has been characterized by an important
switch from secrecy to transparency over the last decades. Central banks
talk much more openly about their policy decisions today than they used
to do in the last decades. While central bankers thought they could better
achieve their target by acting in secret and taking the markets by surprise,
it seems that transparency has nowadays become the new paradigm.
This trend in central banking has given rise to a growing literature about
the pros and cons of higher transparency. In particular, the literature has
recently raised questions about the value of having central banks provide
more and better information to the public. For decisions made under un-
certainty, more accurate information usually permits that decisions are bet-
ter suited to the underlying fundamental. But macroeconomic environ-
ments also often entail strategic complementarities in decision making. As
Keynes pointed out in his beauty contest example, decision makers face the
dilemma of matching some fundamental of the economy and coordinating
with the decision of others. While both public information and private in-
formation play an equivalent role in guessing the fundamental, public infor-
mation plays a preponderant role in guessing the decision of others because
it is common to all agents and better helps predicting their expectations. So,
individual agents assign a higher weight to public information than justified
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by its informative value since it serves as a focal point. Public information
is therefore extremely effective in shaping market outcomes.
In their seminal beauty contest paper, Morris and Shin (2002) (hence-
forth M-S) highlight that the disclosure of noisy public information may be
detrimental to welfare because the overreaction to it may distort the market
outcome away from the fundamental. They conclude that, if there is some
upper bound in the precision of its information, the central bank may be bet-
ter off withholding its information. Their argument has received a great deal
of attention in central banks1 and in the financial press2 because it seems to
contradict the general presumption that transparency is beneficial.
Yet, the literature in the vein of M-S analyzes the welfare effect of public
information when the only task of the central bank is to communicate with
the public, i.e. to disclose or withhold its information. Typically it ignores
that the primarily task of a central bank is to take action by implementing a
monetary instrument. While communication is certainly a key component
of monetary policy, the action implemented by a central bank must not be
ignored for all that. This chapter argues that information policy must be
thought within a framework that also considers the primarily task of the
central bank, namely its action. Indeed, information disclosure – if any –
rarely occurs alone but usually goes with policy implementation. More im-
portantly, one must be aware that the action implemented by a central bank
is chosen according to its perhaps noisy information. When the central bank
has a mistaken view about the economic outcome (because of inevitable
forecast errors) its stabilization policy may well turn out to be rather dis-
torting. Thus, the question of transparency must account for the fact that
the central bank’s action suffers from the same distortion as its disclosure.
One may thus ask how a central bank should communicate with the public
when the monetary instrument it implements is distorted by noisy informa-
tion. Should the central bank implement its instrument in secret to avoid
the private sector’s overreaction to its mistaken view? Or should it, on the
contrary, bring its viewpoint to light?
This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate about the welfare effect of
public information when disclosure goes with action. It especially develops
the idea that – as opposed to M-S – transparency reduces the distortion of
1See for example Kohn (2005) and Issing (2005).
2See The Economist (2004).
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monetary policy. We consider a model of monopolistic competition with im-
perfect common knowledge where firms’ prices are strategic complements.
The economy is hit by demand shocks and firms set their price according to
their own belief about the output gap and their expectations about the belief
of others. Our analysis is constructed into two steps.
First, we discuss in section 3.3 the transparency effect in the case where
information disclosure is the only purpose of the central bank. Under trans-
parency, the central bank publishes its viewpoint on the state of the econ-
omy (while under opacity, it withholds it). Central bank’s disclosure re-
duces the fundamental and strategic uncertainty. This set-up not surpris-
ingly yields the same conclusion as M-S, namely that the central bank should
withhold its information whenever it is rather noisy and when the degree
of strategic complementarities is high. In this context, we introduce the con-
cept of partial transparency. While M-S consider two extreme kinds of dis-
closure, transparency and opacity, we argue that some intermediate level of
transparency better describes the reality and may be welfare improving. It is
not necessarily true that central bank’s disclosures are common knowledge
among the whole population. Indeed, central banks are known for speaking
with mystique. This makes their disclosures equivocal, open to interpreta-
tion, and prevents them from becoming common knowledge. Greenspan’s
testimony to the US Congress in 1987 illustrates the willingness of central
bankers to speak in equivocal manners: “Since I have become a central banker,
I have learned to mumble with great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you
must have misunderstood what I said.” More recently (in December 2002), Mike
Moskow, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, claimed that
“[the Fed speak] is a language in which it is possible to speak, without ever saying
anything.” Imperfect or partial transparency can be well rationalized in this
context. Since a central bank’s disclosure may be detrimental to welfare
when it is common knowledge, introducing some uncertainty about its in-
terpretation reduces its focal role and improves the outcome. This argument
is close to that of Cornand and Heinemann (2004) who introduce the notion
of partial publicity. They show that disclosing public information to a lim-
ited audience reduces the overreaction to it which can be welfare increasing.
Depriving some agents of receiving public information prevents it from be-
coming common knowledge among the whole population. But while under
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partial publicity the disclosure is common knowledge among the limited
audience (only), under partial transparency the disclosure is private to each
firm. In this respect, partial transparency is similar to Heinemann and Illing
(2002) who argue – within a game of speculative attack – that central banks
should provide information to each agent in private with some idiosyncratic
noise to avoid common knowledge (and yields equilibrium uniqueness).
Second, section 3.4 presents the case where the central bank tries to sta-
bilize the economy by implementing a monetary instrument. As discussed
below, central banks have become much more transparent about their in-
strument over the last decades. We show that full transparency is then
preferable to partial transparency. The intuition behind this finding is as
follows. Since the central bank tries to stabilize the economy based on its
information, central bank’s errors influence the economic outcome even if
central bank’s information remains unknown to firms. The central bank’s
mistaken view distorts the economy even under opacity. The disclosure
policy of the central bank however influences firms’ reaction and the price
level because the monetary instrument is part of the output gap, the fun-
damental firms have to respond to. Under transparency, firms’ response
accounts for the monetary instrument and this reduces the distorting ef-
fect of central bank’s action. For instance, if the central bank contracts the
economy by mistake, prices better offset the mistaken policy action when
firms’ reaction to the instrument is maximal, i.e. when the instrument is
common knowledge among firms. Opacity is however optimal in this set-
up for a very small and rather unrealistic range of parameter values. But
interestingly, we show that the case for opacity shrinks when central bank’s
information becomes less accurate: while the monetary instrument increas-
ingly distorts the output gap, transparency, by strengthening the response
of firms to central bank’s action, attenuates the distortion. Transparency is
therefore particularly beneficial when the central bank has a very mistaken
view of the state of the economy.
Section 3.5 compares the optimal disclosure in our two frameworks and
emphasizes the benefit of transparency when the central bank tries to stabi-
lize the economy. As a result, taking the action task of the central bank into
consideration strongly contrasts with M-S according to which transparency
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is welfare detrimental when the central bank’s information is poorly accu-
rate. And finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The economy
The model is derived from an economy with flexible prices, populated
by a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms and a central bank. The
economy is hit by stochastic demand shocks. When the central bank does
not implement any action but solely discloses information, the nominal ag-
gregate demand is determined by the demand shock exclusively. By con-
trast, in the case where the central bank also implements a monetary policy,
the nominal aggregate demand is determined by both the demand shock
and the monetary instrument set by the central bank.
3.2.1 Firms
In a monopolistic competitive economy, the optimal price setting of firm
i is
pi = Ei[p + ξc], (3.1)
where Ei is the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its information,
p is the overall price level, and c is the real output gap. The pricing rule (3.1)
says that each firm sets its price according to both its own belief about the
real output gap and its belief about the overall price level.3 The parameter
ξ determines the extent to which the optimal price responds to the output
gap. Firms strongly respond to the output gap when it has a strong impact
on the competitive real wage. This occurs when the household’s utility and
disutility functions are very concave and convex, respectively, i.e. when
ξ is large. In this case, the real wage required for additional production is
high (since the household derives a low utility from additional consumption
while it suffers a high disutility from additional work) and firms strongly
adjust their price to the output gap.
Per definition, the nominal aggregate demand y is defined as the sum
of the real output gap and the price level: y = c + p. So, one can write the
3See chapter 1 section 1.A for the derivation of the pricing rule 3.1.
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pricing rule as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξy]. (3.2)
The parameter ξ also determines whether prices are strategic complements
or substitutes. In the whole thesis, we assume that prices are strategic com-
plements, i.e. that ξ ≤ 1. Small values of ξ stands for high degree of strategic
complementarities in the economy.
3.2.2 Welfare
The welfare is decreasing in both the dispersion of prices across firms
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di and the variability of the output gap c = y − p. Since there is
currently no consensus about how coordination is socially valuable relative
to macroeconomic distortion, we define a generic welfare function that ac-
counts for alternative weights assigned to coordination. The social loss is
given by
L =
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di + λ(y − p)2, (3.3)
where λ is the weight assigned to the output gap distortion. As discussed
in the previous chapter in section 2.3.3, the welfare function derived in the
seminal beauty contest paper by M-S is captured by the loss (3.3) when the
weight assigned to coordination is equal to that assigned to output gap dis-
tortion, that is to say when λ = 1. The loss (3.3) can also replicate the micro-
founded welfare that assigns a much strong weight on coordination at the
social level. Adam (2006) shows that the weight assigned to the output gap
distortion when the welfare is microfounded amounts to λ = ξ
θ
, where θ > 1
is the degree of substitutability in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
3.2.3 The central bank
The current chapter underlines the relevance of two central bank’s tasks,
namely information disclosure and policy implementation. In section 3.3,
the central bank is supposed to influence the economy with the disclosure
of its information about demand shocks exclusively. By contrast, section 3.4
additionally accounts for the monetary policy I implemented by the central
bank. The monetary instrument is then supposed to partially determined
74
the nominal aggregate demand up to the demand shock g. The nominal
aggregate demand y is the sum of the central bank’s instrument and of the
demand shock g, i.e. y = I + g.
3.3 Pure information disclosure
This section analyzes the welfare effect of public information when the
central bank does not influence the economy except with its information
disclosure. The aim of this section is to illustrate the much debated result
by M-S where information disclosure is the only task of the central bank.
Since the central bank does not implement any action, we set I = 0 and
rewrite the pricing rule (3.2) as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξg]. (3.4)
One may worry about the fact that the central bank does not offset de-
mand shocks in the present economy and claim that this is not optimal.
However, the aim of this chapter is not to address the merits of having a
central bank stabilizing the economy but to compare the welfare effect of
disclosure in the case where the central bank does not stabilize the econ-
omy to the case where it does. So, the present section must be seen as a
benchmark case that replicates the results by M-S and allows a better suited
comparison.
We describe the information structure in the next section. Then, we dis-
cuss the optimal information disclosure first when the central bank chooses
between full transparency and opacity (i.e. the central bank either perfectly
reveals its opinion or totally withholds it), and second when the central
bank can choose its optimal degree of transparency (i.e. the central bank
speaks with some ambiguity).
3.3.1 Information structure
Each firm sets its price according to its information about the demand
shock g and the expectations of other firms about it (the so-called higher-
order expectations). The demand shock is drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion over the real line: g ∈ R. Each firm receives a private signal about the
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demand shock. The private signal is centred on the true value of g and has
a normally distributed error term:
gi = g + εi with εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε).
Firms additionally get a signal disclosed by the central bank. The central
bank itself receives a signal on the demand shock that is centred on its true
value and has a normally distributed error term:
D = g + η with η ∼ N(0, σ2η).
The central bank provides firms with its assessment of the demand shock.
As discussed in the introduction, there are different ways for the central
bank to communicate. Indeed, the central bank may be fully transparent
by disclosing a public signal D common knowledge among firms. Or the
central bank may also be opaque and withhold its information. This is the
case where the central bank provides each firm with an individual signal
whose idiosyncratic noise is infinite. One can imagine any intermediate
situation where the central bank provides firms with more or less equivocal
information. For the sake of generality, we write the signal disclosed by the
central bank and received by firm i as
Di = g + η + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
The individual noise φi captures the degree of transparency of a central
bank. Under transparency, every firm gets the same univocal signal (when
σ2φ = 0), while under opacity, the individual signal got by each firm is so
noisy that its interpretation is impossible (σ2φ → ∞).
3.3.2 Equilibrium
The economy described above is similar to that of chapter 2 section 2.3.
We refer to this section for the resolution of the equilibrium behaviour of
firms and recall the main results for convenience.
The price rule is a linear combination of the demand shock and the cen-
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tral bank’s disclosure and is given by
p = γ1g + γ2D with
γ1 =
ξσ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
The corresponding unconditional expected social loss can be written as
E(L) = γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ + λγ
2
2σ
2
η. (3.5)
We present the optimal disclosure strategy in the subsequent sections.
Since the optimal disclosure has been derived in the previous chapter, we
simply recall the main results.
3.3.3 Transparency versus opacity
As discussed in section 2.3.4, transparency is welfare improving when
the loss under opacity LO is larger than the loss under transparency LT . The
welfare analysis of transparency yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When the central bank’s unique task is information disclo-
sure, full transparency is preferable to opacity when
λ − 2ξ <
σ2ε
σ2η
. (3.6)
It turns out that transparency is welfare detrimental whenever public in-
formation is too noisy relative to private information (σ2η large), when strate-
gic complementarities are rather strong (ξ small), and when the weight as-
signed to output gap stabilization (λ) is large.
3.3.4 Optimal degree of transparency
Again, we report the optimal degree of transparency analyzed in sec-
tion 2.3.5. Deriving the optimal degree of transparency in the framework
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described above, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When the central bank’s unique task is information disclo-
sure, the optimal degree of transparency is given by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (3.7)
.
This analysis calls for partial transparency when central bank’s informa-
tion is rather noisy (σ2η large), when the degree of strategic complementari-
ties is high (ξ small), and when the weight assigned to output gap stabiliza-
tion (λ) is large.
3.4 Action and information disclosure
We now deal with the main aim of this chapter. We analyze the opti-
mal disclosure policy when the central bank’s primarily task is to stabilize
the economy. The economy is hit by demand shocks g and the central bank
tries to offset them by implementing its monetary instrument I . The nomi-
nal aggregate demand is composed of the demand shock and the monetary
instrument, i.e. y = g + I . Thus firms set their price according to their first
and higher-order expectations about both the demand shock and the mon-
etary instrument. The central bank’s action is part of the “fundamental”
firms respond to. We rewrite the pricing rule (3.2) for convenience:
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξg + ξI]. (3.8)
We describe the information structure and derive the equilibrium. We
discuss then the optimal information disclosure when the central bank chooses
between full transparency and opacity, and then whether partial transparency
is optimal.
3.4.1 Information structure
Each firm sets its price according to its own belief about both the demand
shock g and the central bank’s instrument I , and its belief about others’
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belief about them. Again, the demand shock is drawn form the real line:
g ∈ R. Each firm receives a private signal gi = g + εi about the demand
shock that has the same properties as in the former section.
Based on its own information D = g + η, the central bank sets its instru-
ment to offset demand shocks: I = −g − η.
The central bank then provides firms with information about its instru-
ment (or economic assessment). When the central bank is transparent, its in-
strument is a public signal (common knowledge among firms). Conversely,
when it is opaque, firms’ observation of the instrument does not contain any
valuable information at all. In intermediate situations, the central bank pro-
vides firms with more or less ambiguous information about its instrument.
For the sake of generality, we write the signal disclosed by the central bank
and received by firm i as
Ii = I + φi = −g − η + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
As in the former section, the individual noise φi captures the degree of trans-
parency of the central bank. Full transparency is reached when σ2φ = 0 and
full opacity when the central bank withholds information about its instru-
ment (σ2φ → ∞).
3.4.2 Equilibrium
To determine the equilibrium behaviour of firms, we proceed as before.
Substituting successively the average price level with higher-order expecta-
tions about the demand shock and the monetary instrument into (3.8) yields
pi = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)kEi
[
Ē
(k)(g + I)
]
,
and averaging over firms, we get
p = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ē
(k+1)(g + I)
]
. (3.9)
The optimal pricing rule of firm i is a weighted average of its first and
higher-order expectations about the demand shock g and the central bank’s
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instrument I conditional on its information. Its first-order expectations yield
E(g|gi, Ii) =
σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi −
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Ii = αgi + (α − 1)Ii
E(I|gi, Ii) = −
σ2φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi +
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Ii = βgi + (1 + β)Ii.
Plugging this result into (3.9), we have
p =
(
ξ ξ
) ∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
(
α (α − 1)
β (1 + β)
)k+1 (
g
I
)
and rewriting in a linear form leads to
p = γ1g + γ2I with (3.10)
γ1 =
ξ(α − β)
1 − (1 − ξ)(α − β)
=
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
= γ2.
The derivation of this equilibrium pricing rule is given in appendix 3.A.
When the central bank stabilizes the economy with its monetary instrument,
firms equally weight their private signal gi and the central bank’s disclosure
Ii into their pricing decision (γ1 = γ2). This arises because firms respond to
the nominal aggregate demand that is composed of both the demand shock
and the monetary instrument.
Since the central bank tries to stabilize the economy, it is common knowl-
edge among firms (even under opacity) that the nominal aggregate demand
expected by the central bank is equal to zero. In the particular case where
the central bank has perfect information about demand shocks (σ2η = 0), the
monetary instrument perfectly offsets demand shocks and firms set their
price equal to zero. For the more realistic case where central bank’s infor-
mation is noisy, the demand shock is less likely to be precisely offset by the
central bank and thus the nominal aggregate demand to be zero. Firms then
rely more strongly on their private information gi and disclosure Ii to set
their optimal price ( ∂γ1
∂σ2η
> 0).
When the degree of strategic complementarities increases, firms respond
less strongly to their private signal gi and to the instrument disclosure Ii,
and assign a higher weight to the nominal aggregate demand expected by
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the central bank (that is to say zero) since the latter is common knowledge
(∂γ1
∂ξ
> 0).
When private noises increase, fundamental and strategic uncertainty in-
creases as well. Hence, firms less strongly respond to their private signal
and disclosure and higher weight the nominal demand of zero expected by
the central bank ( ∂γ1
∂σ2ε
< 0 and ∂γ1
∂σ2
φ
< 0).
3.4.3 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare analysis in the current context. First, the
equilibrium firms’ behaviour (3.10) implies that the price dispersion across
firms satisfies
E
(∫
i
(pi − p)
2di
)
= E
(∫
i
(γ1gi + γ2Ii − γ1g − γ2I)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ.
Second, with the central bank stabilizing the economy, the output gap is
E(c2) = E
(
(g + I − p)2
)
= E
(
(g + (−g − η) − γ1g − γ2(−g − η))
2
)
= (γ2 − 1)
2σ2η.
So, since γ1 = γ2, the unconditional expected loss can be written as
E(L) = γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
1σ
2
φ + λ(γ1 − 1)
2σ2η
=
λ(σ2ε + σ
2
φ) + ξ
2σ2η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
2
(σ2ε + σ
2
φ)σ
2
η. (3.11)
3.4.4 Transparency versus opacity
Opacity The welfare is now computed when the central bank is opaque
and implements its instrument in secret, i.e. σ2φ → ∞. Under opacity, firms
set their price equal to zero since γ1 = 0 and γ2 = 0. In so far as firms know
that the central bank stabilizes the economy but have no information about
the instrument, their private information gi does not help them guessing the
nominal aggregate demand. Their best nominal aggregate demand estima-
tion is therefore zero and the resulting unconditional expected loss is
E(LO) = λσ
2
η.
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Transparency When the central bank is transparent, its monetary in-
strument is common knowledge: σ2φ = 0. Under transparency, the pricing
rule of firms becomes
pi =
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
gi +
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
Ii,
and the resulting unconditional expected loss yields
E(LT ) =
( ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2ε + λ
( σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2η.
Transparency is welfare improving when the loss under opacity LO is larger
than the loss under transparency LT . Comparing both expected losses, we
get the following proposition.
Proposition 3: When the central bank tries to offset demand shocks with its
monetary instrument, full transparency is preferable to opacity when
λ >
ξσ2ε
2σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
. (3.12)
Whether transparency is beneficial depends on the value of four param-
eters, the relevance of output gap stabilization at the social level λ, the noise
of central bank’s information σ2η , the noise of firms’ private information σ
2
ε ,
and the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ. Note first that trans-
parency is particularly welfare improving when the weight assigned to the
output gap stabilization λ is large. Transparency increases firms’ response
to both their private signal and the monetary instrument what reduces the
output gap but increases the price dispersion. When the central bank ac-
tively shapes the nominal aggregate demand with its monetary instrument
and assigns a large weight to output stabilization, transparency reduces the
potential detrimental effect of the policy owing firms to account for it in
their price setting.
Second, transparency improves welfare when central bank’s informa-
tion is rather noisy (the derivative of the right-hand side (RHS) of inequa-
tion (3.12) is negative with respect to central bank’s noise σ2η). When the
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monetary instrument implemented by the central bank is very likely not to
precisely offset the demand shock, transparency helps reducing the possible
distortion generated by the policy.
Third, switching from opacity to transparency increases the price dis-
persion since prices are all homogeneous under opacity (γ1 = 0).
4 The loss
linked to the rise in dispersion depends on the precision of firms’ private
information. High precision of firms’ private information reduces the cross
section price dispersion. Hence, transparency is welfare improving when
firms’ private information is rather precise (the derivative of the RHS of in-
equation (3.12) is positive with respect to firms noise σ2ε ).
Fourth, transparency is beneficial when strategic complementarities are
strong (ξ small) because strong complementarities reduces the weight as-
signed to private signals and thereby the cross sectional price dispersion
(the derivative of the RHS of inequation (3.12) is positive with respect to ξ).
It is worth underlining here that welfare effects of transparency funda-
mentally depends on whether the central bank tries to offset demand shocks
with its monetary instrument or not. As discussed in section 3.3.3, when
the central bank does not influence the nominal aggregate demand, trans-
parency is welfare increasing (compared to opacity) when (i) the output gap
stabilization is socially not very valuable (λ small), (ii) the central bank’s in-
formation is quite accurate (σ2η small), (iii) the firms’ private information is
rather noisy (σ2ε large), and (iv) strategic complementarities are strong (ξ
small). The qualitative conditions for transparency in an economy where
the central bank does not influence the nominal aggregate demand (section
3.3) are simply the opposite to that in an economy where the central bank
partially determines the nominal aggregate demand with its monetary in-
strument (this section).
3.4.5 Optimal degree of transparency
In this section, we allow the central bank to disclose more or less equivo-
cal information about its instrument and derive the optimal degree of trans-
parency. The recent development of the US Federal Reserve disclosure about
4This mechanism is similar to that of Kondor (2004). He shows that when the funda-
mental is split into two parts (as it is the case in this section) more information increases
the disagreement between agents.
83
its monetary policy provides a good illustration of various degrees of trans-
parency. Before 1994, the Federal Reserve did not publicly announce the
federal funds rate it was targeting. The private sector had to observe the
market operations implemented by the trading desk of the Fed to guess the
policy decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee. This lack of trans-
parency was a source of fundamental uncertainty about the rate targeted by
the Fed and of strategic uncertainty about the beliefs of others about this tar-
get. Since February 1994, the Fed has been publishing the new target after
each meeting of the FOMC. While such a publication reduces uncertainty
about the numerical target, uncertainty still remains about how restrictive
or expansive the Fed considers its policy decision to be. Hence, from 1998
on, the FOMC has decided to indicate after each meeting its current bias
with respect to possible changes in the future policy. And even more re-
cently, the FOMC has made the release of the minutes of its deliberations
available to the public.5 This process clearly increases the degree of com-
mon knowledge about the impact of monetary policy on the aggregate nom-
inal demand among firms. While the previous subsection has compared the
welfare under both extreme cases of full transparency and opacity, we fo-
cus now on intermediate level of transparency and determine the optimal
degree of transparency.
To determine the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ , we set the first
derivative of the loss (3.11) with respect to σ2φ equal to zero:
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
= 2γ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2ε + γ
2
1 + 2γ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2φ − 2λ
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2η + 2λγ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2η
=
[(2λ − ξ)σ2ε + ξ
2σ2η + (2λ − ξ)σ
2
φ]ξσ
4
η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
3
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ =
ξ2
ξ − 2λ
σ2η − σ
2
ε . (3.13)
To ensure that extrema lead to minimum expected losses, the second deriva-
tive of the loss with respect to σ2φ yields
∂2E(L)
∂(σ2φ)
2
=
2[(ξ − 2λ)σ2ε + ξ(λ − 2ξ)σ
2
η + (ξ − 2λ)σ
2
φ]ξσ
4
η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
4
> 0 ⇔ (ξ − 2λ)σ2φ > (2λ − ξ)σ
2
ε + ξ(2ξ − λ)σ
2
η.(3.14)
5See Poole (2005).
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We show that limiting the degree of transparency is never optimal. Sub-
stituting equation (3.13) into (3.14), we observe that inequation (3.14) is sat-
isfied when λ > ξ. That is to say that implementing the degree of trans-
parency given by the RHS of (3.13) yields a minimum expected loss only if
λ > ξ. But this condition implies that the RHS of (3.13) is negative what has
no economic interpretation since the variance cannot be negative. In other
words, the extrema described as in equation (3.13) are maximum expected
losses. As a result, the optimal disclosure strategy consists of choosing be-
tween full transparency and full opacity according to Proposition 3.
This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 4: When the central bank tries to offset demand shocks with its
monetary instrument, partial transparency is never optimal.
In sharp contrast to the economy where the central bank does not stabi-
lize the nominal aggregate demand, reducing the degree of transparency
does not improve welfare when the central bank actively influences the
nominal aggregate demand with its policy. As we bring it up in the next
section, the framework where the central bank stabilizes the economy with
its instrument calls for full transparency under realistic parameter condi-
tions.
3.5 Discussion
This section compares the optimal information disclosure when the only
task of the central bank is to disclose information with the case where it also
stabilizes the economy. The optimal disclosure in both situations is a func-
tion of the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ, the weight assigned
to output gap variability λ, and the relative precision of firms’ private infor-
mation σ
2
ε
σ2η
.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the optimal disclosure when firms’ private infor-
mation is as precise as central bank’s information, i.e. σ
2
ε
σ2η
= 1. Figure 3.2
considers the more realistic case where firms’ private information is less ac-
curate than central bank’s information, i.e. σ
2
ε
σ2η
= 2.
The optimal disclosure derived in section 3.3 where the unique central
bank’s task is to disclose is as follows. The dotted line in both figures is
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Figure 3.2: Optimal information disclosure with σ
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given by λ = (σ
2
ε
σ2η
+ 3ξ)/2 (see Proposition 2). As discussed in section 3.3.4,
full transparency is optimal when λ < (σ
2
ε
σ2η
+3ξ)/2 while partial transparency
is optimal otherwise. The optimal disclosure is partial transparency for pa-
rameter combinations of λ and ξ given by the area called A in both figures.
Full transparency is optimal for parameter combinations in areas B and C.
Partial transparency is beneficial when the degree of strategic complemen-
tarities 1 − ξ is high and when firms’ private information is relatively accu-
rate. As shown above, opacity is never optimal.6 This arises because of the
coordination motive: public information (or more information) allows pri-
vate agents to better coordinate. The optimal degree of transparency (3.7)
6This finding is consistent with Cornand and Heinemann (2004) who show that partial
dissemination of public information is always preferable to withholding public informa-
tion.
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indicates that full opacity is optimal only in the extent that coordination
does not matter at all at the social level. Indeed, when the weight assigned
to output gap stabilization λ goes to infinity, the variance of idiosyncratic
noise σ2φ goes to infinity as well (meaning full opacity). Withholding central
bank’s information is optimal when there is no concern for coordination.
We now turn to the case described in section 3.4 where the central bank
stabilizes the economy with its instrument. The dashed line is given by
λ = ξσ
2
ε
2σ2ε+ξσ
2
η
(see Proposition 3). As discussed in the previous section, full
transparency is optimal for values of λ larger than the dashed line. So, full
transparency is optimal for parameter combinations in areas A and B, while
opacity is optimal for area C. The framework of section 3.4 that accounts
for the stabilization purpose of the central bank makes a case for full trans-
parency in almost all parameter configurations unless price dispersion is
assigned a much higher weight than output gap stabilization. There is no
price dispersion when the central bank withholds its information since ev-
ery firm sets a price of zero under opacity (γ1 = γ2 = 0). But opacity creates
however higher cost in terms of output gap variability.
Yet, the case for opacity is extremely unlikely. For instance, when firms’
private information is as accurate as central bank’s information and ξ =
0.25, opacity would be optimal if the weight assigned to price dispersion
would be more than 9 times higher than that assigned to output gap vari-
ability (from Proposition 3, we obtain λ < ξ
2+ξ
= 0.11). It is interesting to
emphasize that when central bank’s information becomes less accurate (the
relative precision σ
2
ε
σ2η
decreases) transparency becomes beneficial for a larger
range of parameter combinations. Since the central bank’s instrument is
part of the fundamental firms respond to, an increase in central bank’s un-
certainty makes transparency more beneficial.
Following the discussion of section 2.5 of chapter 2, we briefly discuss
the case of microfounded welfare function. As shown by Adam (2006), the
microfounded welfare function is given by equation (3.3) with λ = ξ
θ
where
θ > 1 is the degree of substitutability in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. When
the central bank does not stabilize the economy with its instrument, section
2.5.1 shows that full transparency is always optimal for the microfounded
welfare function. This has been underlined by Hellwig (2005): when coor-
dination is socially highly valuable transparency is welfare improving since
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it helps coordinating. The linear function λ = ξ
θ
can be represented on fig-
ures 3.1 and 3.2 with a slope smaller than one. We clearly see that the ξ − λ
combinations are in areas B and C: full transparency is always optimal.
By contrast, when the central bank tries to stabilize the nominal aggre-
gate demand with its instrument, the microfounded welfare function can
lead to full opacity. As Proposition 3 indicates, opacity is superior to trans-
parency when coordination is socially highly valuable (λ small). For large
value of θ, the weight λ becomes arbitrarily small and may call for opacity
(area C in figures 3.1 and 3.2).
3.6 Conclusion
Can a central bank speak too much? This question has been the subject
of a very controversial literature over the last years. While transparency has
been an important point of central banks’ agenda, the argument by Morris
and Shin (2002) has received a great deal of attention because it seems to
contradict the general presumption that transparency is always beneficial.
According to their analysis, the disclosure of central bank’s noisy informa-
tion can be welfare detrimental and destabilizing since it serves as a focal
point in a context of strategic complementarities. The current chapter con-
tributes to this ongoing debate by highlighting the dual tasks of monetary
policy: action and communication. While the literature in the vein of M-
S considers the case where the sole task of the central bank is to provide
the private sector with information, we also account for the action task of
the central bank and draw opposite conclusions: when central bank’s infor-
mation is poorly accurate, transparency reduces the distorting effect of the
monetary instrument.
This finding challenges the stabilizing role of public disclosure under im-
perfect information. Our analysis highlights the beneficial effects of trans-
parency when the stabilization policy of the central bank is implemented on
the base of imprecise information. Yet, in monetary policy, decisions under
imperfect information are rather the rule than the exception. Indeed, since
monetary policy affects the economy with a substantial delay, central banks
must act in advance and make their decisions according to their forecasts.
The Inflation Reports of the Bank of England provide a good example of the
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information accuracy a central bank bases its decision on. As an inflation
targeter, the Bank of England mainly conducts its policy in compliance with
its expected inflation and output growth that are published in its Inflation
Report. The uncertainty surrounding central bank’s forecasts is surprisingly
high. As pointed out by Morris and Shin (2005) for the August 2005 Report,
the “fan chart” for output growth looks rather like a “hammer” than a “fan”.
Under these circumstances, the instrument set by the central bank may well
be proved inadequate for the actual state of the economy.
Our analysis addresses the question of central bank’s communication
when the conduct of monetary policy suffers from inaccurate information
and shows that transparency helps reducing the distortion associated with
poorly suited policies. This result supports the recent development in cen-
tral banking towards more transparency with respect to policy implemen-
tations.
3.A Appendix: Linear pricing rule
This appendix solves the rational expectations equilibrium for the pric-
ing rule of firms given by equation (3.8).
We first postulate that the optimal price of firm i is a linear combination
of its two signals
pi = γ1gi + γ2Ii. (3.15)
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pric-
ing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average price
is therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(I). (3.16)
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (3.8) and replacing the expectations of firm
i about g and I yields
pi = (1 − ξ)[γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(I)] + ξEi(g) + ξEi(I)
= (1 − ξ)[γ1(αgi + (α − 1)Ii) + γ2(βgi + (1 + β)Ii)]
+ξ(αgi + (α − 1)Ii) + ξ(βgi + (1 + β)Ii).
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Rearranging gives
pi = gi[(1 − ξ)(αγ1 + βγ2) + ξ(α + β)]
+Ii[(1 − ξ)((α − 1)γ1 + (1 + β)γ2) + ξ(α + β)].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
(1 − ξ)βγ2 + ξ(α + β)
1 − (1 − ξ)α
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)(α − 1)γ1 + ξ(α + β)
1 − (1 − ξ)(1 + β)
.
And solving this system of equations yields
γ1 =
ξ(α + β)
1 − (1 − ξ)(α + β)
=
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
This solution is equivalent to equation (3.10) in the text.
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Chapter 4
Can Opacity of a Credible Central
Bank Explain the Conduct of
Monetary Policy in the 70s?1
4.1 Introduction
During the 1970s, many countries experienced long lasting average in-
flation rates that clearly exceeded the rate that seems to be socially desirable.
This feature has been usually explained within the framework of Barro and
Gordon (1983), which presumes that the central bank desires to push output
above its natural level. Indeed, under discretion, the central bank’s incen-
tive to boost the output above its potential level gives rise to a persistent
inflationary bias that supports the monetary outcome in the 1970s.
Yet, the inflationary bias argument is a matter of controversy. Three
strands of criticism have been developed. First, Taylor (1983) and McCal-
lum (1997) question the plausibility of the inflationary bias argument since
any rational central bank should recognize that the renouncement to cheat
the private sector yields a superior outcome. In its comment to Barro and
Gordon (1983), Taylor (p. 125) writes that “[. . . ] the superiority of the zero
inflation policy is obvious [. . . ]. It is therefore difficult to see why the zero inflation
policy would not be adopted” by the central bank. Second, Blinder (1998) (p.
40) points out the particular economic context of the 1970s and argues that
“Barro and Gordon ignored the obvious practical explanations for the observed up-
1This chapter has been developed with the collaboration of Camille Cornand.
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surge in inflation – the Vietnam War, the end of the Bretton-Woods system, two
OPEC shocks, and so on – and sought instead a theoretical explanation for what
they believed to be a systematic inflationary bias in the behaviour of central banks”.
And third, as the Barro-Gordon literature calls for institutional changes in
order to cope with inflation, Friedman and Kuttner (1996) (p. 79) emphasize
that “not only have most countries succeeded in slowing their economy’s inflation,
in most cases they have done so under monetary policymaking institutions no dif-
ferent than they had before”.
This chapter provides an alternative explanation to the time-inconsistency
literature for the high inflation episode of the 1970s that is consistent with
the three aforesaid criticisms.2 We show that central bank’s opacity can ac-
count for an expansive monetary policy in response to oil shocks, even when
the central bank is fully credible. This sharply contrasts with the standard
monetary policy literature that calls – according to the lean against the wind
principle – for taking restrictive action whenever inflation is above target.3
We do not claim, however, that the Barro-Gordon model does not cap-
ture a real phenomenon in central banking. For instance, we believe that
institutional changes in the central bank of New Zealand (adoption of an
explicit inflation target and independence from the government) and their
impacts on inflation fit the Barro-Gordon argument pretty well. We high-
light instead that even a central bank with no inflationary bias and whose
preferences are perfectly known to the private sector may find it optimal to
accommodate monetary policy in response to cost-push shocks when it is
opaque with respect to its monetary instrument. So, our model rather ap-
plies to central banks that are traditionally independent, credible and well-
established, and rationalizes the high inflation episode of the 1970s in coun-
tries like Germany, Switzerland, or the US. In some sense, our model pro-
vides an analysis for inflation time-series in some particular countries, while
Barro-Gordon explains cross-sectional inflation between some countries.
2Orphanides (2002) alternatively argues that policy decisions during the 70s can be rec-
onciled with an optimal approach accounting for the errors in the real time assessments of
the natural rate of unemployment by the Fed.
3Note that some authors adopt other definitions of the lean against the wind principle.
For instance, Schwartz (2003) (p. 1025) argues that “the Fed should ’lean against the wind’,
by taking restrictive action during periods of economic expansion and expansionary action during
periods of economic contraction”. By contrast, Clarida et al. (1999) (p. 1672) say that “the
central bank pursues a ’lean against the wind’ policy: Whenever inflation is above target, contract
demand below capacity (by raising the interest rate).”
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Our analysis emphasizes the relevance of strategic complementarities in
price setting and of information disclosed by the central bank for the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy to stabilize the price level. The effectiveness of
monetary policy on the pricing rule of firms is driven by the disclosure of
the central bank since it determines the fundamental and strategic uncer-
tainty surrounding its monetary instrument. As cost-push shocks create a
trade-off between price and output gap stabilization, the central bank may
find it optimal to stabilize rather the output gap than the price level when
its policy is relatively ineffective to influence the price level, i.e. when the
central bank is opaque with respect to its policy.
In an empirical analysis on US data, Romer and Romer (2000) show that
the observation of the monetary instrument highly influences the formation
of market expectations. Moreover, Demiralp and Jorda (2002) emphasize
the relevance of central bank’s communication to manipulate market expec-
tations. They show, in particular, that the publication of the instrument rate
targeted by the policy board of the Fed since 1994 has increased the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy to shape market expectations (announcement
effect).
We propose a monetary policy model under monopolistic competition
with imperfect common knowledge on the cost-push shocks affecting the
economy where the central bank has no inflationary bias and the private
sector perfectly knows its preferences. Both the central bank and firms are
uncertain about the true state of the economy and receive private signals on
cost-push shocks. Firms also get some signal on the monetary instrument
of the central bank according to the degree of transparency of the central
bank with respect to its policy. While the central bank’s disclosure does not
contain any valuable information under opacity, the monetary instrument
is common knowledge among firms under transparency.
The mechanism of the model is the following. The information disclosed
by the central bank influences the reaction of the price level to monetary pol-
icy and thus influences the extent to which the central bank can deal with the
trade-off generated by cost-push shocks. Under transparency, as the mone-
tary instrument is common knowledge among firms, the optimal monetary
policy always satisfies the lean against the wind principle. By contrast, opac-
ity increases fundamental and strategic uncertainty about the central bank’s
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action and thereby reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy on the price
level. Under opacity, the central bank’s influence on the price level is limited
as firms do not observe its instrument. So, contracting the nominal demand
is ineffective to reduce the price level and the central bank may find it opti-
mal to reduce the output gap by expanding its instrument.4 But opacity is
not a sufficient condition for the optimal monetary policy to be accommo-
dating. The sign of the policy coefficient depends on the relation between
the degree of strategic complementarities, the preference of the central bank
for output gap stabilization, and the relative precision of firms’ private in-
formation.
The three strands of criticism raised against the Barro-Gordon model do
not apply to our argument. First, our central bank does not have an incen-
tive to push output above its potential level. Second, our model accounts for
the response of monetary policy to cost-push shocks. And third, while no
significant institutional changes occurred in the central bank of most OECD
countries, the switch from opacity to transparency is an obvious develop-
ment in the recent conduct of monetary policy that accounts for the decrease
in inflation.
Note that most of the literature rationalizes the case for transparency as
a mean to reach credibility. For example, King (2001) argues that “a degree of
openness was not only desirable but also necessary for any degree of credibility” (p.
375). Interestingly, our analysis emphasizes the relevance of transparency
even when central banks are credible.
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 out-
lines a monopolistic competition economy, in which firms’ pricing decisions
represent strategic complements. Section 4.3 considers a benchmark case
under perfect common knowledge that recalls standard findings in mone-
tary policy analysis and gives useful insights for the intuition behind our
main result. Section 4.4 examines the case of imperfect common knowledge
and shows that the optimal monetary policy under opacity may violate the
lean against the wind principle. We also show that small changes in the de-
gree of transparency or in preferences may have large effects on the optimal
monetary policy. Finally section 4.5 concludes.
4While Goodfriend and King (2005) and Svensson (2002) argue that the lack of central
bank’s credibility increases the cost of disinflation, our analysis emphasizes the role of cen-
tral bank’s transparency as a determinant of the costs of inflation stabilization.
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4.2 The economy
The model is derived from an economy with flexible prices, populated
by a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms and a central bank. The
economy is affected by stochastic cost-push shocks. Nominal aggregate de-
mand is determined by the monetary instrument set by the central bank.
4.2.1 Firms
The behaviour of firms consists in choosing a price. Under monopolis-
tic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz, firms set their price as a function of their
expectations of the overall price level p, the real output gap c, and the cost-
push shock u.5 One can show that the optimal price of firm i is given by
pi = Ei[p + ξc + u]. (4.1)
The pricing rule (4.1) captures the strategic complementarities of prices. In-
deed, each firm i sets its price according to its expectation about both funda-
mentals (the output gap c and the cost-push shock u) and the average action
of others, the overall price level p.
The parameter ξ determines the extent to which the optimal price re-
sponds to the output gap. As we assume below, the central bank determines
the nominal aggregate demand through its monetary instrument. Using the
fact that the nominal aggregate demand (deviation) y is by definition equal
to c + p, we rewrite the pricing rule (4.1) as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξy + u]. (4.2)
We realistically assume that prices are strategic complements and im-
pose 0 < ξ < 1. When ξ decreases, the optimal price setting responds less
strongly to fundamentals (y and u) and more strongly to the strategic term,
the overall price level p: the degree of strategic complementarities increases.
While prices are flexible in our model, imperfect common knowledge
among firms and strategic complementarities may account for nonneutral
effects of monetary policy. Indeed, Hellwig (2002) or Woodford (2003a)
5For the microfounded derivation, see Adam (2006) or Woodford (2003a).
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show that the lack of information about each other’s expectations (higher-
order uncertainty) yields nominal adjustment delays of prices.
4.2.2 The central bank
The central bank minimizes the deviation of both the output gap c and
the price level p from their respective target owing to its monetary instru-
ment I . The central bank’s optimization problem consists in minimizing its
loss
L = min
I
Ecb[λc
2 + p2] (4.3)
where c = y − p is the output gap and λ the weight assigned to the output
gap variability. Note that the central bank has no incentive to push the out-
put above its natural level. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
central bank directly controls nominal aggregate demand with its monetary
instrument (y = I). So, the pricing rule (4.2) can be rewritten as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + u + ξI]. (4.4)
Finally, the economy is affected by cost-push shocks that are normally
distributed:
u ∼ N(0, σ2u).
The monetary response to cost-push shocks is a particularly interesting is-
sue since cost-push shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank. In-
deed, cost-push shocks create a trade-off between price level and output
gap stabilization. In the absence of any monetary policy action, a positive
cost-push shock raises the price level and generates a negative output gap.
While price level stabilization calls for a contractionary policy, output gap
stabilization requires an expansionary one. As we argue in this chapter,
whether the central bank will be involved in price level or in output gap
stabilization depends on its communication strategy since it determines the
effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize prices.
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4.3 Perfect common knowledge
Standard monetary policy analysis assumes that information is common
knowledge among firms. While this chapter deals with monetary policy un-
der imperfect common knowledge, the current section derives, as a bench-
mark, the optimal monetary policy under perfect common knowledge.
When information is perfect and common to all firms, every firm sets the
same price (pi = p). The pricing rule (4.4) then simplifies to
pi = p = I +
1
ξ
u.
The impact of cost-push shocks u on the price level increases with the degree
of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ. When ξ is small, nominal aggregate
demand is given a lower weight into the pricing rule, which increases the
relative weight assigned to cost-push shocks.
The central bank chooses its instrument to minimize its loss (4.3). The
monetary instrument is linear in central bank’s information ucb: I = νucb,
where ν stands for the monetary policy coefficient. When the central bank
has perfect information about the shock, its monetary instrument simplifies
to I = νu.
The loss under perfect information can be written as
L = λ( −
1
ξ
u)2 + [(
1
ξ
+ ν)u]2,
and minimizing it yields the following optimal monetary policy:
ν = −
1
ξ
. (4.5)
The corresponding unconditional expected loss is a function of the variance
of cost-push shocks:
E(L) =
λ
ξ2
σ2u.
The optimal monetary policy coefficient (4.5) is consistent with standard
optimal monetary policy analysis.6 The optimal monetary policy coefficient
6See Clarida et al. (1999) for an overview on standard New Keynesian monetary policy
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ν states that the central bank contracts nominal aggregate demand by −1
ξ
when the cost-push shock increases by one unit. Contracting aggregate de-
mand whenever cost-push shocks are positive is a standard result in mone-
tary policy and is known as the lean against the wind principle. As the price
level increases in the case of a positive cost-push shock, the central bank
contracts the nominal aggregate demand to stabilize it. The strength of the
central bank’s response increases with the degree of strategic complemen-
tarities.
The optimal monetary policy derived in this section illustrates that un-
der perfect common knowledge, the central bank finds it optimal to stabi-
lize the price level. By contrast, as we shall see in the next section, when the
monetary instrument is imperfect common knowledge among firms, opti-
mal monetary policy may call for output gap stabilization.
4.4 Imperfect common knowledge
We now turn to the more realistic case where the state of the economy is
imperfect common knowledge among firms because they have differential
information. We apply the methodology of Morris and Shin (2002) to our
framework of optimal monetary policy. The latter emphasize the relevance
of public information in an economy characterized by strategic complemen-
tarities and imperfect common knowledge. The context of their analysis fits
our framework particularly well as price setting of firms exhibits strategic
complementarities and as the monetary policy is imperfect common knowl-
edge among firms when the central bank is opaque with respect to its in-
strument.
4.4.1 Information structure
The information structure in the economy is as follows. The central bank
receives a private signal on the cost-push shock that deviates from the true
fundamental value by an error term that is normally distributed:
ucb = u + µ, with µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
µ).
analysis.
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The central bank chooses its instrument to minimize (4.3). The optimal
instrument rule of the central bank is a linear function of its signal and can
be written as
I = ν(u + µ). (4.6)
Each firm i receives a private signal on the cost-push shock ui. The pri-
vate signal of each firm deviates from the true cost-push shock by an error
term that is normally distributed:
ui = u + ρi, with ρi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ρ),
where ρi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
In addition to their private signal about the cost-push shock, firms get a
signal on the monetary instrument.The information conveyed by the central
bank’s disclosure depends upon its degree of transparency with respect to
its monetary instrument. Each firm i receives a signal on the central bank’s
assessment of the state of the economy that is written, for the sake of gener-
ality, as
Di = D + φi = u + µ + φi, with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ),
where σ2φ is the degree of transparency.
7 It captures the uncertainty sur-
rounding the monetary instrument in the economy. Since firms are ratio-
nal, they know the policy coefficient ν and can infer the instrument imple-
mented by the central bank from their signal on its economic assessment.
When the central bank is transparent, all firms perfectly observe the central
bank’s assessment (i.e. σ2φ→0) and the monetary instrument becomes com-
mon knowledge among them. By contrast, under opacity (i.e. σ2φ→∞), the
central bank’s disclosure does not contain any valuable information. This
increases the uncertainty of firms about the instrument.
Historically, central banks used to be extremely opaque and have be-
come recently more and more transparent about their instrument. For ex-
ample before February 1994, the Federal Reserve did not publicly report on
the federal funds rate it was targeting. In this context, the private sector
had to infer the policy decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee
7One can alternatively imagine that the central bank direclty provides information about
its instrument.
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from the market operations conducted by the trading-desk of the Fed. This
lack of transparency was a source of fundamental uncertainty about the rate
targeted by the Fed and of strategic uncertainty about the beliefs of others
about this target.
4.4.2 Equilibrium
To determine the perfect Bayesian equilibrium behaviour of firms, we
recall the optimal pricing rule (4.4) for convenience and substitute succes-
sively the average price level with higher-order expectations about the cost-
push shock and the monetary instrument
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + u + ξI]
= Ei
[
u + ξI + (1 − ξ)
[
Ē[u + ξI + (1 − ξ)[Ē[u + ξI + . . .]]]
]]
.
We denote by Ei(.) the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its in-
formation and by Ē(.) the average expectation operator such that Ē(.) =
∫
i
Ei(.)di. With heterogeneous information, the law of iterated expectations
fails and expectations of higher-order do not collapse to the average expec-
tation of degree one.8 Thus, we rewrite the pricing rule as
pi =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)kEi
[
Ē
(k)(u + ξI)
]
,
and averaging over firms yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ē
(k+1)(u + ξI)
]
, (4.7)
where Ē(k) stands for the higher-order expectation of degree k. We use the
following notation of higher-order expectations: Ē(0)(x) = x is the expected
variable x itself, Ē(1)(x) = Ē(x) is the average expectation of x, Ē(2)(x) =
ĒĒ
(1)(x) = ĒĒ(x) is the average expectation of the average expectation of x,
and so on.
8See Morris and Shin (2002).
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In order to solve the inference problem of each firm
Ei(u, I) = E[u, I|ui, Di],
we define the corresponding covariance matrix V4×4 and the relevant sub-
matrices
V =
(
Vuu Vuo
Vou Voo
)
.
The expectation of both the cost-push shock and the instrument conditional
on the information set of firm i is given by
E
(
u
I
ui, Di
)
= Ω
(
ui
Di
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
) (
ui
Di
)
(4.8)
=


σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ
σ2uσ
2
ρ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ
νσ2uσ
2
φ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ
ν(σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
µσ
2
ρ)
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ


(
ui
Di
)
,
where Ω = VuoV
−1
oo
.
We express the price equation (4.7) as
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[ (
1 ξ
)
ΩΞ
k
(
u
D
)
]
, (4.9)
where the matrix Ξ is given by the first-order expectation of the cost-push
shock u and the average central bank’s disclosure D
E
(
u
D
ui, Di
)
= Ξ
(
ui
Di
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
1
ν
Ω21
1
ν
Ω22
) (
ui
Di
)
.
Appendix 4.A shows that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium yields the linear
price setting of firm i
pi = γ1ui + γ2Di with (4.10)
γ1 =
(1−ξ)
ν
γ2Ω21 + Ω11 + ξΩ21
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω11
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)γ1Ω12 + Ω12 + ξΩ22
1 − (1−ξ)
ν
Ω22
.
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The optimal monetary policy consists of choosing the instrument (4.6)
that minimizes the loss (4.3) subject to the price rule (4.9).
According to (4.3), the central bank minimizes the unconditional ex-
pected loss
E(L) = var(p) + λ · var(c). (4.11)
The variance of the price level is given by
var(p) = (γ1 + γ2)
2σ2u + γ
2
2σ
2
µ,
and the variance of the output gap is
var(c) = (ν − γ1 − γ2)
2σ2u + (ν − γ2)
2σ2µ.
The optimal monetary policy will depend on the degree of central bank’s
transparency. We derive the optimal monetary policy first under opacity
and then under transparency.
4.4.3 Optimal montary policy under opacity
Under opacity (σ2φ→∞), firms do not observe the monetary instrument.
They are however aware that the central bank responds to cost-push shocks
according to its information and rationally use their private information ui
to infer the monetary instrument I .
In that case, the second column of Ω in (4.8) consists of zeros as the cen-
tral bank’s disclosure does not contain any valuable information. The solu-
tion to the inference problem of each firm boils down to
Ei(u, I) = E
(
u
I
ui
)
=
(
Ω1
Ω2
)
ui =
(
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
ρ
νσ2u
σ2u+σ
2
ρ
)
ui.
Plugging this into equation (4.7) yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ωk+11 (1 + ξν)u
]
=
Ω1(1 + ξν)
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω1
u =
σ2u
σ2ρ + ξσ
2
u
(1 + ξν)u = γ1u. (4.12)
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The optimal monetary policy consists of choosing the instrument (4.6)
that minimizes the unconditional expected loss (4.11) subject to the price
rule (4.12). The variance of the price level is simply given by
var(p) = γ21σ
2
u,
while the variance of the output gap is
var(c) = (ν − γ1)
2σ2u + ν
2σ2µ.
The fixed-point solution to this optimization problem yields the follow-
ing equilibrium price setting for firm i:
pi = γ1ui =
λσ2u
ξσ2u + σ
2
ρ
·
σ2uσ
4
ρ + ξ
2σ4uσ
2
µ + 2ξσ
2
uσ
2
ρσ
2
µ + σ
4
ρσ
2
µ + ξσ
4
uσ
2
ρ
ξ2σ6u + λσ
2
uσ
4
ρ + λξ
2σ4uσ
2
µ + 2λξσ
2
uσ
2
ρσ
2
µ + λσ
4
ρσ
2
µ
ui,
while the optimal monetary policy satisfies
ν = −
(ξΩ21 − λ(1 − Ω1)Ω1)σ
2
u
(ξ2Ω21 + λ(1 − Ω1)
2)σ2u + λ(1 − (1 − ξ)Ω1)
2σ2µ
=
λσ4uσ
2
ρ − ξσ
6
u
ξ2σ6u + λσ
2
uσ
4
ρ + λξ
2σ4uσ
2
µ + 2λξσ
2
uσ
2
ρσ
2
µ + λσ
4
ρσ
2
µ
. (4.13)
Interestingly, under opacity, the optimal monetary policy coefficient (4.13)
can be positive or negative depending on the parameter configuration. As
discussed above, cost-push shocks create a trade-off between price level and
output gap stabilization. The central bank’s disclosure influences the reac-
tion of the price level to monetary policy and thereby the trade-off the cen-
tral bank faces. Opacity reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy on
the price level as it increases fundamental and strategic uncertainty of firms
about the central bank’s action. Under opacity, the central bank’s influence
on the price level is limited as firms do not observe its instrument. So, con-
tracting the aggregate demand is relatively ineffective to reduce the price
level. Hence, the central bank may find it optimal to reduce the negative
output gap (instead of the price level) by increasing aggregate demand (i.e.
ν > 0).
Yet opacity is not a sufficient condition for the policy coefficient to be
positive. The sign of the policy coefficient (4.13) depends on the relation
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between the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ, the preference of
the central bank for output gap stabilization λ, and the relative precision of
firm’s information σ2ρ/σ
2
u. In particular, the following condition holds:
ν > 0 ⇔ ξ < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
. (4.14)
We propose to call the case where ν > 0 the blow with the wind principle,
according to which the central bank expands nominal aggregate demand
whenever cost-push shocks are positive. We now discuss the conditions for
ν > 0.
Degree of strategic complementarities The policy coefficient is pos-
itive when complementarities are high (ξ low). As opacity weakens the
effectiveness of monetary policy on the price level, strong complementar-
ities reduce it even further. Two related intuitions can be mentioned for
this effect to arise. First, when the degree of strategic complementarities
in the economy is high, higher-order expectations are given an increasing
weight in the price setting. This exacerbates the strategic uncertainty about
the monetary instrument that characterizes opacity and reduces the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy to stabilize the price level. This renders price
level stabilization ineffective compared to output gap stabilization and the
central bank finds it optimal to set a monetary policy coefficient that accom-
modates the aggregate demand: ν > 0. Second, when the degree of strategic
complementarities is high, the monetary instrument I has a small impact on
the price level. The price stabilization is less effective and more difficult to
achieve as aggregate demand variations have a smaller impact on the price
level. The central bank then faces a trade-off that incites it to stabilize the
output gap instead of the price level.
Figure 4.1 computes the central bank’s response ν as a function of strate-
gic complementarities 1− ξ with σ2u = 1, σ
2
ρ = 0.5, and λ = 1 for three values
of dispersion of central bank’s signals σ2µ. As strategic complementarities
increase, strategic uncertainty reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy
and the policy coefficient ν increases. Not surprisingly, the strength of the
central bank’s response (absolute value of ν) increases with the precision of
its signal.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal monetary policy under opacity (impact of xi)
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Figure 4.2: Optimal monetary policy under opacity (impact of σ2ρ)
Precision of private information When the relative precision of firms’
private information increases (σ2ρ/σ
2
u falls), the fundamental and strategic
uncertainty of firms about the monetary instrument decreases. The reduc-
tion of uncertainty makes the monetary policy more effective to stabilize
the price level and the trade-off favours the lean against the wind principle.
This increases the incentive of the central bank to reduce price deviation.
Firms also respond more strongly to cost-push shocks with more accurate
information. This implies that the strength of the central bank’s response
increases: the absolute value of the policy coefficient rises.
Figure 4.2 shows the optimal monetary policy as a function of the preci-
sion of firms’ private information σ2ρ, with σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
µ = 0.25, and λ = 1 for
three values of complementarities ξ. When the precision of firms’ private
information increases (σ2ρ falls), firms’ uncertainty about cost-push shocks
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is reduced and prices respond more strongly to cost-push shocks. This in-
creases the variability of the price level and the incentive of the central bank
to stabilize the price level.
Central bank’s preference Finally, when the central bank is more in-
clined towards price stabilization, the incentive of the central bank to con-
tract the nominal demand in order to reduce the price level increases in a
very intuitive way. Then the lean against the wind principle is preferred to
the blow with the wind principle.
4.4.4 Optimal monetary policy under transparency
This section derives the optimal monetary policy when the monetary
instrument is common knowledge among firms. In the case of full trans-
parency (σ2φ = 0), the solution to the inference problem of firm i is given
by
E
(
u
I
ui, D
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
) (
ui
D
)
=
(
σ2uσ
2
µ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
µ
σ2uσ
2
ρ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
µ
0 ν
) (
ui
D
)
.
The equilibrium pricing rule (4.10) is described by
pi =
σ2uσ
2
µ
ξσ2uσ
2
µ + σ
2
uσ
2
ρ + σ
2
µσ
2
ρ
ui +
[ σ2uσ
2
ρ
ξ(ξσ2uσ
2
µ + σ
2
uσ
2
ρ + σ
2
µσ
2
ρ)
+ ν
]
D. (4.15)
Minimizing the unconditional expected loss (4.11) subject to firms’ pric-
ing rule (4.15) yields the following optimal monetary policy:
ν = −
1
ξ
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
µ
< 0. (4.16)
The optimal policy under transparency coincides with the standard mone-
tary policy analysis and satisfies the lean against the wind principle. Indeed,
the standard literature assumes that the instrument is common knowledge
among firms (firms know the monetary instrument implemented by the
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Figure 4.3: Optimal monetary policy for intermediate degree of trans-
parency
central bank) but appears as a particular case in our framework (i.e. trans-
parency case).
4.4.5 Increase in central bank’s transparency
While the former analysis is restricted to extreme disclosure strategies
(i.e. opacity vs. transparency), the current section discusses the case of inter-
mediate levels of transparency (0 < σ2φ < ∞). More particularly, we examine
the impact of an increase in transparency about central bank’s monetary in-
strument on the optimal monetary policy. We show that small variations in
transparency or in central bank’s preferences can have large effects on the
optimal conduct of monetary policy.
Figure 4.3 computes the central bank’s response ν as a function of the
degree of transparency σ2φ, with σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
µ = 0.5, σ
2
ρ = 0.5, and ξ = 0.25 for
three values of λ, the weight assigned to output gap variability.
In the case of full transparency (σ2φ = 0), the policy coefficient ν is in-
dependent from the preference λ (as equation (4.16) shows) and always
negative whatever the parameter configuration. For intermediate levels of
transparency, the sign (and strength) of the policy coefficient depends on
the preference of the central bank and on the degree of transparency.
First, for a given level of transparency (say σ2φ = 0.9), a switch in prefer-
ence towards greater price level stabilization from λ = 1 to λ = 0.5 renders
the optimal monetary policy coefficient negative. When the central bank is
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less inclined towards output gap stabilization, it tends to contract nominal
aggregate demand in a larger extent in order to reduce inflation.
Second, a small increase in transparency (σ2φ falls) may also have a large
impact on the policy coefficient as it leads to a change in its sign. As more
transparency reduces the cost of reducing inflation, the central bank finds it
optimal to achieve a lower level of inflation by contracting nominal aggre-
gate demand in a larger extent.
4.4.6 Discussion
Our result with respect to the optimal monetary policy in response to
cost-push shocks under opacity gives an interesting insight into the conduct
of monetary policy in the 70s. Over this decade, the world economy has
experienced both important oil shocks and high inflation level. Yet, it seems
that oil shocks alone could not account for the high level of inflation. As
argued by Clarida et al. (2000) (p. 168) for the case of the US economy, “it
is hard to imagine [. . . ] that the 1973 oil shock alone could have generated high
inflation [. . . ] in the absence of an accommodating monetary policy.” While these
authors show that the conduct of monetary policy violated the so-called
Taylor principle9 in the pre-Volcker era and satisfied it during the Volcker-
Greenspan era, they conclude that (p. 178) “one important question [their]
paper raises but does not answer is the following: why is it that during the pre-
1979 period the Federal Reserve followed a rule that was clearly inferior?”. The
optimal monetary policy derived in our model provides a rationale for this
puzzle.
De Long (1997) extensively documents the evolution in the perception
of the response to be adopted in case of cost shock occurrence. He under-
lines central bankers’ concern for the impact of a restrictive monetary policy
on output and more particularly on unemployment. Our model shows that
the trade-off between inflation and output strongly depends on the level of
transparency in the economy. In the case of opacity, the trade-off is clearly
unfavourable to inflation stabilization. The central bank can only reduce
inflation at the cost of a strong decrease in output; as it becomes more trans-
9The Taylor principle calls for an increase in nominal interest rate larger than the rise in
expected inflation, so that the real interest rate rises as well. A central bank following this
principle fights inflation as it contracts the economy whenever inflation expectations rise.
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parent, the central bank can reduce inflation at a lower cost. De Long ar-
gues that the main reason for the inflation in the 70s lies in the “shadow of
the Great Depression”. The fear of recession and the excessive emphasis on
the output gap10 are somehow rationalized in our model as the reduction of
inflation leads to a much higher contraction in output under opacity than
under transparency.
Hence, we can illustrate the development in the conduct of monetary
policy in the US as follows. In the pre-Volcker era, the Fed was rather
opaque with respect to nominal aggregate demand and did not assign as
much weight to price stabilization as it does today. Our framework shows
that opacity and some considerations for output gap may explain why cen-
tral banks conducted an accommodating monetary policy in response to oil
shocks. This policy configuration is represented by the point A in figure 4.3.
Then, under Volcker, the Fed became much more inclined towards price
stabilization.11 This corresponds to a reduction in the value of λ and may
imply according to (4.14) a switch from the blow with wind to the lean against
the wind principle. In figure 4.3, the move from A to B illustrates the shift in
the conduct of monetary policy as Volcker took office.
Finally, under the influence of Greenspan, the Fed becomes much more
transparent. Our analysis then suggests that the lean against the wind princi-
ple is always optimal when the degree of common knowledge about mone-
tary instrument (nominal aggregate demand) is high among firms whatever
the parameter configuration. As point C indicates on the figure, when the
central bank is very transparent, the optimal monetary policy satisfies the
lean against the wind principle even if the preference for output gap stabiliza-
tion is large (λ = 2).
4.4.7 Phillips curves and economic outcomes
This section interprets former monetary policy issues in terms of Phillips
curves. The latter describe the price-output combinations the central bank
can achieve with its policy. Since the degree of transparency drives the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize prices, it also shapes the slope of
the Phillips curve.
10See Orphanides (2005)
11See Orphanides (2005).
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Figure 4.4: Phillips curves and economic outcomes under opacity: impact
of strategic complementarities
Full opacity
The case of opacity derived in section 4.4.3 is represented by figure 4.4.
It is computed with σ2µ = σ
2
ρ = σ
2
u/2 and λ = 1 (σ
2
φ → ∞ under opacity).
As opacity enhances uncertainty about the monetary instrument, its effec-
tiveness is driven by the degree of strategic complementarities 1− ξ and the
precision of firms’ information σ2ρ/σ
2
u. More particularly, when complemen-
tarities are extremely strong or precision of firms’ information nearly zero
(ξ → 0 or σ2ρ → ∞), the effectiveness of monetary policy on prices is highly
limited and the corresponding Phillips curve is horizontal.
Suppose that the economic outcome in the absence of central bank’s in-
tervention is written O. When the central bank is opaque, the degree of
complementarities relatively strong, and firms’ information not too accu-
rate, condition (4.14) says that the optimal monetary policy is expansive.
The resulting economic outcomes are written A and B in figure 4.4. Re-
ducing complementarities or increasing precision of firms’ information re-
duces uncertainty (or its impact) and raises the slope of the Phillips curve
under opacity as figure 4.4 shows. When firms’ information is very accurate
(σ2ρ → 0), the curve is vertical. From the slope of the Phillips curve depends
whether the monetary policy is expansive (points A and B) or contractive
(point C).
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Figure 4.5: Phillips curves and economic outcomes: impact of transparency
(λ = 1)
Intermediate degrees of transparency
Figures 4.5 illustrate the economic outcome for different degrees of trans-
parency. The parameter values are σ2µ = σ
2
ρ = σ
2
u/2, ξ = 0.25, and λ = 1. The
dotted line represents the possible price-output combinations for a fully
transparent central bank. In this case, since monetary policy is common
knowledge among firms, the Phillips curve is vertical. The solid line is the
Phillips curve for full opacity. The slope of the curve falls with strategic
complementarities, and rises with the precision of firms’ private informa-
tion and with the degree of transparency. Under opacity and when the curve
is relatively flat, the optimal monetary policy is expansive and leads to the
economic outcome indicated by point A. By contrast, when transparency
increases or when complementarities weaken or when firms’ information is
more accurate, the Phillips curve becomes steeper. This yields a contractive
optimal monetary policy (point B). Finally, with full transparency the policy
is always contractive and the outcome is given by C.
One can make the following digression with respect to the rule that the
central bank would follow according to its communication strategy. Un-
der opacity, the central bank chooses the inflation-output gap combination
given by the point A in figure 4.5. When a positive cost-push shock oc-
curs, firms’ expectation of inflation rises. Interestingly, the optimal mon-
etary policy under opacity consists of increasing inflation even more by
accommodating nominal aggregate demand. This suggests that when the
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Figure 4.6: Phillips curves and economic outcomes: impact of transparency
(λ = 0.3)
central bank seeks to reach the point A, the Taylor principle12 is violated
since the increase of inflation expectation is not reduced by contractive pol-
icy.13 By contrast, for higher degree of transparency, the point B indicates
that the central bank contracts nominal aggregate demand in response to
the increase in inflation expectation: the Taylor principle is satisfied. The de-
gree of transparency then rationalizes the observation made by Clarida et al.
(2000) concerning the satisfaction or violation of the Taylor principle. Note
that the literature in the vein of Barro and Gordon (1983) does not address
this issue since it considers excess inflation as a permanent phenomenon.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the case where the central bank is more inclined
towards price stabilization (λ = 0.3). The optimal monetary policy may be
restrictive even for an opaque central bank. The point A shows the outcome
resulting from a contractive monetary policy.
4.5 Conclusion
The accommodating monetary policy of the 70s is usually rationalized
within the Barro-Gordon framework. This literature presumes that the high
12According to the Taylor principle, the central bank should contract the economy when-
ever inflation expectation rises in order to fight inflation.
13This result however suggests that the nature of the increase of inflation expectation
is crucial to determine the optimal policy under opacity. While the violation of the Taylor
principle seems to be optimal when the increase in inflation expectation is caused by a cost-
push shock, this would not be optimal if the increase in expectation would be unfounded
(sun spot).
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inflation episode comes from the incentive of the central bank to push the
output above its natural level and to cheat the private sector.
By contrast, our analysis shows that, even in the absence of inflationary
bias, a credible central bank may find it optimal to accommodate monetary
policy in response to cost-push shocks whenever the uncertainty surround-
ing its monetary instrument is high. Our model highlights the relevance
of central bank’s disclosure for the effectiveness of monetary policy in an
economy characterized by strategic complementarities and imperfect com-
mon knowledge. In particular, central bank’s opacity linked to some pref-
erence for output gap stabilization yields an optimal monetary policy that
violates the lean against the wind principle. As the central bank faces a trade-
off between price and output gap stabilization, its disclosure influences the
effectiveness of its policy, and thereby whether it will be involved into price
or output gap stabilization. Briefly, this chapter rationalizes why inflation
is lower when the central bank is transparent with respect to its monetary
instrument.
4.A Appendix: Linear pricing rule
This appendix solves the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the pricing
rule of firms given by equation (4.9).
We first postulate that the optimal price of firm i is a linear combination
of its two signals
pi = γ1ui + γ2Di. (4.17)
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pric-
ing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average price
is therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(u) + γ2Ei(D). (4.18)
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (4.4) and replacing the expectations of firm
i about u, D, and I yields
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + u + ξI]
= (1 − ξ)[γ1Ei(u) + γ2Ei(D)] + Ei(u) + ξEi(I)
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= (1 − ξ)[γ1(Ω11ui + Ω12Di) + γ2(
Ω21
ν
ui +
Ω22
ν
Di)]
+Ω11ui + Ω12Di + ξΩ21ui + ξΩ22Di.
Rearranging gives
pi = ui[(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω11 + γ2
Ω21
ν
) + Ω11 + ξΩ21]
+Di[(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω12 + γ2
Ω22
ν
) + Ω12 + ξΩ22].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
(1−ξ)
ν
γ2Ω21 + Ω11 + ξΩ21
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω11
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)γ1Ω12 + Ω12 + ξΩ22
1 − (1−ξ)
ν
Ω22
.
This system of equations is equivalent to (4.10) in the text.
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Chapter 5
Monetary Policy and its
Informative Value1
5.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, there has been a switch in central banks’ prac-
tice from secrecy to transparency. Generally speaking, central bank’s trans-
parency refers to the absence of asymmetric information between the cen-
tral bank and the private sector. This trend in central banking has given
rise to a growing literature about the pros and cons of higher transparency.
Higher transparency is usually rationalized by the economic benefits and
democratic accountability required from an independent central bank.2
The literature mainly focuses on the impact of economic and political
transparency of central banks in the Barro and Gordon (1983) framework.
As central banks are presumed to systematically boost the economy above
its natural level, the literature examines the extent to which transparency
helps to reduce the inflation bias and time-inconsistency problem and to
increase the credibility and flexibility of central banks.3
Yet, in the current context of central bank’s independence and histori-
cally – and durable – low levels of inflation, many central banks have reached
a high degree of credibility. On the one hand, the benefit of independence
1This chapter has been developed with the collaboration of Camille Cornand.
2These are the two main premises of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in
Monetary and Financial Policies (paragraph 4) adopted by the Interim Committee of the
Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF (1999)).
3See Geraats (2002) for an overview.
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from political interferences is nowadays commonly accepted.4 On the other
hand, central bankers are aware that boosting the output above its natural
level would be inflationary and consider that the assumption of inflationary
biased central banks does not capture the actual rationale for the conduct
of monetary policy.5 In particular, Blinder (1998), King (1997), and Vick-
ers (1998) argue that the Barro-Gordon argument is not applicable to their
respective central banks.6
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the benefits and costs of trans-
parency for well-established and credible central banks. Under these cir-
cumstances, the question of transparency deals with the provision of cen-
tral bank’s information to the private sector about its economic assessment.
There is an ongoing debate about whether a central bank should explain its
decisions: many central banks discuss nowadays whether they should pub-
lish their macroeconomic forecasts or the minutes of deliberations of their
policy board.
Recently, the literature has raised questions about the value of having
central banks provide more and better information to the public. There is
a general presumption that more information enhances efficiency as eco-
nomic agents make better decisions when they are better informed. Yet, in
their seminal beauty contest paper, Morris and Shin (2002) – emphasizing
the relevance of strategic complementarities underlying most of macroe-
conomic aggregates – argue that, in an environment characterized by im-
perfect common knowledge and strategic complementarities, more accurate
public information may be detrimental to welfare because public informa-
tion is attributed too large a weight relative to its face value. Their argu-
ment has received a great deal of attention in the academic literature, the
financial press7, and central banks8. In a closely related work, Amato et al.
4For example, as politicians gave their opinion about the conduct of monetary policy by
the European Central Bank, its president at that time, Wim Duisenberg, stated that it was
a “normal phenomenon” to observe suggestions from politicians but that “it would be very
abnormal if those suggestions were to be listened to” (The Economist (1998)).
5Note that we have shown in chapter 4 that the lack of credibility is not necessary for
the central bank to implement an accommodating policy in response to positive cost-push
shocks.
6For a discussion of this issue, see Cukierman (2002). Blinder (2000) also shows that
there is a strong consensus among central bankers about the importance and benefit of
credibility.
7See The Economist (2004).
8See for example Kohn (2005) and Issing (2005).
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(2002) interpret the model by Morris and Shin (2002) as a Lucas-Phelps is-
lands economy in which firms try to second-guess the pricing strategies of
their competitors. Challenging this result, Hellwig (2005) shows in a fully
micro-founded model that more accurate public information about mon-
etary shocks is always welfare increasing because it reduces price disper-
sion.9 In chapter 3, we have developed another argument in favour of trans-
parency by showing that when the economy is hit by demand shocks that
the central bank tries to offset, transparency is particularly beneficial when
central bank’s information is rather noisy.
The present chapter contributes to this debate on the welfare effects of
economic transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. While Hellwig
(2005) considers the case where money supply follows a stochastic process,
we focus on the optimal monetary policy. Our analysis is based on a model
of monopolistic competition with imperfect common knowledge and where
two shocks affect the economy, namely demand and cost-push shocks. Both
the central bank and firms are uncertain about the true state of the econ-
omy. Our approach has two main characteristics. First, we concentrate on
the effect of economic transparency in the case where the central bank has
no inflationary bias and where the private sector perfectly knows its prefer-
ences. Second, we consider the instrument of the central bank not only as
an action that stabilizes the economy but also as a signal that partially re-
veals to firms its own imperfect assessment of the state of the economy. The
signaling role of monetary policy has been well documented by Romer and
Romer (2000). Using US data, they show that “the Federal Reserve’s actions
signal its information” and that “commercial forecasters raise their expectations of
inflation in response to contractionary Federal Reserve actions [...]” (p. 430). So,
monetary policy entails a dual role, as an action and as a vehicle for infor-
mation. The central bank chooses its instrument by optimally balancing its
action and information purposes.
In our set-up, an opaque central bank does not share its information about
the state of the economy with firms. When the economy is simultaneously
hit by many types of shocks, firms are unable to properly interpret the mon-
etary instrument as they cannot disentangle the rationale behind it. For
instance, the central bank may implement an expansionary instrument ei-
9See chapter 2 section 2.3 for a detailed discussion.
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ther because of a negative demand shock or because of a negative cost-push
shock. This confusion reduces the informative value of the instrument on
both fundamental shocks and on the beliefs of others about these shocks. By
contrast, a transparent central bank discloses enough information so that it
reveals to firms its assessment of fundamental shocks. A transparent central
bank thus discloses an additional announcement indicating its own signals
on the state of the economy.
Walsh (2006) considers a similar framework. However, his work differs
to ours in two respects. First, he assumes prices to be sticky. This implies
transmission mechanisms to be forward-looking. Second, his central bank
imperfectly controls a real variable (the output gap) while ours imperfectly
controls the nominal aggregate demand.
This chapter analyzes the welfare effect of economic transparency, that
is the extent to which the central bank should fully reveal to firms its own
assessment of fundamental shocks (namely demand and cost-push shocks).
We derive the optimal monetary policy and optimal central bank’s disclo-
sure strategy. The welfare analysis of transparency is driven by three inter-
twined effects.
First, transparency has a positive incentive effect on the optimal monetary
policy. As firms are unable to properly disentangle the reasons behind the
instrument under opacity, the central bank balances the action and informa-
tion purposes of its monetary instrument. This distorts its policy away from
what would be optimal with respect to the action purpose only. By contrast,
under transparency, since its assessments are revealed to firms, the central
bank implements the instrument that is optimal from the perspective of its
sole action purpose.
Second, transparency has a positive uncertainty effect with respect to de-
mand shocks. Reducing the fundamental and strategic uncertainties about
demand shocks is welfare increasing. This arises because demand shocks
can be neutralized by the policy implemented by the central bank. Even if
central bank’s information about demand shocks is noisy, transparency is
welfare increasing since it reveals to firms how monetary policy influences
the economy firms have to respond to. This mechanism is in line with the
conclusion of chapter 3.
Third, transparency has a negative uncertainty effect with respect to cost-
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push shocks. Cost-push shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank as
they create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization. Re-
ducing the fundamental and strategic uncertainty about cost-push shocks
owing to transparency is consequently detrimental to welfare since it ex-
acerbates the response of each firm to cost-push shocks and increases the
resulting loss.
Overall, we show that transparency is welfare increasing (i) when the
degree of strategic complementarities is low, (ii) when the economy is not
too affected by cost-push shocks (relative to other shocks), (iii) when the
central bank is more inclined towards price level rather than output gap
stabilization, (iv) when firms have relatively precise private information,
and (v) when the central bank has information that is relatively precise on
demand shocks and relatively imprecise on cost-push shocks. Hence, our
framework gives a rationale for the development of the economy over the
last decades. Increasing transparency10 seems appropriate in the current
context of declining occurrence and amplitude of cost-push shocks11 and
increasing inclination of central banks towards price stabilization.
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 outlines
a monopolistic competition economy, in which firms’ pricing decisions rep-
resent strategic complements. Section 5.3 considers a benchmark case un-
der perfect common knowledge that recalls standard findings in monetary
policy analysis and gives useful insights for the intuition behind our main
results. Section 5.4 turns to the case of imperfect common knowledge and
examines the optimal monetary policy and transparency. This section con-
siders how announcements affect the optimal policy responses to demand
and cost-push shocks and whether transparency is welfare increasing. Fi-
nally section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive
firms, and a central bank. We abstract here from the microfounded mar-
ket interactions since they are very standard and focus on the optimal be-
10The increase in transparency in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years is stud-
ied by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006).
11See Andersen and Wascher (2001) and Blanchard and Simon (2001).
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haviour of firms.12
5.2.1 Firms
The central equation of our model is given by the optimal pricing rule of
firms. This is derived from an economy where the representative household
consumes a composite good à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and where goods
are imperfect substitutes. In such a context, the optimal price set by firm i is
pi = Ei[p + ξc + u], (5.1)
where Ei is the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its informa-
tion, p the overall price level, c the output gap, and u the cost-push shock.
The pricing rule (5.1) says that each firm sets its price according to both its
own expectations about the real output gap and the cost-push shock, and
its expectations about the overall price level. Per definition, the nominal ag-
gregate demand deviation is the sum of deviations of the output gap and
the price level: i.e. y = c + p. So, one can write the pricing rule as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξy + u]. (5.2)
The parameter ξ captures the impact of the real output gap on prices (through
wages). A large ξ means that the representative household is highly risk
averse and that output gaps imply large variations in wages and thereby in
prices. ξ also describes whether prices are strategic complements or substi-
tutes. We assume that 0 < ξ < 1, which implies that prices are strategic
complements, meaning that firms tend to raise their price whenever they
expect the others to do so. This assumption seems very natural and cap-
tures the concept of beauty contest introduced by Keynes: firms base their
decision not only on their own expectations of fundamentals but also on the
so-called higher-order expectations, i.e. expectations of the average expec-
tations of fundamentals, up to an infinite number of iterations.
12See appendix 1.A for the derivation of the microfoundations.
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5.2.2 The central bank
Based on its information, the central bank minimizes both the variabil-
ity of the output gap c and that of the price level p owing to its monetary
instrument I :
min
I
Ecb[λc
2 + p2], (5.3)
where λ is the weight assigned to the output gap variability. The mone-
tary instrument implemented by the central bank is a linear combination
of its signals on shocks: I = ν1gcb + ν2ucb. ν1 and ν2 are the policy coeffi-
cients, and gcb and ucb stand for the central bank’s signals on demand and
mark-up shocks, respectively. We assume that the monetary instrument I
implemented by the central bank partially determines nominal aggregate
demand. Precisely, the nominal aggregate demand y is the sum of the cen-
tral bank’s instrument I and of the demand shock g, i.e. y = I + g. So, the
pricing rule becomes
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξg + u + ξI]. (5.4)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both shocks affecting the econ-
omy are normally and independently distributed:
g ∼ N(0, σ2g)
u ∼ N(0, σ2u).
5.3 Perfect common knowledge
Standard monetary policy analysis assumes that information is common
knowledge among firms. While this chapter deals with monetary policy un-
der imperfect common knowledge, the current section derives, as a bench-
mark, the optimal monetary policy under perfect common knowledge.
When information is perfect and common to all firms, every firm sets the
same price. The pricing rule (5.4) then simplifies to
pi = p = I + g +
1
ξ
u.
Note that the impact of cost-push shocks u on the price level increases with
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the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ. As discussed in appendix
1.A, when the economy is highly extensive (ξ small), firms assign a smaller
weight to the nominal aggregate demand and a relatively larger one to the
cost-push shock and to average price level.
When the central bank has perfect information as well, its instrument
simplifies to
I = ν1g + ν2u.
The resulting loss under perfect information is
L = λ
(
−
1
ξ
u
)2
+
[
(1 + ν1)g + (
1
ξ
+ ν2)u
]2
,
and minimizing the unconditional expected loss yields the following opti-
mal monetary policy:
ν1 = −1
ν2 = −
1
ξ
.
The corresponding unconditional expected loss is a function of the variance
of cost-push shocks and yields
E(L) =
λ
ξ2
σ2u.
This result is consistent with standard optimal monetary policy analy-
sis.13 The coefficient ν1 indicates that the central bank perfectly offsets de-
mand shocks. Since the monetary instrument is part of the nominal aggre-
gate demand, the central bank is able to offset demand shocks. By closing
the output gap, the central bank also gets rid of price deviations. So demand
shocks are perfectly neutralized.
By contrast, cost-push shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank
as they create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization.
Indeed, in the absence of any monetary policy action, a positive cost-push
shock raises the price level and generates a negative output gap. While price
level stabilization calls for a contractionary policy, output gap stabilization
13See Clarida et al. (1999) for an overview on standard New Keynesian monetary policy.
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requires an expansionary one. Under perfect common knowledge, the op-
timal monetary policy coefficient ν2 states that the central bank lowers its
instrument by −1
ξ
when the cost-push shock increases by one unit (i.e. con-
tractionary policy). As the price level increases because of a positive cost-
push shock, the central bank contracts the nominal aggregate demand so
that the price level is completely stabilized (i.e. p = 0). The resulting output
gap is c = −1
ξ
u. The strength of the central bank’s response increases with
the degree of strategic complementarities. Contracting aggregate demand
whenever cost-push shocks are positive is a standard result in monetary
policy and is known as the lean against the wind principle.14
5.4 Imperfect common knowledge
We now turn to the more realistic case where the state of the economy
is imperfect common knowledge among firms because they have differen-
tial information. We derive the optimal monetary policy as a function of
the central bank’s transparency and then analyze the welfare effect of trans-
parency. As information provided by the monetary instrument influences
firms’ reaction, the optimal policy varies according to the communication
strategy adopted by the central bank.
We assume that the monetary instrument is perfectly observed by firms.
This corresponds to the current practice of most central banks.15 By setting
its instrument publicly, the central bank implicitly discloses a public signal
to firms. However, without additional information, firms are unable to un-
derstand the central bank’s assessment of the economy. This is the reason
why many central banks, additionally to revealing the level of their instru-
ment (e.g. the level of the overnight interest rate), explain their decision.
A clear trend in this respect is the switch towards communication of the
minutes of Monetary Policy Committee discussions. This section precisely
aims at evaluating such communication strategies by considering whether
the central bank should disclose additional information in the form of an
14As we shall see below, this standard principle does not necessarily hold under imper-
fect common knowledge.
15Note that the transparency of the monetary instrument is often rationalized by the fact
that it renders monetary policy more effective as it exempts the private sector to “waste
effort inferring the stance of monetary policy from diffuse signals generated in the day-to-day imple-
mentation of policy” (Greenspan (2001)). See chapter 1 section 1.2.2 for an overview.
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explicit announcement that precisely reveals to the private sector its view
about the state of the economy.
The information structure of the central bank is as follows. The central
bank receives a signal on both the demand and the cost-push shocks in pri-
vate. Each signal – or estimate – deviates from the true fundamental value
by an error term that is normally distributed:
gcb = g + η, with η ∼ N(0, σ
2
η)
ucb = u + µ, with µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
µ),
where η and µ are independently distributed.
The central bank chooses its instrument to minimize (5.3). Since both
fundamental shocks and both error terms are independently normally dis-
tributed, the optimal instrument rule of the central bank is a linear combi-
nation of its signals and can be written as
I = ν1(g + η) + ν2(u + µ). (5.5)
We first present the case where the central bank does not announce the
rationale behind its instrument (opacity) and second the case where it re-
veals its own signals with an explicit announcement (transparency). Then
we compare and discuss the optimal disclosure policy.
5.4.1 No announcement (opacity)
Each firm i receives a private signal on the cost-push shock ui that can
be interpreted as a private estimate. The private signal of each firm deviates
from the true cost-push shock by an error term that is normally distributed:
ui = u + ρi, with ρi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ρ),
where ρi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
Firms also receive a public signal in the form of the monetary policy in-
strument (5.5). By setting its instrument, the central bank gives an indication
to firms of its own beliefs about the state of the economy. Yet, without an-
nouncement, firms are uncertain about the right interpretation of the mone-
tary instrument and about how others may interpret it. Firms rationally use
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the monetary instrument to infer the fundamental shocks g and u, and the
expectations of other firms about these shocks.
Equilibrium
To determine the perfect Bayesian equilibrium behaviour of firms, we
recall the optimal pricing rule (5.4) for convenience and substitute succes-
sively the average price level with higher-order expectations about the de-
mand and cost-push shocks and the monetary instrument
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξg + u + ξI]
= Ei
[
ξg + u + ξI + (1 − ξ)
[
Ē[ξg + u + ξI + (1 − ξ)[Ē[ξg + u + ξI + . . .]]]
]]
.
We denote by Ei(.) the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its in-
formation and by Ē(.) the average expectation operator such that Ē(.) =
∫
i
Ei(.)di. With heterogeneous information, the law of iterated expectations
fails and expectations of higher-order do not collapse to the average expec-
tation of degree one.16 Thus, we rewrite the pricing rule as
pi =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)kEi
[
Ē
(k)(ξg + u + ξI)
]
,
and averaging over firms yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ē
(k+1)(ξg + u + ξI)
]
, (5.6)
where k is the degree of higher-order iterations. We use the notation: Ē(0)(x) =
x, Ē(1)(x) = Ē(x), and Ē(2)(x) = ĒĒ(1)(x) = ĒĒ(x). The price level p is
a weighted average of higher-order expectations of the nominal aggregate
demand g + I and the cost-push shock u. The corresponding output gap is
given by
c = y − p = g + I −
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[
Ē
(k+1)(ξg + u + ξI)
]
.
16See Morris and Shin (2002).
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The output gap is the difference between the nominal aggregate demand
and the weighted average of higher-order expectations of the demand shock
g, the cost-push shock u, and the monetary instrument I . As fundamental
and strategic uncertainties about nominal aggregate demand increase, the
real effect of variations in nominal demand increases as well. In the partic-
ular case where it is common knowledge, nominal aggregate demand has
only a price effect. This does not mean however that the central bank cannot
stabilize (fully or partially) both demand and cost-push shocks.
In order to solve the inference problem of each firm
Ei(g, u) = E[g, u|ui, I],
we define the corresponding covariance matrix V4×4 and the relevant sub-
matrices
V =
(
Vuu Vuo
Vou Voo
)
.
The expectation of shocks conditional on the private and public signals of
firm i is given by
E
(
g
u
ui, I
)
= Ω
(
ui
I
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
) (
ui
I
)
,
where Ω = VuoV
−1
oo
.
Using this, equation (5.6) becomes
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
[ (
ξ 1
)
ΩΞ
k
(
u
I
)
+ ξI
]
, (5.7)
where
Ξ =
(
Ω21 Ω22
0 1
)
.
Appendix 5.A derives the equilibrium pricing rule. The equilibrium
strategy for firm i is a linear combination of its private signal on cost-push
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shocks ui and the public signal I :
pi = γ1ui + γ2I with (5.8)
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + Ω21
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω21
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)γ1Ω22 + ξ(1 + Ω12) + Ω22
ξ
.
Optimal monetary policy
This section derives the optimal monetary policy under opacity. The
central bank sets its monetary instrument (5.5) to minimize the expected
loss (5.3) subject to the price rule (5.8). The unconditional expected loss is
given by
E(L) = var(p) + λ · var(c).
First, the variance of the price level p can be written as
var(p) = (γ2ν1)
2σ2g + (γ2ν1)
2σ2η + (γ1 + γ2ν2)
2σ2u + (γ2ν2)
2σ2µ.
Secondly, we determine the variance of the output gap. The output gap is
c = I + g − p
= g − γ1u + (1 − γ2)I.
Therefore, the variance of the output gap yields
var(c) = (1 + (1 − γ2)ν1)
2σ2g + ((1 − γ2)ν1)
2σ2η
+((1 − γ2)ν2 − γ1)
2σ2u + ((1 − γ2)ν2)
2σ2µ.
As the monetary policy is both an action and a vehicle for information,
the central bank chooses its instrument by optimally balancing its action
and information purposes.
The instrument that is optimal from the perspective of its action is given
by the optimal monetary policy in the case where both the central bank
and firms share the same information. Indeed, when firms already know
(before observing the instrument) the central bank’s assessment of the state
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Figure 5.1: Optimal monetary policy under opacity
of the economy, the central bank has no incentive to distort its instrument
in order to disguise its signals. When central bank’s and firms’ information
is symmetric, the monetary instrument reflects its action purpose only.
However, as soon as firms have imperfect information about the central
bank’s assessment, the central bank can reduce its loss by considering also
the informative value of its instrument. The information purpose of mon-
etary policy calls for making the instrument as less informative as possible
on cost-push shocks and as informative as possible on demand shocks.
Figure 5.1 shows the optimal monetary policy as a function of σ2ρ, the
variance of the error terms of firms’ private signal on cost-push shocks. The
precision of firms’ information declines moving from the left to the right
part of the graph. The optimal monetary policy is computed with the fol-
lowing parameter values: σ2g = 1, σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2, and λ = 1.
Three cases can be distinguished with respect to the precision of firms’ in-
formation.
First, when firms have perfect information on the cost-push shock (σ2ρ =
0), the central bank implements the policy that is optimal from the perspec-
tive of its action and ignores the informative value of its instrument. In-
deed, the central bank has no incentive to disguise its signal on the cost-
push shock by altering its policy because firms already know the true cost-
push shock. At the same time, revealing its signal on the demand shock to
firms is not welfare detrimental since demand shocks are neutralized.17 The
17Chapter 3 shows that transparency reduces the distorting effect of the monetary instru-
ment implemented by a central bank with poorly accurate information.
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strength of demand shock neutralization depends on the precision of cen-
tral bank’s information. In the present case where the variance of the error
term is one fifth of the variance of the true demand shock, the optimal neu-
tralization becomes ν1 = −
σ2g
σ2g+σ
2
η
= −0.833. In a similar way, the response
of the central bank to cost-push shocks ν2 = −
1
ξ
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
µ
increases (in abso-
lute value) with the precision of its information. The response to cost-push
shocks also depends on the degree of strategic complementarities. As the
latter increases, cost-push shocks are given an increasing relative weight in
the pricing decision of firms and the central bank responds more strongly.
With higher complementarities, monetary policy is less effective because
nominal aggregate demand management has a small impact on prices when
the economy is “highly extensive”.
Second, when firms’ private information is extremely noisy, again the
central bank fully neutralizes demand shocks according to the precision of
its information, i.e. ν1 → −
σ2g
σ2g+σ
2
η
as σ2ρ → ∞. However, the central bank
does not respond to cost-push shocks because firms do not react to them
since they get very noisy private signals, i.e. ν2 → 0 as σ
2
ρ → ∞.
Third, for intermediate values of information precision, the optimal mon-
etary policy depends on both the precision of private information and the
degree of strategic complementarities. We first describe the central bank’s
response to cost-push shocks and then its response to demand shocks.
The optimal policy can be divided into two policy regions. When λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
<
ξ, the central bank responds to cost-push shocks according to the so-called
lean against the wind principle by contracting the nominal aggregate demand
whenever its signal on the cost-push shock is positive (i.e. ν2 < 0). And
when ξ < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
, it implements a slightly expansionary instrument when-
ever its signal on the cost-push shock is positive.18 The sign of the policy
coefficient ν2 depends on the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize
the price level. Under opacity, the uncertainty of firms about the policy re-
sponse of the central bank to cost-push shocks is large and this reduces the
impact of the policy on the price level. As discussed in section 5.3, cost-push
shocks create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization.
18Interestingly, the condition for the policy coefficient ν2 to be positive is identical to that
derived in chapter 4 under opacity even if the monetary instrument is common knowledge
in the current chapter (while it was uncertain in chapter 4). See equation (4.14).
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The central bank is involved either in price level or output gap stabilization
according to the effectiveness of its policy to stabilize the price level. This ef-
fectiveness is high when firms’ fundamental and strategic uncertainty about
the central bank’s response to cost-push shocks is low. This arises either
when firms’ private information is highly accurate (i.e. private signals are
good indicators for central bank’s response) or when strategic complemen-
tarities are weak (i.e. strategic uncertainty plays only a minor role). Other-
wise, as uncertainty surrounding the response to cost-push shocks is high,
the central bank finds it optimal to stabilize the output gap by expanding
nominal demand in response to positive cost-push shocks. The strength of
the policy response to cost-push shocks ν2 declines with σ
2
ρ. As the quality
of firms’ information decreases, prices react also less to firms’ expected cost-
push shocks and the central bank finds it optimal to respond less strongly
to them as well. By doing so, the central bank reduces the informative value
of its instrument about cost-push shocks.
The response of the central bank to demand shocks also depends on
whether ξ is larger than λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
. In the region where λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
< ξ, the central
bank finds it optimal to respond more aggressively to demand shocks than
it would do in the perspective of its sole action purpose. As firms have rela-
tively precise information about cost-push shocks, the central bank strength-
ens its response to demand shocks to make its instrument less informative
about cost-push shocks. When λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
= ξ, as the central bank does not re-
spond to cost-push shocks (ν2 = 0), the optimal response to demand shocks
coincides with the policy required by a pure action motive. And finally,
when ξ < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
, the central bank weakens its response to demand shocks.
Compared to the policy case where the pure action purpose matters for the
setting of the instrument, this policy reduces the informative value of the
instrument about its cost-push shock signal and increases its value about its
demand shock signal.
5.4.2 Announcement (transparency)
Although the instrument provides information on the central bank’s sig-
nals, it does not allow firms to properly understand the reason for the cho-
sen monetary policy. As most central banks publish their instrument target,
many of them are even more transparent and make the minutes of their
130
Monetary Policy Committee deliberations available to the public. This re-
veals to the public the viewpoint of the central bank about the economy and
rationalizes the monetary instrument.
As in the former case without announcement (opacity), each firm re-
ceives a private signal on the cost-push shocks ui and the monetary instru-
ment I is publicly available. With both demand and cost-push shocks hit-
ting the economy, the sole observation of the monetary instrument does not
allow firms to disentangle the extent to which each shock is responsible for
the instrument. In the current set-up, the central bank can remove uncer-
tainty about the rationale for the instrument by explicitly announcing (one
of) its signals. This renders the informative purpose of the monetary instru-
ment redundant and induces the central bank to implement its instrument
for its action purpose only. We qualify such a central bank as transparent
since its announcement eliminates any information asymmetry between it-
self and firms. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the central bank
directly announces its signal on the demand shock gcb.
19 In this context,
firms rationally use their three signals to infer the fundamental shocks and
other firms’ expectations about them.
Equilibrium
This section solves the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and derives the opti-
mal behaviour of firms and of the central bank. We proceed as in the former
section to solve the inference problem each firm faces
E[g, u, I|ui, I, gcb]
and define the corresponding covariance matrix V6×6 and the relevant sub-
matrices
19One may think of different types of announcement that would reveal central bank’s
signals to firms. In practice, the publication of inflation forecast and/or target appears to be
the main form of announcement adopted by transparent central banks. Indeed, inflation is
a concept firms are familiar with and is likely to be better interpreted than other measures,
like output gap for example. Nevertheless, announcement of the inflation or output gap
targets are equivalent in our context of rational expectations.
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V =
(
Vuu Vuo
Vou Voo
)
.
The expectation of the fundamental shocks conditional on the private
and public signals of firm i is given by
E



g
u
I
ui, I, gcb


 = ΩT



ui
I
gcb


 =



Ω11 Ω12 Ω13
Ω21 Ω22 Ω23
0 1 0






ui
I
gcb


 ,
where Ω = VuoV
−1
oo
.
Using this result into the price rule (5.6) yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1 − ξ)k
(
ξ 1 ξ
)
ΩΞ
k



u
I
gcb


 , (5.9)
where
Ξ =



Ω21 Ω22 Ω23
0 1 0
0 0 1


 .
As appendix 5.A shows, the price level equation (5.9) is a linear combi-
nation of the cost-push shock u and of the public signals I and gcb:
p = γ1u + γ2I + γ3gcb with (5.10)
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + Ω21
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω21
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)γ1Ω22 + ξ(1 + Ω12) + Ω22
ξ
γ3 =
(1 − ξ)γ1Ω23 + ξΩ13 + Ω23
ξ
.
Optimal monetary policy
The central bank sets its monetary instrument to minimize the expected
loss given the precision of its information. First, the variance of the price
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level p can be written as
var(p) = (γ2ν1 + γ3)
2σ2g + (γ2ν1 + γ3)
2σ2η + (γ1 + γ2ν2)
2σ2u + (γ2ν2)
2σ2µ.
Secondly, we determine the variance of the output gap. The output gap is
c = I + g − p
= g − γ1u + (1 − γ2)I − γ3gcb.
Therefore,
var(c) = (1 + (1 − γ2)ν1 − γ3)
2σ2g + ((1 − γ2)ν1 − γ3)
2σ2η
+((1 − γ2)ν2 − γ1)
2σ2u + ((1 − γ2)ν2)
2σ2µ.
With the additional announcement, firms are able to perfectly disentan-
gle the signals of the central bank. Thus the central bank cannot influence
firms’ beliefs by altering its instrument. The central bank does not face, un-
like under opacity, the problem of optimally balancing the action and infor-
mation purposes of its monetary instrument anymore. On the contrary, the
central bank implements the instrument that is optimal from the perspec-
tive of its action purpose only. The corresponding coefficients of monetary
policy satisfy:
ν1 = −
σ2g
σ2g + σ
2
η
(5.11)
ν2 = −
1
ξ
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
µ
. (5.12)
As stated above, equation (5.11) indicates that the central bank tries to
fully neutralize demand shocks according to the precision of its signal. The
central bank’s response to cost-push shocks (5.12) increases with the preci-
sion of its information. However, the response also depends on the degree
of strategic complementarities since monetary policy is less effective for in-
fluencing the price level.
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5.4.3 Welfare effect of transparency
This section analyzes the welfare effect of transparency. The main results
are the following. First, transparency is welfare increasing with respect to
demand shocks but detrimental with respect to cost-push shocks. As de-
mand shocks can be neutralized by the central bank, reducing uncertainty
about how the central bank responds to them helps stabilizing the econ-
omy.20 By contrast, reducing uncertainty about cost-push shocks is detri-
mental as it exacerbates firms’ reaction and raises the resulting loss since
the central bank cannot neutralize this type of shocks. Transparency is wel-
fare improving either when cost-push shocks are not too relevant compared
to demand shocks or when the degree of strategic complementarities is low
as firms’ pricing decision relies less on cost-push shocks. Second, trans-
parency is particularly beneficial when the central bank is more inclined to-
wards price stabilization. Indeed, transparency increases the effectiveness
of monetary policy on the price level.
We first describe the three mechanisms that drive these results. Then,
we compare the welfare level under opacity versus transparency, and em-
phasize the impact of the degree of strategic complementarities (1 − ξ), of
the precision of firms’ private information σ2ρ, of the variance of cost-push
shocks σ2u, and of the preference of the central bank for output gap stabiliza-
tion λ.
Effects at stake
Our results are driven by three effects. First, transparency has a posi-
tive incentive effect on the optimal monetary policy. In the absence of trans-
parency, firms are unable to disentangle the reasons behind the monetary
instrument. Monetary policy then entails a dual role, which induces the cen-
tral bank to optimally balance the action and information purposes of its in-
strument. Transparency eliminates the informative value of the instrument
(or makes it redundant) and the central bank focuses on its action purpose.
The incentive effect of transparency is welfare increasing as transparency
allows the central bank to choose the instrument that optimally stabilizes
the economy.
20This result is consistent with our conclusion of chapter 3.
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Figure 5.2: Welfare effect of transparency: impact of ξ
Second, transparency has a positive uncertainty effect with respect to de-
mand shocks on the behaviour of firms. Transparency reduces both fun-
damental and strategic uncertainties about demand shocks. Reducing this
uncertainty is welfare improving since demand shocks can be neutralized
by the central bank. As discussed in chapter 3, this mainly departs from the
conclusion by Morris and Shin (2002) because our framework additionally
accounts for the action taken by the central bank.
Third, transparency has a negative uncertainty effect with respect to cost-
push shocks. As cost-push shocks create a trade-off between price and out-
put gap stabilization, they cannot be neutralized by the central bank. Reduc-
ing uncertainty about cost-push shocks is thus welfare detrimental because
it exacerbates the reaction of firms to them.
Degree of strategic complementarities and precision of private informa-
tion
Figure 5.2 represents the ratio of the unconditional expected loss under
transparency (i.e. with announcement) to the unconditional expected loss
under opacity (i.e. without announcement) E(LT /LO) as a function of strate-
gic complementarities ξ for three values of precision of firms’ information
σ2ρ. Transparency is welfare detrimental whenever the ratio is larger than
one. The model is solved numerically with the following parameter values:
σ2g = 1, σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2, and λ = 1.
Transparency is welfare detrimental when the negative uncertainty ef-
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fect with respect to cost-push shocks dominates both positive incentive and
uncertainty effects with respect to demand shocks. Removing uncertainty
about cost-push shocks is highly relevant either when higher-order expec-
tations are given a large weight or when firms have very noisy information
about them.
Figure 5.2 shows that transparency is welfare detrimental when the de-
gree of strategic complementarities (1 − ξ) is high. Price setting in an econ-
omy with a high degree of strategic complementarities is characterized by
two intertwined features. First, prices are mainly determined by cost-push
shocks when complementarities are high because demand shocks have a
limited impact on prices as the economy is highly extensive. Second, firms
are more sensitive to other firms’ pricing decision. This implies that, with
increasing strategic complementarities, firms put an increasing weight on
higher-order expectations of cost-push shocks. In this context, the detri-
mental effect of transparency is driven by the negative uncertainty effect
related to cost-push shocks. Indeed, when strategic complementarities are
strong, transparency, by reducing higher-order uncertainty, induces firms to
strongly react to cost-push shocks.
The precision of firms’ private information strongly influences the ef-
fects at stake. In the case where firms’ private information is very noisy, the
detrimental uncertainty effect of transparency dominates its positive incen-
tive effect. When firms already have precise private information, reducing
uncertainty on fundamental shocks and higher-order expectations has a rel-
atively small negative effect compared to the positive incentive effect. So,
transparency is welfare detrimental when complementarities are high and
as long as firms’ private information is not too precise.
Relative importance of cost-push shocks
Figure 5.3 represents the ratio E(LT /LO) as a function of the variance
of cost-push shocks for three levels of strategic complementarities. Other
parameter values are σ2g = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2σ
2
u, σ
2
ρ = 0.2σ
2
u, and λ = 1.
The variance of cost-push shocks σ2u captures the importance of cost-
push shocks in the economy. When there is no cost-push shock (σ2u = 0),
the question of transparency is irrelevant to welfare whatever the degree
of strategic complementarities. As the central bank exclusively responds
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Figure 5.3: Welfare effect of transparency: impact of σ2u
to demand shocks, firms perfectly interpret the rationale behind the mon-
etary instrument even under opacity. So, the optimal monetary policy and
the economic outcome cannot be distinguished between opacity and trans-
parency.
However, as soon as σ2u increases, the first panel of figure 5.3 shows that
the welfare effect of transparency depends on both the degree of strategic
complementarities and the importance of cost-push shocks in the economy,
relative to demand shocks. As discussed in the previous section, trans-
parency tends to improve welfare when complementarities are weak. But
whatever the degree of strategic complementarities, transparency turns out
to be welfare detrimental as the relative importance of cost-push shocks in-
creases. Indeed, since cost-push shocks cannot be neutralized by the central
bank, the detrimental uncertainty effect of transparency dominates as cost-
push shocks become more relevant. The second panel of figure 5.3 allows
the variance of cost-push shocks to become very large. Transparency is wel-
fare detrimental even in the case of low complementarities (ξ = 0.7) when
the importance of cost-push shocks is very high relative to that of demand
shocks.
Central bank’s preference for output gap stabilization
Figure 5.4 illustrates the ratio E(LT /LO) as a function of σ
2
u for three lev-
els of λ, the weight the central bank assigns to output gap variability. The
parameter values used for the simulation are σ2g = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2σ
2
u,
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σ2ρ = 0.2σ
2
u, and ξ = 0.5.
It turns out that transparency is welfare improving when the central
bank is more inclined towards price stabilization. Indeed, the central bank
more effectively influences firms’ behaviour and thus the price level when
it is transparent. As the central bank becomes more inclined towards price
level stabilization (λ falls), the optimal central bank’s response to cost-push
shocks under opacity becomes stronger. Indeed, as the central bank’s in-
fluence on firms’ behaviour is limited under opacity, it finds it optimal to
respond more strongly to shocks to better control the price level. In order to
reduce price variability, the central bank more strongly expands or contracts
nominal aggregate demand subsequent to cost-push shocks. This makes the
monetary instrument more informative about cost-push shocks and consid-
erably reduces the negative uncertainty effect of transparency.
Precision of central bank’s signal on cost-push shocks
Figure 5.5 illustrates the ratio E(LT /LO) as a function of the precision
of central bank’s information on cost-push shocks σ2µ for three levels of ξ.
The parameter values used for the simulation are σ2g = 1, σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2,
σ2ρ = 0.2, and λ = 1.
This figure shows that transparency is welfare improving as the preci-
sion of central bank’s signal on cost-push shocks decreases. The intuition
is straightforward. Transparency is welfare detrimental when it exacerbates
firms’ reaction to cost-push shocks. But with poorly accurate central bank’s
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Figure 5.5: Welfare effect of transparency: impact of σ2µ
information about cost-push shocks, the announcement does not contain
much valuable information about them. As more accurate information on
cost-push shocks exacerbates firms’ reaction, noisy central bank’s informa-
tion reduces the pertinence of the announcement with respect to cost-push
shocks. But, as transparency does not provide much information about cost-
push shocks when σ2µ is large, it provides firms with valuable information
about demand shocks and central bank’s response to them.
When the economy is exclusively hit by demand shocks, transparency
allows the central bank to better stabilize the economy since firms know the
policy implemented by the central bank. With both demand and cost-push
shocks hitting the economy and imprecise central bank’s information about
cost-push shocks, transparency also improves the neutralization of demand
shocks without increasing too much the loss due to cost-push shocks.
Discussion
Our framework potentially rationalizes the recent trend towards trans-
parency in the conduct of monetary policy with respect to a couple of styl-
ized facts. First, the occurrence and amplitude of cost-push shocks have
declined over the last decades.21 Our model suggests that economic trans-
parency turns out to be more beneficial as the economy becomes less sensi-
tive to cost-push shocks. Second, central banks are more inclined towards
price stability today than they were in the past. Indeed, the recent switch
21See Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Andersen and Wascher (2001).
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from secrecy to transparency is often motivated by the will of central banks
to publicly reveal their intention to stabilize prices.22 In this respect, our
model suggests that stronger price stabilization calls for higher economic
transparency. Since the main aim of political transparency (openness about
policy objective, explicit inflation target) is better price stabilization, our re-
sult highlights that economic transparency should go along with political
transparency.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the
conduct of monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge on the state
of the economy. The main characteristic of our analysis is to recognize that
monetary policy entails a dual role: the instrument of the central bank is
both an action that stabilizes the economy and a signal that partially reveals
to firms the central bank’s assessment of the state of the economy. We derive
both the optimal monetary policy and the optimal central bank’s disclosure.
The notion of transparency considered in this chapter is the following.
The observation of the monetary instrument does not allow firms to disen-
tangle the central bank’s opinion about each shock. A transparent central
bank removes this uncertainty by disclosing an additional announcement
that explains to the private sector the rationale behind its instrument. Under
opacity, firms are unable to perfectly disentangle the central bank’s signals
responsible for the instrument. So, the central bank chooses its instrument
by optimally balancing its action and information purposes. By contrast,
under transparency, the central bank allows firms to identify the rationale
behind the instrument and implements the policy that is optimal in the per-
spective of its sole action purpose.
In this context, we show that transparency is welfare increasing (i) when
the degree of strategic complementarities is low, (ii) when the economy is
not too much affected by cost-push shocks, (iii) when the central bank is
more inclined towards price stabilization, (iv) when firms have relatively
precise private information, and (v) when the central bank has information
that is relatively precise on demand shocks and relatively imprecise on cost-
22See Geraats (2002) and Rogoff (2003).
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push shocks.
This result rationalizes the increase in central bank’s transparency in the
current context where cost-push shocks have a relatively low impact on the
economic development. Since central banks that assign a large weight on
price stabilization tend to be transparent with respect to their political tar-
gets, our framework suggests that economic transparency should go along
with political transparency.
5.A Appendix: Linear resolutions
This appendix solves the rational expectations equilibrium for the pric-
ing rule of firms given by equation (5.7) and (5.9) under opacity and under
transparency.
Opacity case
We first postulate that the optimal price of firm i is a linear combination
of its two signals
pi = γ1ui + γ2I.
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pric-
ing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average price
is therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(u) + γ2I.
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (5.4) and replacing the expectations of firm
i about shocks yields
pi = (1 − ξ)[γ1Ei(u) + γ2I] + ξI + ξEi(g) + Ei(u)
= (1 − ξ)[γ1(Ω21ui + Ω22I) + γ2I]
+ξI + ξ(Ω11ui + Ω12I) + (Ω21ui + Ω22I).
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Rearranging gives
pi = ui[(1 − ξ)γ1Ω21 + ξΩ11 + Ω21]
+I[(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω22 + γ2) + ξ(1 + Ω12) + Ω22].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + Ω21
1 − (1 − ξ)Ω21
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)γ1Ω22 + ξ(1 + Ω12) + Ω22
ξ
.
This solution is equivalent to equation (5.8) in the text.
Transparency case
In the case of transparency, the optimal price of firm i is assumed to be a
linear combination of its three signals
pi = γ1ui + γ2I + γ3gcb.
The optimal weights γ1, γ2, and γ3 depend on firms’ expectations about the
pricing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average
price is therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(u) + γ2I + γ3gcb.
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (5.4) and replacing the expectations of any
firm i about shocks yields
pi = (1 − ξ)[γ1Ei(u) + γ2I + γ3gcb] + ξI + ξEi(g) + Ei(u)
= (1 − ξ)[γ1(ΩT21ui + ΩT22I + ΩT23gcb) + γ2I + γ3gcb]
+ξI + ξ(ΩT11ui + ΩT12I + ΩT13gcb) + (ΩT21ui + ΩT22I + ΩT23gcb).
Rearranging gives
pi = ui[(1 − ξ)γ1ΩT21 + ξΩT11 + ΩT21]
+I[(1 − ξ)(γ1ΩT22 + γ2) + ξ(1 + ΩT12) + ΩT22]
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+gcb[(1 − ξ)(γ1ΩT23 + γ3) + ξΩT13 + ΩT23].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
ξΩT11 + ΩT21
1 − (1 − ξ)ΩT21
γ2 =
(1 − ξ)γ1ΩT22 + ξ(1 + ΩT12) + ΩT22
ξ
γ3 =
(1 − ξ)γ1ΩT23 + ξΩT13 + ΩT23
ξ
.
This solution is equivalent to equation (5.10) in the text.
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Chapter 6
Sticky Information and Monetary
Policy
6.1 Introduction
Monetary policy analysis is mainly based on two equations: a Phillips
curve that describes the set of feasible inflation-output combinations and an
objective function that describes the target of the central bank. The opti-
mality of monetary policy crucially depends on how money is supposed to
influence the real economy. This chapter compares optimal monetary policy
in economies where money nonneutrality is caused either by sticky price or
sticky information.
Standard monetary policy analysis builds on the sticky-price Phillips
curve in the tradition of Calvo (1983).1 In that economy, price adjustment
is time-contingent. Every period, each firm can adjust its price with some
probability. When a firm has the opportunity to adjust its price, this ad-
justment may remain effective for future periods. Therefore, the firm sets a
price equal to a weighted average of the current and expected future opti-
mal prices. As a result, the Phillips curve is forward-looking. Yet, the sticky-
price Phillips curve seems to be inconsistent with some basic empirical evi-
dence.2 It is especially unable to account for the gradual impact of monetary
shocks on inflation. The pertinence of the policy recommendations arising
1See Clarida et al. (1999) for a comprehensive overview.
2We discuss below the critiques of the sticky-price Phillips curve made by Ball (1994),
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Mankiw (2001), and Mankiw and Reis (2002).
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from a model that suffers from obvious anomalies may be thrown into ques-
tion.
Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose a new Phillips curve where prices are
flexible but information spreads slowly through the population. They show
that the Phillips curve derived from the sticky-information economy fits the
standard facts more accurately. In particular, permanent monetary shocks
generate a gradual impact on inflation in the sticky-information Phillips
curve in the sense that inflation rises over time and reaches its maximum
with a substantial delay after the monetary innovation.
Inflation expectations play an essential role in the determination of cur-
rent inflation in both models. But while the current inflation depends on
current expectations about future inflation in the (forward-looking) sticky-
price model, it is past expectations about current inflation and output gap
that determine the current inflation in the sticky-information model. This
feature accounts for different monetary policy conclusions.
Ball et al. (2005) address the question of the optimal monetary policy in
an economy where information is sticky. They derive the optimal policy
from a microfounded welfare function that calls for minimizing the rela-
tive price dispersion. Their welfare analysis suggests that the central bank
should implement any deterministic path of price level since it minimizes
price dispersion. But whether the deterministic target path is stationary,
expansionary or oscillatory is irrelevant in terms of welfare. As argued by
Fuhrer (2002), these conclusions are suspect since the foundations of the
welfare losses are peculiar to this model.
By contrast, our analysis focuses on a flexible inflation targeting central
bank. The aim of this chapter is to compare the optimal monetary policy
in response to cost-push shocks with the sticky-information Phillips curve
to the standard analysis based on the sticky-price Phillips curve when the
central bank’s concern is about inflation. We show that the optimal target-
ing rule under commitment in the sticky-information model (contrary to
sticky price) has no history-dependence in the sense of Woodford (1999a) but
is forward-looking. As a result, the price level is not stationary in the sticky-
information economy.
Section 6.2 presents the sticky-price and sticky-information Phillips curves.
We address the extent to which cost-push shocks generate a gradual impact
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on inflation with sticky information. It turns out that the impact on infla-
tion is gradual when information faster spreads among firms than the shock
wears off. The optimal targeting rules are derived in section 6.3 and the eco-
nomic outcomes are presented in section 6.4. The optimal output gap path
is strongly influenced by whether the impulse response of inflation is grad-
ual or not. In particular, when the impact of cost-push shocks on inflation is
gradual, the central bank acting under commitment finds it optimal to wait
that information disseminates in the population before fighting inflation by
strongly contracting the output gap. The central bank contracts the econ-
omy to fight inflation when the spread of information is high. This comes
from the fact that reducing inflation is much less costly when firms are in-
formed than when they are not. It also suggests that any communication
policy that tends to increase the speed of information dissemination deteri-
orates welfare. Finally, section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The model
In the following section, we discuss the sticky-price versus sticky-information
Phillips curve, and motivate our choice to consider an inflation targeting
policy objective.
In a monopolistic competitive economy, firms’ prices are strategic com-
plements. The optimal price for each firm i in period t is a function of the
expected price level pt and the expected output gap ct. The linearized ex-
pression of the price setting rule is given by
pi,t = Ei,t[pt + ξct], (6.1)
where ξ captures the sensitivity of real wage conditions and thereby prices
to the output gap.3 Per definition, the following identity equation holds:
yt = ct + pt, where yt is the nominal aggregate demand. Plugging this into
the pricing rule (6.1) yields
pi,t = Ei,t[(1 − ξ)pt + ξyt]. (6.2)
The degree of strategic complementarities is driven by the parameter ξ.
3See microfoundations in section 1.A.
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If ξ is small, the output gap weakly influences the real wage and each firm
more strongly weights the average price level into its pricing rule. Note
that in the absence of frictions and under perfect common knowledge, the
pricing decision (6.2) becomes pt = yt. In this case, variations of the nominal
aggregate demand would have a strong impact on the price level but no
impact at all on the output gap. For monetary policy to have a real impact
on the economy, some imperfections or rigidities must be added into the
model. We first present the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve that is
built on the assumption that prices are sticky. Then we turn to the Phillips
curve derived by Mankiw and Reis (2002) that assumes sticky information.
6.2.1 Sticky-price Phillips curve
The sticky-price Phillips curve describes how inflation is related to the
economic activity and to the private sector’s expectations in an economy
where price adjustment is time-contingent. Under monopolistic competi-
tion, the optimal price a firm would set in each period t is given by (6.2).
Yet, prices are assumed to be sticky in this economy. In the tradition of
Calvo (1983), each agent is given the opportunity to adjust his price with
some probability α every period.4 When an agent has the opportunity to
adjust his price, he recognizes that the price he chooses may remain effec-
tive for a while and sets a price p∗i,t equal to a weighted average of current
and expected future optimal prices pi,t+j determined by
p∗i,t = (1 − (1 − α)β)
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jβjEi,t[pi,t+j] (6.3)
= (1 − (1 − α)β)
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jβjEi,t[(1 − ξ)pt+j + ξyt+j] (6.4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) stands for the discount factor of an agent adjusting his
price. The private agent assigns less weight to prices that are further in the
future since it may get another price adjustment opportunity in the sub-
sequent periods. The next date for price adjustment is geometrically dis-
tributed. Since firms are homogeneous with respect to their price setting
4Alternatively, Cochrane (1995) shows that this model can be derived from an economy
with convex costs of changing prices.
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rule and information they have, every firm adjusting its price in period t
sets the same price p∗i,t. To derive the sticky-price Phillips curve, we express
the current price level as
pt = αp
∗
i,t + (1 − α)pt−1. (6.5)
Combining (6.3) and (6.5), we get
1 − α
α
(pt − pt−1) = (1 − (1 − α)β)
[
ξ(yt − pt) + pt
+(1 − α)β
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jβjEi,t[(1 − ξ)pt+1+j + ξyt+1+j]
]
− pt
= (1 − (1 − α)β)[ξ(yt − pt)] +
(1 − α)β
α
Et(pt+1 − pt),
which is equivalent to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve
πt = κct + βEtπt+1 + ut, (6.6)
where πt = pt − pt−1 and κ =
αξ(1−(1−α)β)
1−α
. The relation between inflation
and output gap is perturbed by the cost-push shock ut. In the absence of
cost-push shocks, the output gap could be filled by stabilizing inflation to
zero. The introduction of this shock gives rise to a trade-off between infla-
tion stabilization and output gap stabilization: it changes the equilibrium
level of output under flexible prices without changing the efficient level of
output. Cost-push shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1)-process in the
form ut = ρut−1 + ǫt, where ǫt is white noise.
5
Many economists have recently emphasized that the sticky-price Phillips
curve (6.6) makes some implausible predictions about the effects of mone-
tary policy on the economic activity.6
First, Ball (1994) shows that the sticky-price Phillips curve predicts cred-
ibly announced disinflation to create a boom rather than a recession. The
former statement contradicts the standard observation that slowdowns in
money growth caused recessions in the last decades.7 This counterfactual
5Note that adding the cost-push shock u in the Phillips curve (6.6) is equivalent to intro-
ducing it into (6.1) since the cost-push shock u is exogeneous.
6See Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and Christiano et al. (2005) for empirical evidence.
7One may argue that the announced disinflations were contractionary because of a lack
of credibility. However, the prediction of the sticky-price Phillips curve also contradicts the
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feature arises because of the forward-looking behaviour of firms. When the
central bank announces a future slowdown in money growth, the price de-
velopment will experience a slowdown as well. But firms that get a price
adjusting opportunity between the announcement and the implementation
of disinflation recognize that their price will remain effective for a while
and act in advance by reducing their price increase before the policy is im-
plemented even if money growth is still unchanged. This implies that the
slowdown in price increase will precede the reduction in money growth,
which increases real money balances and yields a boom.
Second, Mankiw (2001) documents the fact that monetary shocks have
their maximal impact on inflation instantaneously in the sticky-price Phillips
curve. Yet, empirical observation shows a substantial delay between mon-
etary shocks and their maximal impact on inflation (i.e. the impact on in-
flation is gradual in the sense that inflation rises after the shock occurs over
some quarters).8
Third, as underlined by Mankiw and Reis (2002), the sticky-price Phillips
curve shows a slightly negative correlation between the change in infla-
tion and the level of economic activity. This contradicts the acceleration
phenomenon observed in real data. These empirical anomalies seem to be
caused by the lack of inflation inertia. Although the price level is sticky in
the sticky-price Phillips curve, the inflation rate itself can change quickly.9
The sticky-price Phillips curve also violates the strict natural rate hy-
pothesis according to which no announced monetary policy can keep out-
put permanently high. McCallum (1994) argues that satisfaction of the nat-
ural rate hypothesis is a criterion that models used for monetary policy
should meet. This hypothesis states that output should be equal to potential
output on average, regardless of monetary policy regime, that is
Ect = 0.
The sticky-price Phillips curve violates this hypothesis since permanently
falling inflation keeps output permanently high.10 This is shown by apply-
intuition about the effect of a slowdown in money growth on the real economy.
8See Friedman (1968) and Christiano et al. (1996) for empirical evidence.
9See Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
10Yun (1996) shows that indexing all prices to the steady-state inflation rate makes the
sticky-price model conform to the natural rate hypothesis.
149
ing the unconditional expectation operator E(·) to (6.6), which can then be
written as
E(πt − βπt+1) = κξEct.
We recognize from the previous expression that a permanent decline in in-
flation keeps the output gap permanently positive.
In spite of its poor dynamic properties briefly mentioned above, the
sticky-price Phillips curve has become the workhorse for monetary policy
analysis. We now turn to the newly competing Phillips curve.
6.2.2 Sticky-information Phillips curve
Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose an alternative Phillips curve derived
from an economy where prices are fully flexible but where information spreads
slowly through the population.11 Money non-neutrality arises in the econ-
omy because of the limited ability of individuals to process information.
The behavioural foundation of their model returns to Friedman’s idea that
private agents often fail to incorporate all available macroeconomic infor-
mation into their decision-making. Again, the optimal price an agent would
set in each period, if information were perfect, is given by equation (6.2).
While an agent can adjust his price every period, he only updates his infor-
mation set on current and future states of the economy with the probability
α every period. This means that every period t a fraction α of firms sets its
price based on available information in period t while the remaining frac-
tion 1−α of firms sets its price in period t on past information about current
period t. More precisely, the fraction of firms that sets its price based on in-
formation available in period t− j is given by α(1−α)j for ∀j ≥ 0. Informa-
tion includes all variables that are relevant to the development of economic
outcomes.12 On receiving an information update, a rational agent computes
his optimal prices path for the current and all future periods (based on that
11Lucas (1972) first underlines that real effects of purely nominal disturbances result from
imperfect information. However, his model predicts only highly transitory effects on real
activity because common knowledge is achieved immediately in the subsequent period
after a shock. By contrast, information in the model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) literally
never becomes common knowledge.
12Note that models considered in the previous chapters formalize imperfect common
knowledge by assuming that all firms get imperfect and differential information about the
economy. By contrast, the model of Mankiw and Reis assumes that some firms get perfect
information while others no information at all.
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information). Therefore, the price an agent sets in any period t is the optimal
price for the period t expected at the date of the last information update, i.e.
Et−jpi,t if his last information update occurred j periods ago.
The price level is a weighted average of current and past expectations of
the current optimal price (6.1)
pt = α
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jEt−jpi,t
= α
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jEt−j(pt + ξct). (6.7)
To derive the sticky-information Phillips curve, we rewrite (6.7) as
pt =
αξ
1 − α
ct + α
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jEt−1−j(pt + ξct). (6.8)
Expressing (6.7) as in the previous period yields
pt−1 = α
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jEt−1−j(pt−1 + ξct−1). (6.9)
Subtracting (6.9) from (6.8), we get the sticky-information Phillips curve
πt =
αξ
1 − α
ct + α
∞∑
j=0
(1 − α)jEt−1−j(πt + ξ∆ct) + ut, (6.10)
where πt = pt−pt−1 and ∆ct = ct−ct−1. Again, we assume that the inflation-
output gap relation is disturbed by the introduction of the cost-push shock
ut in the absence of which monetary policy would be trivial (as it would
simultaneously stabilize inflation by closing the output gap). Cost-push
shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1)-process in the form ut = ρut−1 + ǫt,
where ǫt is white noise.
Mankiw and Reis (2002) show that the sticky-information Phillips curve
fits the standard facts more accurately. First, disinflation always causes a
contraction, even if pre-announced. Monetary policy is neutral in the ex-
tent that it is common knowledge among all firms. The degree of common
knowledge in the sticky-information Phillips curve increases with the frac-
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tion of informed firms, that is with the length of the pre-announcement.
Monetary policy is common knowledge only in the limit when it is an-
nounced an infinite number of periods before its implementation such that
all firms are informed. When the announcement occurs some periods before
implementation, the degree of common knowledge increases compared to
the case without pre-announcement. This reduces the detrimental effect of
disinflation but does not remove it totally.
Second, monetary policy shocks have their maximum impact on infla-
tion with a substantial delay. The intuition behind the hump-shaped re-
sponse of inflation is as follows. Suppose a sudden permanent increase in
money supply. Since prices are flexible, a firm updating its information in
period t decides its future price path following two reasonings. On the one
hand, abstracting from strategic complementarities (ξ = 1), fundamentals
call for a unique price increase in the updating period. This would imply a
maximal impact of the monetary shock on inflation at the date of the shock
since the fraction of firms updating subsequently their information for the
first time α(1−α)j decreases over time. However, on the other hand, strate-
gic motives incite firms to raise their price only when others raise it as well.
As a consequence, firms updating their information at the date of the shock
t plan to increase their rise in price over time because the coordination mo-
tive incites them to “wait” that others raise their price as well. As a result of
both effects, the impact of new information on first updating firms is limited
as the coordination motive prevents them to fully react immediately.
And third, the sticky-information model can explain the acceleration
phenomenon: inflation is positively correlated with output gap.
The sticky-information Phillips curve does also satisfy the strict natural
rate hypothesis since no announced monetary policy can permanently in-
crease the output. By applying the unconditional expectation to the Phillips
curve (6.10) and under the assumption of perfect foresight (i.e. all agents
know the true state of the economy because the last innovation occurred at
t = −∞), we obtain
E(ct) = (1 − α)E(ct−1).
The latter expression implies that the output gap converges toward zero, i.e.
that the sticky-information Phillips curve (6.10) conforms to the natural rate
hypothesis.
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Delayed and gradual effect on inflation
While the main merit of the sticky-information Phillips curve (6.10) is its
power to reproduce the gradual and inertial property of inflation observed
in real data, this feature is not inherent to the model but principally depends
on the relation between the persistence of shocks hitting the economy and
the speed of information dissemination in the population.
Mankiw and Reis (2002) illustrate the gradual impact of permanent mon-
etary shocks on inflation when strategic complementarities are relatively
strong. As we show below, highly persistent shocks (relative to the speed of
information dissemination) and strong complementarities are essential for
the sticky-information Phillips curve to create gradual inflation. The con-
tribution of this section is to discuss the parameters configuration for this
Phillips curve to yield a delayed and gradual effect of shocks on inflation.13
We restrict our analysis to the simple following case. Suppose that the
economy is in equilibrium and that the private sector expects it to remain
so forever. This initial equilibrium assumption implies that the expectations
built before period zero E−1(·), E−2(·), . . . , E−∞(·) are all equal to zero. Then,
the economy is hit in the initial period 0 by a unique innovation in cost-
push shock ǫ0 = u0 with known correlation ρ. Since the innovation ǫ0 is
the only innovation in the economy (i.e. ǫt = 0, ∀t > 0), expectations about
future economic conditions are all homogeneous regardless of the period of
information update. And finally, the rational private sector slowly learns
about the initial cost-push innovation and adjusts its expectations.
Under these two assumptions and by restricting our attention to the ra-
tional expectation equilibrium, one can rewrite the Phillips curve (6.10) in a
more convenient way as
πt = atct − at−1ct−1 + btu0 ∀t ≥ 0, (6.11)
13Collard and Dellas (2003) address the extent to which an alternative information dis-
semination scheme yields a gradual inflation response by replacing the random scheme
suggested by Calvo by that suggested by Taylor (i.e. information update at fixed intervals).
They show that sticky information with the Taylor scheme does not lead to gradual infla-
tion. This arises because a long lasting lack of common knowledge is necessary for inflation
to be gradual (what is difficult to achieve with Taylor scheme unless updating intervals are
rather long).
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where
at = ξ
(( 1
1 − α
)t+1
− 1
)
and
bt =
( ρ
1 − α
)t
.
Note that the Phillips curve (6.11) describes the development of the Phillips
curve according to a unique innovation at period t = 0. This relation be-
comes steeper and steeper with the information dissemination, moving from
a short-run to a long-run Phillips curve.14 If an additional innovation would
occur in an unfolding period, then a new short-run Phillips curve would
describe the inflation-output combination with respect to this unexpected
innovation.
To illustrate the intrinsic gradual inflation of the Phillips curve, we close
the model with a rule that links inflation to the output gap. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that inflation and output gap evolve in a symmetric
way and set
ct = −ιπt
with ι > 0. Using this we rewrite (6.11) as
πt = −ιatπt + ιat−1πt−1 + btu0
=
bt
1 + ιat
u0 +
ιat−1
1 + ιat
πt−1.
Substituting successively for lagged inflation, one can express current
inflation as a function of the initial shock u0,
πt =
{
Ψtbt +
t∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
(ιΨt−jat−1−j)Ψt−ibt−i
}
u0 ∀t ≥ 0, (6.12)
where
Ψt =
1
1 + ιat
.
We now determine the parameters configuration that leads to a gradual
impact of cost-push shocks on inflation, i.e. to an increasing inflation over
time. We first examine the conditions for inflation to increase from the initial
14Note some similarities with our result in chapter 4 section 4.4.7. We show in a different
informational context that the slope of the Phillips curve increases with the degree of central
bank’s transparency.
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period of the innovation t = 0 to the following period t = 1. Inflation in the
initial and subsequent periods is given by
π0 = Ψ0b0u0
π1 = [Ψ1b1 + ιΨ1a0Ψ0b0]u0.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the gradual inflation increase from period 0 to pe-
riod 1: ∆ = π1 − π0 as function of the information stickiness α and of the
cost-push shocks persistence ρ, the degree of strategic complementarities
1 − ξ, and the coefficient of the implemented rule ι. The light surface in the
figure represents the combination of parameters for which inflation rises
from period 0 to period 1 (∆ > 0). Even if the analytical condition for grad-
ual inflation is not tractable, we are able to approximately describe the main
trend. The upper plot shows the influence of the information stickiness α
and of the cost-push shocks persistence ρ for inflation increase and is com-
puted with ξ = 0.1 and ι = 0.05. When the information spreads faster than
the shock vanishes, i.e. α is greater than 1− ρ, the impact of the shock on in-
flation is increasing between the initial period 0 and period 1. The lower plot
shows the influence of the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ and
the coefficient ι. We observe that inflation rises when complementarities are
rather strong. Indeed, as discussed above, it is the slow information dissem-
ination combined with the coordination motive of the pricing equation that
gives rise to the increasing inflation. As a result, when complementarities
are weak, inflation tends to fall over time. A large coefficient ι also reduces
the increase in inflation ∆. When ι is large, the output gap in period 0 is
large as well, which implies, according to equation (6.11), a lower inflation
in period 1. Consequently, a rule that keeps the output gap large relative to
inflation reduces the increasing effect of cost-push shocks on inflation.
Figure 6.2 displays the inflation increase over the first 20 periods follow-
ing the innovation. The difference ∆ = πt+1 − πt is computed with a degree
of strategic complementarities ξ = 0.1, a shock persistence ρ = 0.8, and
a rule coefficient ι = 0.05. Again the light area illustrates cases for which
inflation increases over time. The duration of the inflation increase is de-
termined by the speed of information dissemination. Unless information
spreads slower than the shock vanishes (in which case inflation never rises
except in the initial period), the duration of inflation increase is higher the
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Figure 6.1: Gradual impact on inflation in period one
slower the speed of dissemination. As underlined by Woodford (2003a),
the gradual characteristic of inflation dynamics relies on the lack of com-
mon knowledge among firms about shocks affecting the economy. Lower-
ing the speed of information dissemination accounts for reducing the de-
gree of common knowledge in every period what extends the duration of
increasing inflation.
6.2.3 Central bank’s policy objective
The policy objective describes the goals the central bank pursues by con-
ducting monetary policy. Following most of the literature on monetary pol-
icy analysis, we assume that the policy objective consists in minimizing the
weighted sum of the deviation of inflation π and output gap c from their
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Figure 6.2: Gradual impact on inflation over time
respective target values.15 Once the target values are normalized to zero,
the welfare loss of the central bank in any period t has the quadratic form
π2t + λc
2
t , where λ is a positive relative weight on output deviation. In any
period zero, the goal of the central bank is to minimize the discounted sum
of welfare losses
min
I
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb(π
2
t + λc
2
t ), (6.13)
owing to its instrument I , where βb is the central bank’s discount factor. The
policy objective guides the policy maker through the choice of the optimal
policy. One may think of two ways of rationalizing the central bank’s objec-
tive (6.13). Indeed, this objective can be motivated either by a pragmatic or
by a microfounded welfare theoretical perspective.16
The pragmatic approach rationalizes objective (6.13) by stressing two
well-known features. First, monetary policy is recognized to play a cru-
cial role in the determination of inflation. Central bankers are also aware
that inflation involves real costs for the economy as a whole. While Fischer
and Modigliani (1978) classify potential costs of inflation according to the
indexation of the economy,17 De Long (1997) argues that the experience of
15See Walsh (2003a).
16See Clarida et al. (1999) section 2.2.
17For instance, Fischer and Modigliani (1978) propose an overview of the potential costs
of inflation. They classify the costs of inflation according to the extent to which the economy
is indexed to inflation. In a fully indexed economy, the real effects of inflation are limited to
seigniorage, diversion of resources to transactions, and menu costs. Yet, when inflation is
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the 1970s awakened central bankers to the costs of high inflation.18 Hence,
the central bank should keep inflation under control. Second, as described
by Phillips curves, monetary policy may influence the real economy in the
short run. Models incorporate a combination of long-run monetary neu-
trality and short-run nominal inertia, such that monetary policy has a po-
tentially significant role in stabilizing the economy. Resting on these two
common ideas, the policy objective has been motivated in the literature in a
very intuitive way that clearly captures both central bank’s tasks: the con-
trol of inflation and the stabilization of output gap.
It is worth noting that the policy objective (6.13) has been recently ra-
tionalized into fully microfounded models motivating the policy objective
from the utility of a representative household. Indeed, by deriving microe-
conomic foundations of monetary policy analysis, one can show that the
welfare maximization of a representative agent calls for stabilization of both
the output gap (because of the concavity of household’s utility function and
Jensen’s inequality) and the relative price distortion across goods (because
price dispersion leads to inefficient substitution between goods).19 While
this result is robust, the determinants of the variance of relative price distor-
tion depend on the price setting scheme.
In the Calvo sticky-price model, Woodford (2003b) shows that the rel-
ative price distortion is related to the inflation squared. Since firms set
their price at different periods, price dispersion will be low when the op-
timal price path remains constant over time, i.e. when inflation is minimal.
It turns out that the optimal approximated welfare of the representative
household yields a policy objective in the form of (6.13).
Ball et al. (2005) derive the microfounded policy objective a central bank
should adopt in the case of sticky information. Since prices are flexible in
this economy, relative prices are distorted if agents do not share the same
information. In this context, the central bank should commit to a determin-
istic path for the price level in order to insure common information among
private agents. Whether the deterministic path is stationary, explosive, or
unanticipated or not fully indexed, the list of potential costs is much longer and includes –
to mention but a few – redistributive effects, forecast imprecision, and distortion of relative
prices.
18See also Shiller (1996).
19See Woodford (2003b), chapter 6.2.
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oscillatory is irrelevant in terms of welfare.20
However, the microfounded approach of central bank policy objective
has at least two limitations. First, these models do not seem to capture the
real costs of inflation as perceived by real world experiment. For instance,
in the sticky-price model, apart from its impact on relative price distortion,
inflation per se is costless. Second, the use of a representative household
may be misleading in deriving the welfare analysis related to monetary pol-
icy issues as it ignores the disparate effect of monetary policy across society
members. For instance, redistributive effects or forecast imprecisions are
absent from microfounded models. The microeconomic derivation of the
objective function is on a knife-edge: economists like their models to have
microeconomic foundations but microfounded objectives miss the real ef-
fects and costs of inflation as described by Fischer and Modigliani (1978),
Shiller (1996), and De Long (1997).
Therefore, in this chapter, we adopt the pragmatic approach as in most of
the literature. The central bank is assumed to care about inflation instead of
relative price distortion. We focus on the inflation targeting objective (6.13)
whatever the economy we refer to, even if it could be regarded as microe-
conomically inconsistent in the case of sticky information. This approach
is nevertheless consistent with concerns of central banks in the conduct of
monetary policy in reality.21
6.3 Optimal stabilization policy
The central bank’s optimal policy consists of choosing the time path of
inflation-output combinations that minimize its objective function (6.13),
which is subject to the constraints characterized either by the sticky-price
Phillips curve (6.6) or by the sticky-information Phillips curve (6.10). We
define the optimal monetary policy as a “specific targeting rule” in the sense
of Svensson (2003). Such rules are expressed as an operational condition for
the target variables (π and c) or for forecasts of the target variables. This
20Note that alternative information diffusion schemes may lead to different welfare func-
tion. For instance, Adam (2006) analyzes monetary policy when firms have limited capacity
to process information (following Sims (2003)) and shows that stationary price level target-
ing minimizes the price dispersion across firms.
21See King and Wolman (1996) for example.
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allows us to define the optimal path of economic outcomes without specify-
ing the monetary instrument path that the central bank would implement.
We abstract from the interest rate or money supply required for implemen-
tation. One can however obtain the implied optimal interest rate rule by
substituting the inflation-output gap combination resulting from the spe-
cific targeting rule in an IS (or aggregate-spending) equation. Or, the im-
plied money supply can be obtained by substituting the inflation-output
gap combination in a quantity-theory equation. Since there is currently no
consensus about the right specification of the demand side model (in partic-
ular of the right IS curve) we leave the demand side unspecified.
We first present the canonical optimal specific targeting rule derived
from the sticky-price economy and then turn to the rule in the case of sticky
information. While our analysis focuses on the unconstrained optimal mon-
etary policy under commitment, we also present alternative monetary pol-
icy designs, namely discretion, myopia, and re-optimized commitment. Con-
trary to standard literature which distinguishes only discretion from com-
mitment, we introduce myopia which gives useful insights for the sticky-
information economy.
6.3.1 Sticky-price economy
The private sector of a sticky-price economy is forward-looking. In a
forward-looking system, the present outcome depends not only on the cur-
rent policy but also on current expectations of future events that will be
driven by future policy. The way how the private sector builds its expec-
tations about future events plays an essential role in this environment. In
particular, the extent to which the central bank can influence private sec-
tor’s expectations about its future monetary policy determines the current
economic outcome.22
Commitment We first derive the optimal monetary policy under the
assumption that the central bank can commit to implement in the future the
policy it announces at the date of policy optimization. Under commitment,
the central bank accounts for its ability to influence private sector’s expecta-
22Currie and Levine (1993) propose a methodology to derive the optimal policy in
forward-looking models.
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tions because a precommitment technology is assumed to exist. At the time
of optimization, the central bank chooses once and for all the optimal path
of inflation-output combinations that minimize its expected loss given by
(6.13) subject to the current and future Phillips curves in the form of (6.6).
The optimization problem is given by the following Lagrangian:
L0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
{
(π2t + λc
2
t ) + µt
[
πt − κct − βEtπt+1 − ut
]}
, (6.14)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Phillips curve. Dif-
ferentiating with respect to πt and ct for any t ≥ 0 yields the first-order
conditions
∂L0
∂πt
= 2πt + µt − µt−1 = 0
∂L0
∂ct
= 2λct + µtκ = 0,
for all t ≥ 0, with the initial condition µ0 = 0. Combining both first-order
conditions together, the commitment solution for a central bank optimizing
(6.14) at date t = 0 is given by
ct = −
κ
λ
πt t = 0 and (6.15)
ct − ct−1 = −
κ
λ
πt t = 1, 2, . . . . (6.16)
The commitment solution is determined by two different conditions. At
the date of optimization, the monetary policy is given by condition (6.15)
according to which the central bank contracts the output gap in response
to inflationary pressure. This rule is independent from past endogeneous
variables. By contrast, the optimal monetary policy for periods subsequent
to the date of optimization is given by condition (6.16) according to which
the central bank implements a positive inflation whenever the output gap
growth is negative. This policy rule minimizes the expected loss (6.13)
caused by a positive cost-push shock because it reduces current firms’ ex-
pectations about future inflation. Indeed, by announcing the targeting rule
(6.16) the central bank commits to create a deflation when the output gap
growth will be positive (i.e. when the negative output gap will converge to
zero) what lowers the current expectation about future inflation and thereby
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the optimal price setting of firms in the initial period. As a result, the tar-
geting rule under commitment is history-dependent in the sense of Wood-
ford (1999a): the optimal monetary policy is a function of the previous
output gap in a way “that is unrelated to any constraints that past events im-
pose upon what is technically achievable in the present” (p. 282).23 History-
dependence leads the central bank to implement a deflation after inflation
episodes. Firms’ expectations about future deflation reduce the current in-
flation, which improves welfare.
However, once it has reaped the benefit of firms’ expectations about de-
flation, the central bank faces the temptation to deceive the private sector
by renouncing to implement deflation. The optimal monetary policy un-
der commitment suffers from time inconsistency since it yields a special
condition for the initial period with respect to the condition for the subse-
quent periods. Time inconsistency arises because the initial action can be
chosen independently of the policy the central bank commits to (it fails to
be history-dependent). The policy implemented by the central bank at the
date of optimization must not satisfy any consistency with respect to the
announcement it makes. Therefore, even in the present environment of per-
fect information, private agents cannot control whether the announcement
made by the central bank about future economic conditions is consistent
with the policy the central bank really plans to implement in the future. If
the central bank re-optimizes its Lagrangian later on, it would find it opti-
mal to implement condition (6.15) in that period, even if it had committed
itself to implementing (6.16) at the previous optimization date. That is what
McCallum (2003) calls “strategic incoherence”: at the date of optimization,
“the optimizing central bank can see that, if it were to apply the same optimizing
procedure again in the future, it would choose to depart from the plan that it is now
choosing” (p. 4). As a result, a re-optimizing central bank would implement
in all periods the condition (6.15) which fails to drive firms’ expectations in
an optimal way.
To cope with strategic incoherence, Woodford (1999a) proposes to con-
duct monetary policy under a timeless perspective according to which the cen-
tral bank should implement in the optimizing period the policy that would
have been optimal to commit to far away in the past. This comes to im-
23See also Woodford (1999b).
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plement condition (6.16) in the initial period as well. However, since the
optimal commitment policy is given by the rules (6.15) in the initial period
and (6.16) in the subsequent periods, Sauer (2006) shows that, under some
conditions, implementing (6.16) in the initial and subsequent periods (time-
less perspective) may yield a worst economic outcome than implementing
(6.15) in all periods (discretion).
Discretion Discretionary monetary policy is related to the case where
no precommitment technology exists. In the absence of any precommit-
ment technology, a central bank cannot credibly influence beliefs and con-
sequently takes private sector expectations as given. The strategic interac-
tions between the central bank and the private sector do not have to be spec-
ified.24 The central bank optimizes its Lagrangian by ignoring its influence
on the expectation term Etπt+1. In other words, the Phillips curve, under
discretion, can be written as πt = κct + qt, where qt stands for the values the
central bank takes as given, i.e. βEtπt+1 + ut. The discretionary Lagrangian
becomes
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
{
(π2t + λc
2
t ) + µt
[
πt − κct − qt
]}
, (6.17)
and the optimization yields the following inflation-output combination:
ct = −
κ
λ
πt ∀t. (6.18)
The discretionary central bank contracts the output whenever inflation is
positive and expands it whenever inflation is too low. The discretionary so-
lution is time consistent. Whether the central bank optimizes its Lagrangian
(6.17) once and for all at date t = 0 or re-optimizes it later on does not alter
the optimality of the condition. The optimal discretionary condition (6.18)
coincides with condition (6.15) that is optimal in the initial period under
commitment. The discretionary policy is equivalent to the policy resulting
from a central bank under commitment re-optimizing at each successive
date.
24Another way to understand discretion, is to say that the central bank moves after the
private sector has built its expectation. See Stokey (1989).
163
Myopia Apart from the usual discretion and commitment solutions, it is
worthwhile, at this point, to introduce a third type of policy: the myopic so-
lution. We define as myopic a central bank that chooses it monetary policy
in order to minimize the current welfare loss exclusively and ignores the
welfare losses in the future periods. Whether a precommitment technology
exists or not, has no relevance in this type of policy. The myopic solution
is often assimilated, by simplicity, to discretion. The myopic policy design
is associated with the case where the discount factor of the central bank βb
approaches zero. The optimal myopic solution is the inflation-output com-
bination that minimizes the current loss π2t +λc
2
t under the current restriction
(6.6) and is given by
ct = −
κ
λ
πt ∀t.
We recognize that the myopic condition coincides with both the discre-
tionary and the initial commitment condition. This statement may help ex-
plain why the absence of a precommitment technology, the policy re-optimization,
and myopia of the central bank are often interchangeably used.25 However, we
show in the next section that each scenario leads to distinct first-order con-
ditions in the sticky-information economy.
6.3.2 Sticky-information economy
We derive in this section the optimal monetary policy for the sticky-
information economy. As in the sticky-price economy, the current economic
outcome depends on firms’ expectations. This gives rise to potentially dif-
ferent outcomes according to the extent the central bank manages to influ-
ence firms’ belief. The current economic outcome is driven by firms’ past
expectations about the current state of the economy. This sharply contrasts
with the sticky-price model where the current outcome is determined by
current expectations about future inflation. We focus on the optimal mone-
tary policy under commitment and under myopia.26 The central bank of the
25For example, McCallum (1995) says that the discretionary solution concerns the case
where “there is no precommitment technology available to the unconstrained central bank” and,
in the same paper, that a discretionary central bank “minimizes (its loss) on a period-by-period
basis (...).”
26Note that an analytical solution for discretionary policy is not available because the
previous output gap is a state variable in the sticky-information Phillips curve and because
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sticky-information economy chooses the path of inflation-output combina-
tions that minimizes its welfare loss (6.13) subject to the sticky-information
Phillips curves in the form of (6.10). As in the former section, the optimiza-
tion problem at date t = 0 can be determined by the following Lagrangian:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
{
(π2t +λc
2
t )+µt
[
πt−
αξ
1 − α
ct−α
∞∑
j=0
(1−α)jEt−1−j(πt +ξ∆ct)−ut
]}
,
(6.19)
where µt is the Lagrange parameter.
Myopia A myopic central bank minimizes its current loss exclusively
and ignores its future losses (i.e. the discount factor of the central bank βb
approaches zero). In this case, the central bank minimizes the current loss
π2t + λc
2
t under the current restriction πt =
αξ
1−α
ct + qt, where qt = α
∑
∞
j=0(1−
α)jEt−1−j(πt + ξ∆ct) + ut and stands for the variables that the central bank
cannot influence. The myopic central bank ignores the impact of its current
policy on future economic outcomes. The optimization process yields the
following myopic condition:
ct = −
αξ
λ(1 − α)
πt ∀t. (6.20)
According to this policy, the central bank implements a positive output gap
whenever inflation is below its target (and a negative output gap whenever
inflation is above its target). This condition is similar to the standard discre-
tionary policy under sticky price. But as we see below, the myopic solution
does not coincide with the optimal condition for the initial period of com-
mitment under sticky information.
Commitment Under commitment, the central bank commits itself once
and for all to implement a path of inflation-output combinations. The com-
mitment solution describes the unconstrained optimal policy path that min-
imizes (6.19) when a precommitment technology is assumed to exist. Differ-
entiating (6.19) with respect to πt and ct for any t ≥ 0 yields the first-order
the corresponding value function is time-varying (information spreads over time). Jensen
(2005) keeps out of this problem by ignoring the state variable in the sticky-information
Phillips curve in an ad hoc way.
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conditions
∂L0
∂πt
= 2πt +
(
1 − α
t−1∑
j=0
(1 − α)j
)
µt = 0
∂L0
∂ct
= 2λct − αξ
t∑
j=0
(1 − α)j−1µt + αβξ
t∑
j=0
(1 − α)jµt+1 = 0,
for all t ≥ 0. Combining these conditions together, we get the following
consolidated first-order conditions:
ct =
αξ
λ(1 − α)
(βbEtπt+1 − πt) for t = 0,
ct =
αξ
λ(1 − α)
(
1 +
1
1 − α
)
(βbEtπt+1 − πt) for t = 1,
ct =
αξ
λ(1 − α)
(
1 +
1
1 − α
+
1
(1 − α)2
)
(βbEtπt+1 − πt) for t = 2,
and so on. Let these optimal conditions be re-written more compactly as
ct =
ξ
λ
( 1
(1 − α)t+1
− 1
)
(βbEtπt+1 − πt) ∀t. (6.21)
We note that the commitment condition for every period is special. The
impact of an announcement on private sector’s expectations increases over
time as announcements refer to dates further in the future. An announce-
ment made in period x about period x + 2 benefits from a higher dissemi-
nation through the population than an announcement made in period x + 1
about period x + 2. As a result, the policy the central bank commits to ac-
counts for its impact on firms’ expectations.
As in the sticky-price model, the commitment solution suffers from time
inconsistency. This arises because of the progressive information dissemi-
nation: since firms’ expectations about current outcome have been mainly
formed in the past, the central bank has an incentive to deceive firms by
re-optimizing its policy considering past expectations as given. This arises
because the plan the central bank committed to in previous periods about
the current policy accounted for its impact on past expectations, while in
the current period the current policy has no impact on expectations since
they have been determined in the past. If the central bank re-optimizes its
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Lagrangian (6.19) in a subsequent period, it will find it optimal to adjust
its plans accordingly. However, in contrast to the sticky-price model, there
is no immediate benefit of commitment in the stick-information economy.
Since information progressively spreads through the population, the benefit
of commitment depends on the share of the population whose expectations
have been influenced by the policy the central bank committed to. This has
strong implications for the implementation and credibility of commitment
because the central bank cannot reap the benefit of commitment in the initial
period as in the sticky-price model but must wait that information spreads.
As discussed below, the central bank implements in the first periods un-
der commitment a policy that is inferior to the myopic policy and benefits
from commitment only in subsequent periods. This should make it easier to
achieve a credible commitment policy in the sticky-information model than
in the sticky-price one.
6.4 Economic outcomes
After having derived the optimal targeting rules for central banks un-
der different types of policy design for both the sticky-price and sticky-
information economies, we discuss the resulting economic outcomes. In
particular, we describe the inflation and output gap responses to cost-push
shocks under alternative policy designs and address issues about price level
stationarity and credibility of commitment. Impulse responses are simu-
lated with the Matlab-codes for solving rational expectation models devel-
oped by Jensen and McCallum.
6.4.1 Sticky-price economy
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the economic development over 40 periods
in response to a cost-push innovation u1 = ǫ1 = 1 in period t = 1 under
discretion (according to the targeting rule (6.18)) and commitment (accord-
ing to the targeting rule (6.16)), respectively. The coefficient of correlation of
cost-push shocks is assumed to be ρ = 0.8. We think of a period as a quarter.
The probability of a price adjustment in every period is set to α = 0.5 and
the degree of strategic complementarity to 1 − ξ = 0.9. This implies that
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Figure 6.3: Sticky-price: Response to cost-push shocks under discretionary
policy
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Figure 6.4: Sticky-price: Response to cost-push shocks under commitment
private agents update their information twice a year on average. We choose
a central bank’s and firms’ discount factor βb = β = 0.99 that corresponds to
a real interest rate of 4% a year. The central bank equally weights inflation
and output gap deviations in its objective, so λ = 1/16 since a period is a
quarter.
The central bank is supposed to optimize its Lagrangian (6.14) at the date
of the innovation.
The cumulative loss (6.13) over 40 periods is lower under commitment
than under discretion and amounts to 36.83 and 60.09, respectively. The loss
is lower under commitment because the central bank reduces the private
sector’s expectation about future inflation by credibly committing to imple-
ment a deflation when the output gap will converge to its steady state.
Under both discretion and commitment the cost-push innovation has no
gradual impact on inflation: inflation is maximal at the date the innovation
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occurs. However, we note three intertwined differences between economic
outcomes under discretion and under commitment. First, while inflation is
always nonnegative under discretion, the central bank acting under com-
mitment implements a deflation after some periods. Second, the output gap
is U-shaped under commitment (while it is symmetric to inflation under
discretion). Third, the price level is stationary under commitment but not
under discretion. Appendix 6.A formally shows that the price level con-
verges to zero under commitment but not under discretion. Under discre-
tion, both inflation and the output gap converge to their steady state value
after having reached their maximal deviation at the date of the innovation.
By contrast, under commitment, inflation is rapidly brought back to zero
and then turns to be negative. As a result, the output gap contraction is
much more severe and inflation lower under commitment. Discretionary
policy yields an excess inflation that results from the so-called stabilization
bias.27 Vestin (2003) demonstrates that the optimal monetary policy of an
inflation targeting central bank acting under commitment can be replicated
by the discretionary policy of a central bank targeting the price level. This
arises because price targeting ensures price level stationarity even under
discretion.28
The upper panel of figure 6.5 compares the loss under commitment to
the loss under discretion over 40 periods. It turns out that commitment
yields lower losses in the first nine periods but at the cost of higher losses in
subsequent periods. This feature questions the credibility of commitment
since the central bank has no incentive to contract the output gap for the
price level to return to its initial level once it has reaped the benefit of com-
mitment.
6.4.2 Sticky-information economy
We compute the impulse responses of the sticky-information economy to
a cost-push innovation u1 = ǫ1 = 1 in period t = 1. Again, the central bank
optimizes its Lagrangian (6.19) at the date of the innovation. The sticky-
information Phillips curve (6.10) must be computed with a finite number
27See Clarida et al. (1999).
28In a similar exercise, Walsh (2003b) argues that speed limit targeting policies (variation
of output gap) are superior to inflation or price level targeting when the Phillips curve is
not purely forward looking but contains some backward-looking variables.
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Figure 6.5: Loss under commitment minus loss under discretion
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Figure 6.6: Sticky-information: Response to cost-push shocks (ρ = 0.8) un-
der myopia
of lagged expectations. We insert 30 lagged expectations in the Phillips
curve. This means that the first 30 simulated periods are exact computation
of the sticky-information model and that the subsequent periods remain cal-
culated with 30 lags only. Since the probability of information update is set
to α = 0.25, this approximation is robust as more than 99.98% of the popula-
tion gets informed about the initial innovation with 30 lagged expectations.
Following Mankiw and Reis (2002), we set the probability of information
update α to 0.25 and the degree of strategic complementarity 1 − ξ to 0.9.
This implies that private agents update their information once a year on av-
erage. We choose a central bank’s discount factor βb = 0.99 that corresponds
to a real interest rate of 4% a year. The central bank is assumed to equally
weight inflation and output gap deviations in its objective, so λ = 1/16. We
consider two degrees of shock persistence, ρ = 0.6 and ρ = 0.8.
As discussed in section 6.2.2, since the speed of information dissemina-
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Figure 6.7: Sticky-information: Response to cost-push shocks (ρ = 0.6) un-
der myopia
tion is α = 0.25, the correlation of cost-push shocks ρ = 0.6 illustrates the
case where the shock declines faster than information spreads: cost-push
shocks are not expected to yield a gradual impact on inflation. By contrast,
the impact of shocks on inflation is expected to be gradual with the correla-
tion of ρ = 0.8 (information spreads faster than the shock vanishes).
Myopia Figures 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate the impulse responses for a my-
opic central bank (targeting rule (6.20)) with the coefficients of correlation
of cost-push shocks ρ = 0.8 and ρ = 0.6, respectively.
Under myopia, the central bank contracts the output gap whenever in-
flation is above target and proportionally to inflation deviation. The degree
of shocks persistence ρ determines whether inflation (and the output gap)
rises over time or whether it reaches its maximum at the date of the innova-
tion. Apart from the possible gradual increase in deviation over time when
shocks persistence is high relative to the speed of information dissemina-
tion, the economic outcome under myopia in the sticky-information model
is qualitatively similar to discretion in the sticky-price model. Inflation and
output gap evolve symmetrically, and the price level is not stationary but at-
tains a higher level after the occurrence of a positive cost-push innovation.
The persistence of shocks has a large implication in terms of welfare.
While the cumulative loss (6.13) over 40 periods amounts to 2.72 when the
persistence is set to ρ = 0.6, it amounts to 111.42 with ρ = 0.8. Alterna-
tively, for a given degree of shocks persistence, reducing the speed of infor-
mation dissemination weakens the hump-shape path of inflation (or even
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Figure 6.8: Sticky-information: Response to cost-push shocks (ρ = 0.8) un-
der commitment
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Figure 6.9: Sticky-information: Response to cost-push shocks (ρ = 0.6) un-
der commitment
eliminates it totally) and reduces thereby the cumulative loss. As a result,
a communication policy that tends to reduce the speed of information dis-
semination improves welfare.
Commitment Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the impulse responses for a
central bank acting under commitment (targeting rule (6.21)) with the co-
efficients of correlation of the cost-push shocks ρ = 0.8 and ρ = 0.6, respec-
tively.
Again, the degree of persistence of shocks determines whether inflation
rises over time and has a large impact on welfare. The cumulative loss
amounts to 2.69 when the persistence is ρ = 0.6 and to 27.32 when ρ = 0.8.
Comparing these losses with that under myopia, it turns out that commit-
ment is particularly beneficial when cost-push shocks are highly persis-
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tent and have a gradual impact on inflation (or when information spreads
slowly). Indeed, the cumulative loss under commitment represents 98.89%
and 24.52% of that under myopia when ρ = 0.6 and ρ = 0.8, respectively.
When cost-push shocks are highly persistent, figure 6.8 shows that the
central bank finds it optimal not to contract the output gap in the first pe-
riods following the cost-push innovation. The central bank even slightly
expands the output gap as long as inflation increases. This arises because,
as equation (6.10) indicates, inflation is a function of the expected output
gap growth. Hence, expanding the output gap in the first periods allows
the central bank to strongly fight inflation later on by then contracting the
output gap in a larger extent than it would be able to do if the output gap
would not be slightly positive. Interestingly, this result suggests that the
central bank waits that information largely spreads among the population
to fight inflation by contracting the output gap. That is to say that the cen-
tral bank does not find it optimal to implement a contractive policy as long
as information dissemination is low.29
When cost-push shocks are slightly persistent, figure 6.9 shows that the
central bank never expands the output gap in response to the cost-push
innovation. However, the strength of the output gap contraction increases
in the first periods suggesting that information dissemination reinforces the
desire of the central bank to fight inflation by creating a stronger recession.
One can easily show that the cumulative loss increases with the speed
of information dissemination.30 Faster dissemination increases the degree
of common knowledge of cost-push shocks and exacerbates firms’ reaction
to them. While there is no role for central bank’s communication in the
present model, this analysis suggests however that increasing transparency
about cost-push shocks is welfare detrimental. This conclusion is in line
with chapter 5 that explicitly addresses the question of central bank’s com-
munication.
The price level is not stationary in the sticky-information even under
commitment. As the first and third panels of figures 6.8 and 6.9 show, the
29This result seems to support our analysis of chatper 4. In that chapter, we argue that
opacity of the central bank with respect to its instrument can rationalize an accommodating
monetary policy in response to a positive cost-push shock.
30For example, the cumulative loss under commitment when the cost-push shock persis-
tence is ρ = 0.8 accounts to 40.47 with an information dissemination speed of α = 0.3 and
to 19.65 with α = 0.22.
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central bank never implements a deflation and the price level does not re-
turn to its initial value. This result sharply contrasts with the sticky-price
economy where the central bank commits to implement a deflation later
on to reduce the current expectation of firms about future inflation. Since
the sticky-information economy is not forward-looking, committing to im-
plement a deflation in the future has no beneficial impact on welfare. This
has some implication for the credibility of commitment with sticky informa-
tion. While the central bank in the sticky-price economy faces the tempta-
tion to reap the benefit of commitment in the first periods without imple-
menting the promised deflation in subsequent periods, the central bank in
the sticky-information economy benefits from commitment in subsequent
periods only at the cost of lower welfare in the first periods following the
cost-push innovation. As the second panel of figure 6.5 illustrates, the loss
under commitment is larger than that under myopia in the first nine periods
and smaller afterwards. This does not remove the strategic incoherence and
the temptation of the central bank to depart from the announced commit-
ment by re-optimizing its policy later on (and considering past expectations
as given), but the central bank can benefit from commitment at some initial
costs.
6.5 Conclusion
Most of monetary policy analysis in the past has focused on an econ-
omy with monetary nonneutrality arising because of time-contingent price
setting. Yet, the sticky-price model makes counterfactual predictions about
the effects of monetary policy on inflation. One may therefore question the
pertinence of monetary policy recommendations drawn from a model that
clearly contradicts empirical evidence. As Mankiw and Reis (2002) show,
substituting stickiness in price setting by stickiness in information updat-
ing yields a model that performs better at fitting the stylized facts about the
output-inflation trade-off.
This chapter presents some implications for the optimal monetary pol-
icy in the case of inflation targeting when monetary nonneutrality arises be-
cause of information stickiness. The main distinction between both sticky-
price and sticky-information model relies on how expectations influence in-
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flation. While current expectations about future inflation influence current
inflation in the sticky-price economy, it is past expectations about current
inflation (and output gap) that matter for current inflation in the sticky-
information economy.
The absence of forward-looking variables in the sticky-information Phillips
curve has strong implications for the stationarity of the price level. While
the central bank of the sticky-price economy acting under commitment im-
plements a deflation after inflation episodes in order to ensure price level
stationarity, the central bank of the sticky-information economy does not
commit to balance inflation with subsequent deflation. As a result, the
price level is not stationary in the sticky-information economy. The history-
dependence of the optimal targeting rule under commitment accounts for
the price level stationarity in the sticky-price economy. The central bank
commits to return to the initial price level for reducing current expecta-
tions about future inflation. But since the sticky-information Phillips curve
is not forward-looking, committing to price level stationarity does not im-
prove the trade-off the central bank faces. As a result, the optimal target-
ing rule under commitment in the sticky-information model is not history-
dependent but forward-looking.
Our analysis emphasizes the relevance of the persistence of cost-push
shocks relative to the speed of information dissemination through the popu-
lation for the impulse response of inflation and for the conduct of monetary
policy. We show that cost-push shocks have a gradual impact on inflation
only in the extent that information spreads faster among firms than shocks
vanish. The response of the central bank also depends on the information
dissemination in the population. The strength of output gap contraction in
response to a positive cost-push innovation increases with information dis-
semination. In the particular case where cost-push shocks have a gradual
impact on inflation, the central bank finds it optimal to wait some periods
that information spreads before fighting inflation with strong output gap
contractions. Hence, the central bank expands the economy as long as the
private sector has poor information. This suggests that central banks should
take the persistence of shocks and the speed of information dissemination
into serious consideration for conducting their policy.
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6.A Appendix: Price level stationarity under com-
mitment in the sticky-price economy
This section shows that the optimal monetary policy under commitment
in response to cost-push shocks leads to price level stationarity.
In order to show this property of the sticky-price Phillips curve, it is
useful to rewrite (6.6) as an expectational difference equation
βEtpt+1 − (1 + β)pt + pt−1 = −(κct + ut) (6.22)
and solve it by the method explained in Sargent (1987). First, we express
with an asterisk all variables expected at date t. Second, we use the lag
operator l defined by lEtpt = Etpt−1 and its inverse, the forward operator
f = l−1. (6.22) can then be rewritten as
(
βf2 − (1 + β)f + 1
)
lp∗t = −(κc
∗
t + u
∗
t ). (6.23)
The quadratic expression (βx2− (1+β)x+1) has two positive roots, namely
1 and 1
β
. Then (6.23) becomes
β(f − 1)(f −
1
β
)lp∗t = −(κc
∗
t + ut)
β(f − 1)(fβ − 1)lp∗t = −β(κc
∗
t + ut)
(1 − l)p∗t = (1 − fβ)
−1(κc∗t + ut)
pt = pt−1 +
∞∑
j=0
βjEt(κct+j + ut+j). (6.24)
We seek to determine the price level at some period T sufficiently far
away after the realisation of a cost-push shock u0. More particularly, we
show that inflation has an additive permanent effect on the price level un-
der discretionary monetary policy while the price level returns to its initial
position under commitment.
Substituting the discretionary first-order condition (6.18) into (6.24) yields
pT = pT−1 + κ
(
−
κ
λ
(pT − pT−1)
)
+ uT +
∞∑
j=1
βjET (κcT+j + uT+j)
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(
1 +
κ2
λ
)
pT =
(
1 +
κ2
λ
)
pT−1 + uT +
∞∑
j=1
βjET (κcT+j + uT+j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
. (6.25)
Setting T sufficiently large, equation (6.25) expresses the price level in a pe-
riod where the real economy is not affected by the cost-push shock u0 any
more. Future output gaps and cost-push shocks can be approximated to be
zero: limT→∞ δ = 0. The price level development does not converge to its
initial value of zero since pT = pT−1. Inflation is however stabilized at zero.
We now substitute successively the first-order condition under commit-
ment (6.16) into (6.24). This yields
pT = pT−1 − κ
(κ
λ
(pT − pT−1) − cT−1
)
+ uT +
∞∑
j=1
βjET (κcT+j + uT+j)
(
1 +
κ2
λ
)
pT =
(
1 +
κ2
λ
)
pT−1 − κ
(κ
λ
(pT−1 − pT−2) − cT−2
)
+ δ
= pT−1 + κ
(κ
λ
pT−2 −
κ
λ
(pT−2 − pT−3) + cT−3
)
+ δ
(
1 +
κ2
λ
)
pT = pT−1 + δ. (6.26)
Expression (6.26) indicates that the price level converges toward its initial
level of zero with speed λ
λ+κ2
: the price level is stationary when the mone-
tary policy is conducted under commitment.
As equation (6.25) indicates and figure 6.3 illustrates, the discretionary
monetary policy stabilizes inflation but not the price level: its remains higher
than its initial level after the shock has occured. By contrast, equation (6.26)
and figure 6.4 show that the price level returns to its initial level under com-
mitment.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis addresses issues of monetary policy in the context of strategic
complementarities under imperfect common knowledge and underlines the
relevance of central bank’s communication.
In particular, our main contributions are to show that
• central bank’s transparency deteriorates the precision of its informa-
tion and disclosure when the central bank assesses economic condi-
tions by observing the economy,
• central bank’s transparency stabilizes the economy when the central
bank implements a monetary instrument based on poorly accurate in-
formation,
• the optimal monetary instrument is a function of central bank’s com-
munication strategy,
• central bank’s opacity increases the cost of stabilizing inflation (in terms
of output gap) and rationalizes an accommodating response to cost-
push shocks,
• central bank’s transparency exacerbates firms’ reaction to cost-push
shocks, which is welfare detrimental.
As argued by Geraats (2002), “the desirability of central bank’s transparency
depends crucially on the specific context” (p. 536). Our analysis focuses on dif-
ferent mechanisms and draws different, sometimes opposite, conclusions.
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Our results seem however to be robust to the way imperfect common knowl-
edge is formalized. For instance, we show that many conclusions of chap-
ters 4 and 5 where all firms have imperfect differential information are ro-
bust to the model of chapter 6 where some firms have perfect information
while others have no information.
An interesting direction for future research would be to develop a model
that simultaneously accounts for various aspects discussed in this thesis. In
particular, we foresee a model where the central bank observes the econ-
omy to glean information about economic conditions (endogeneous infor-
mation), and chooses its optimal monetary instrument and disclosure to sta-
bilize the economy.
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